

1. Since 2003 (i.e. in the course of just four years), the European Union has launched or successfully completed **15 operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**, of which 11 have been civilian or civilian/military and 4 military in combination with civilian operations. On 15 June 2007 it launched its 16th operation with the civilian police and Rule of Law Mission in Afghanistan.
2. Another large-scale police and Rule of Law operation has already been planned **for Kosovo** once the EU receives a mandate to succeed the United Nations mission there (UNMIK).
3. **Some 10.000 men and women have been deployed in the EU's operations to date**, including police officers from all the EU Member States, soldiers, judges. The Kosovo operation will involve around 1800 police officers and experts. In Afghanistan, some 200 men and women will be deployed, including those contributed by non-EU Member States.
4. The dimension of all these operations is remarkable **in both geographical and thematic terms**: on three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia), they cover a spectrum ranging from military peacekeeping through police missions to establish and reform police structures in crisis-ridden countries to operations to support the reform of the security sector in fragile nations and the establishment of functioning institutions.
5. In the course of just a few years, the EU has thus developed **into a global security player**. Ever since it came into being at the 1999 Cologne European Council, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), **has been seeking to achieve an integrated civilian/military approach to crisis management**. The *European Security Strategy*

(ESS) established in December 2003 provides the political-conceptual framework for that.

6. The crux of it lies in the **conviction that complex, multinational challenges require cohesive, multinational responses**. Sustained stabilisation of crisis regions therefore requires the following: timely intervention, and ideally prevention (including *preventive engagement*); a clear definition of the political and strategic *end state* sought; the development of a clear roadmap and a well thought-out *exit strategy*; the correct deployment and best possible coordination of civilian and military instruments, tailored to the individual nature of a conflict or crisis region; and, finally, mutually-agreed, effective cooperation with international partners, in particular the United Nations (UN), the USA, NATO and the African Union (AU). What is at stake is an international order, based on "effective multilateralism".

7. The United Nations Security Council is the central source of legitimacy and the hub of the international response mechanism. The EU considers a UNSC resolution as the most desirable legal base for collective action. Acting as a regional arrangement the EU has set itself the task of supporting overall UN objectives and in particular in its peacemaking efforts. On the basis of the Joint declaration of 03, a senior/level political dialogue has been initiated supported by on/going contacts at the secretariat level. These contacts are particularly intensive in preparing for a possible transition in Kosovo.

8. All our practical experiences of deployment have shown that almost **every military crisis management operation has to lead to or be embedded in a large-scale civilian effort if it is ultimately to be successful**. Conversely, **many civilian missions require military expertise, support or protection**. Stabilisation and reconstruction in crisis regions can seldom be achieved without military assistance or

protection. In the context of the overall approach to crisis management, the EU's military instrument therefore plays an important but limited role.

9. The EU's Member States have access not only to troops, but also to a multitude of civilian resources and crisis intervention capabilities. Our efforts are therefore focused on reconstruction, the long-term strengthening of institutions, reform of the security sectors of fragile States (in particular, reform of the armed forces and police and their democratic supervision), economic support and "help for self-help".

Security and development are two sides of the same coin. The objective is long-term political stabilisation.

10. Of course, the EU's development aid has an external and security policy dimension; conversely, ESDP operations may create the prerequisites for or benefit from long-term Commission projects. There is therefore broad agreement that the **EU must put up a fully coordinated front to the outside world and improve its overall effectiveness. Unity and consistency are essential if the EU is to be credible and effective in its external dealings.**

10. The EU's observer mission **in ACEH** (Sumatra/Indonesia) is an example. Whereas the Council directed the Monitoring Mission, the EP led an Election Observation Mission and the peace process receives continuing support from Community development programs aimed at reintegration and post-tsunami reconstruction.

11. **Key to this is civilian/military coordination** and the targeted planning of the civilian and military instruments provided for not only under the ESDP, but also under the EU's first and second pillars – whether in Brussels, in and between the capitals or "in the field". Clearly, this can be achieved only on the basis of a uniform understanding of the specific political objective and a joint strategy linking short-term

operations to long-term programmes. **We need an overall joint reflection and planning culture**, together with the appropriate structures and efficient procedures to make funding rapidly available. **The EU's Reform Treaty** will, it is hoped, constitute a milestone in progress towards uniform planning and consistent external action by the EU. However, there is much to do before then.

12. Our internal reflections on reform within the Council Secretariat are currently focusing on two areas:

- (1) If we are to act in a considered and well-prepared manner and have time for a swift and measured response, the development of strategic options and integrated planning are indispensable and must be both civilian/military and cross-pillar in nature. A significant step has been taken in that direction **with the formation of the *Civilian/Military Cell*** within the EU Military Staff. In that Cell, diplomats, officers and Commission officials work efficiently together in mixed teams. If a rapid and flexible (but also appropriate and effective) response is also to be possible, the civilian and military sides need to coordinate closely with each another beyond management levels in establishing parallel plans. **With the new *EU Operations Centre***, a central planning and management capability has been available for this purpose in Brussels since the beginning of 2007.
- (2) 12. The development of the military management capability has its civilian counterpart: the conduct of civil operations is currently the responsibility of a *Head of Mission* in the country of operation. Often an *EUSR* is appointed in the area to strengthen co-ordination and cohesion. With a view to the professional management of ambitious civilian operations, **the EU is now setting up a fully trained, layered command organisation for civilian operations, modelled on the military command structure. In future, a *Civilian Operations Commander* will direct all *Heads of Missions***. He will be assisted in that task by his own staff, which will function as a civilian headquarters. All the basic elements of a central, civilian/military planning and management capability are

therefore present in Brussels, in full compliance with the overall requirements of our security and defence policy.