Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations:

Integrated Missions Revisited

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
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Preface

The concluding conference in Oslo (29–30 October 2007) marked the end of a series of regional seminars held around the world during the course of 2007. The regional seminars constituted a substantial and serious effort by Norway and partner governments such as China and South Africa to ensure that regional perspectives were fully incorporated in the process. Although each seminar had a slightly different focus, the reflections, analysis and recommendations offered by the participants at the different seminars were broadly similar. [i]

The conference was opened by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre. Mr Støre set the stage by underlining the urgency for improving the effectiveness and impact of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in the field, and the importance of bringing coherence to the current situation, in which the demand for UN peacekeeping is greater than the supply. He pointed out that the UN has come a long way in strengthening its capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while noting that there are still many challenges to be met and improvements to be made.

The two-day conference had an ambitious agenda. Actors from a wide range of political, operational and organizational areas provided significant input with their experience and expertise. Discussions were both theoretical and results-oriented. The proceedings from the regional seminars and a preliminary synthesis of findings from the full series of seminars had been distributed to the participants in advance in order to focus the conference discussions. As a result, discussions were largely guided by the underlying question of how to improve and implement an integrated approach, rather than the question of why and whether integration was desirable. The participants primarily focused on identifying lessons learned and barriers and enablers to increasing integration. [ii]

Executive Summary

The final and concluding conference of the Project on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, which was held in Oslo from 29 to 30 October 2007, was the culmination of a series of six regional seminars conducted throughout 2007 (in Beijing, Addis Ababa, Geneva, New York, Johannesburg and Brussels).[iii] The participants at the Oslo conference discussed a number of challenges and dilemmas facing integrated missions today. The conference drew heavily on the operational experience of participants and the many lessons learnt from their attempts to implement multidimensional mandates. Building on the previous seminars, participants at the conference seemed to mutually understand that when a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission has been given a multidimensional mandate by the Security Council, an integrated approach to implementation is an operational imperative. However, while there has been some progress in achieving integration, there is still a significant divide between integration as a policy ideal and integration as a reality on the ground. One explanation for this, which was pointed out repeatedly during the series of seminars and again reiterated in Oslo, is the ever-shifting state and nature of peace operations. This makes them a "moving target" that continues to grow in size and complexity, and means that it is difficult to assess precisely how implementation can and should take place. This dilemma also confirms the need for better and more integrated approaches, to address the challenges of constant change. It was felt that an integrated approach is a means to a more effective and efficient UN operation both in the field and at headquarters. However, better integration cannot be achieved without inter-departmental, inter-institutional and inter-governmental support.

Despite the diversity of experience, several common themes emerged:

The absence of a methodical attempt to build the senior leadership group as a cohesive unit was raised as an obstacle to effective coherence. Building a solid leadership team is crucial. Certain personalities undoubtedly have an immense impact on the overall performance of the integration process. It is important to look beyond individual personalities, and focus on strengthening the system as a whole, by building a team with strong leadership skills, as well as specific abilities and competencies, able to grasp the larger goal of an integrated process. It is thus important to consider the team as a whole, and its strengths as an integrated unit, when recruiting leaders. This approach should also apply to mission recruitment and planning, with emphasis on profiling during the selection process and training for senior mission staff.

The importance of ensuring that the senior UN representative in the field has at her or his disposal a clear and robust mandate, leverage[iv] and resources to direct the UN's effort on the ground in a way that informs, generates and underpins political solutions, was stressed repeatedly by participants. It was also suggested that many of the central decision-making responsibilities should be transferred or delegated from headquarters to the field. This would enhance the integration of actors in the field, enabling them to focus on their collective impact in the field rather than on how to work around time-consuming bureaucratic UN rules and regulations.

Moreover, to sufficiently equip the leadership team to meet the multidimensional demands set out by the Security Council mandate, Member States need to also adapt and change the current

frameworks that guide both the administrative and budgeting processes. Today, success often depends on the personal capabilities of senior UN mission leaders to find ways of manoeuvring around the system, rather than as a result of it.

Participants also discussed the increasingly complex relationship between the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the "multi-hatted" Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) (who also acts as Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)), and the Director of Administration (who now reports directly to the newly established Department of Field Support). It was agreed that these roles need to be looked into and clarified.

The role of the DSRSG/RC/HC was discussed in great depth. The position has become increasingly complex, and it was suggested that it should be strengthened by establishing a dedicated support team or office that reflects the range of tasks. The need for more and better planning and support structures in general to improve management in the field was also discussed at length. It was pointed out that this would reduce the mission's dependence on personalities for its success. The participants also discussed the negative impact of the slowness of the general UN recruitment process and the absence of system-wide training systems geared towards enabling better integration in the field.

The discussion on the peacebuilding continuum revealed a general agreement that there is a clear need to improve both the theoretical and the practical approach to the three main elements of the continuum (peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding). Moreover, a much stronger focus is needed on understanding each as part of a "coherent whole". The concept of the sequential development of peace, which has been widely identified as problematic, is still a strong influence in strategic planning, which in turn has consequences for practical implementation in the field. It was agreed that a more coherent analysis of how peace develops, which should result in improved guidelines, will increase the interconnectedness of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The UN, its Member States and other international actors need to change their modes of operation in order to address the special needs of countries emerging from or affected by conflict.

Participants also stressed that failure is inevitable if and when peacekeeping becomes a substitute for necessary political efforts and compromises to achieve sustainable peace. Member States carry a great responsibility on both accounts, if recovery and peacebuilding efforts are to succeed in the long-term in a constantly shifting political climate. The importance of "bringing politics back" was echoed in all circles, including humanitarian circles. The latter group highlighted that getting a clearer view of what needs to be achieved politically could also assist in making the necessary distinction between humanitarian assistance in emergencies, and the need for long-term recovery efforts.

It was recommended that one should examine the potential that the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) could have in taking on a more proactive and convening role in promoting better system coherence and integration. While the PBC has made a great deal of progress in the last year, it still has not shown the ability to ensure effective coordination within the UN and with other partners. This is in part due to the fragmented aid architecture and tendencies to ear-mark funds,

instead of creating a flexible structure able to integrate the mission on the basis of functions rather than supply of funds. This is further complicated by the fact that Member States often do not engage with the UN with one coherent, unambiguous voice.

Moreover, participants highlighted the importance of moving forward with ongoing processes to adopt a common planning and assessment framework; based on the assumption that peacebuilding is not a sequential process, but a highly interlinked series of simultaneous activities. Participants at the conference focused on several aspects of planning, including the ongoing development of the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which is intended to provide guidelines to all the UN entities involved in the planning and preparation of multidimensional peace operations. Participants stressed, however, that while much progress has been made in this regard, more work is needed on improving the coordination of planning and planning frameworks with other UN partners, including donors. In line with this, participants pointed out the importance of improving coordination and communication between the various parallel planning processes (the UN, national governments, bilateral donors, the World Bank, the IMF). Partnerships in multidimensional peace operations are essential because NGOs and other relevant actors are playing an increasingly central role in post-conflict settings. Participants stressed that partnerships should be complementary and result-oriented, to make sure that all are aware of what is to be expected, delivered, how and by whom. As one participant put it, "You have to ask what you are responsible for and how you are accountable. We are all for coordination as long as it is reality-based." But if not, it was pointed out, more harm than good could be done. Not all assistance is necessarily helpful. This has proven time and again to be a difficult lesson for the international community to learn.

The benefits and challenges of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which involve rapidly disbursable funding arrangements, were also covered. Participants underlined that although QIPs can provide an immediate peace dividend to the population, they can also add stress to an already tense situation if they are poorly planned and designed.

The participants at the conference discussed how to balance the need to strengthen the protection of civilians in compliance with humanitarian principles, in particular in situations of active conflict. The discussion suggested that debate on this issue has now matured and there was strong agreement on the essential principles that should be adopted. In particular, there was wide agreement on applying an asymmetric approach to integration and in so doing acknowledging that humanitarian sensitivities are likely to be helpful to the successful implementation of a UN Security Council protection mandate. It was also recognized that humanitarian principles were not, and should not, be seen as incentives not to integrate.

On the contrary, humanitarian principles should guide the overall process of integration by setting standards, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and providing checks and balances, according to the needs and situation on the ground. The participants generally agreed, however, that significant dilemmas remain with regard to humanitarian assistance, and the occurrences of unintended consequences are not well understood. Participants stressed the need for more research and discourse on to how to operationalize the current understanding of humanitarian space, rather than speaking of it as a stand-alone concept and focusing on limitations.

The importance of increasing focus on human rights within an integrated mission context was also one of the central issues discussed. Considerable progress has been made, but much work still needs to be done.

Another critical issue raised both in the plenary session and in breakaway sessions was the need for better alignment of peace operation mandates with the resources provided. This is not a novel conclusion or recommendation. However, it has proven difficult to implement, as it requires the full support and engagement of all actors, including the intergovernmental processes at UN headquarters (including the financial committees and advisory entities of the UN General Assembly), donors (including the governing boards of funds and programmes) and other key actors such as the World Bank, the EU and others. Participants stressed that without improved alignment of these variables, a more integrated (i.e. efficient and effective) mission in the field is not feasible.

The need for a more incentive-based culture of integration was frequently raised. This is beginning to be seen in the UN, but much work remains before rules and procedures for integration are fully implemented. It was agreed that a higher level of accountability regarding integration – in terms of greater impact on the ground – within and between the various actors and institutions, both in the field and at headquarters, is essential.

A significant barrier to coherence in the field is the lack of integrated accountability under Security Council mandates. Certain parts of these mandates entail no accountability to the Security Council, only to the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or the governing board of the agency, fund or programme involved. Participants did not argue in favour of broadening the Security Council's authority, but rather stressed the importance integrated and detailed mechanisms for contact and dialogue between the Council and the other parts of the UN system to better meet the demands of a multidimensional mandate.

Participants stressed that closer consultations and dialogue between the various UN bodies and the Security Council could improve the Council's working methods (and thus its ability to develop more effective mission mandates), and could increase collaboration and interaction throughout the UN system in the implementation of peace operation mandates.

The potentially negative role of bilateral donors and other arrangements for undermining coherence in the field were also identified as a potential problem, especially the ear-marking of funds and specific donor priorities. This can undermine the UN's efforts to channel resources in a way that ensures greatest impact, and makes it harder for the UN to focus its efforts on a common set of priorities, if these priorities are not matched by the donor profiles.

The need for predictable and manageable funding was discussed. The fact that some parts of a mission mandate are covered by assessed contributions, while other parts are covered by voluntary contributions, leads to a strain on the mission leadership in the field. Precious time is spent working through policies and procedures that are not suited to the urgency of the situation in the field, that is, the urgency to secure the necessary funding to fulfil the mandate in question. Participants stressed that Member States need to be aware of the paradoxical restrictions that the inter-governmental system places on the mission, and that ultimately impede integration in the

field. In this regard, Member States can play an important role in facilitating the integration of the UN system. The current system for financing multidimensional peace operations does not allow for adequate resourcing of multidimensional mandates with strong peacebuilding and/or recovery components.

Thus it was agreed that more needs to be done to align mandates and resources. There is a need to think about how to improve the link between assessed and voluntary funding sources. This in turn will also require closer contact and dialogue between the UN Security Council, the UN system at large, and other multilateral partners, donors and stakeholders.

Another recurring theme during the conference was the issue of national and local ownership and capacity-building. Securing ownership by the host state, and building capacity is vital for the success of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Usually, it was noted, in countries emerging from war and/or in a post-conflict reconstruction situation, there is a clear tension between speed and ownership. At the same time as it is important to deliver peace dividends quickly to the local population, it is also essential that the (re-)building of local capacity takes place right from the planning stage. The question of how to better link internal and system-wide planning frameworks with concurrent national processes was also addressed. New ways of linking the process of defining and implementing nationally-owned programmes for peace and development with the programmes of the UN system, and other partners and donors, should be explored. The UN's efforts to develop country-specific *compacts* or, in other words, country-specific frameworks or strategies that bring on board all stakeholders, including national partners, to set out priorities, make implementation plans and define responsibilities in line with both national and international programming objectives, were referred to as a very positive development that should be further explored.

It was also agreed that in all of the issues discussed above, the Secretary General should take on a stronger role, in guiding not only efforts inside the UN system, but also helping to forge incentives for better coherence and integration both within and outside the UN system, to promote better effectiveness, efficiency and impact on the ground.

Participants also agreed that if we are to effectively address the challenges facing the UN, where the demand is greater than the supply, the geopolitical situation tenser than ever and the resources scarce and fragmented, we must revise our key implementing arrangements, including those at the intergovernmental level. As one participant noted, "It is not only a question of doing more, we must do things differently. Otherwise we will not be able to get the job done."

1.   Introduction

The strategic aims of peace operations have changed fundamentally in the period since the end of the last millennium. An increase in the number and complexity of operations has made it necessary not only to re-think but also to reorganize the many different elements that make up multidimensional and integrated missions today. It has become increasingly clear that the vast array of approaches and instruments employed in peace operations, both within and outside the UN system, calls for some form of integration, the degree of which should be determined by the situation in question, in order to adequately address the political realities.

There was general agreement that the "integrated missions" concept has come a long way since it was first launched. To begin with, it often caused a sense of frustration, and still does to some extent, but as it is developed and promulgated, it is increasingly being embraced and attempts are moreover being made to make the necessary changes to convert the concept into action. It was also made clear that the UN has made great progress in implementing a more integrated approach on the ground, much more than it is given credit for. Nevertheless, a clear weakness is the lack of connection between policy and practice, with the result that integration takes place *despite* UN policies and procedures, rather than *because* of them. Success has largely depended on the creativity, courage and management skills of a few individuals, not sufficiently reflected in the structure of the organization as a whole. In other words, there is still considerable room for improvement in terms of achieving our common goals on the ground. An essential and significant part of this process is to continuously revisit the many challenges and barriers facing multidimensional and integrated peace operations. The Oslo conference along with the preceding regional seminars has sought to do just this. It has focused on the ever-changing dynamics of the challenges that face our efforts to bring lasting peace to countries affected by conflict, and it has attempted to provide useful recommendations for the measures needed to accomplish this.

1.1   Structure

This conference report summarizes two intense days of in-depth discussions covering a broad range of topics from the definition of the concept of integration itself to the many implications and challenges for effective implementation on the ground. The report is organized thematically, roughly following the order of the final conference agenda. Chapter 1 discusses the concept of integration, and reflects on some of the conceptual discourses. Chapter 2 examines the many challenges that face the management and leadership of UN multidimensional and integrated peace operations, as seen and experienced by the participants. Chapter 3 covers the links between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Chapter 4 sums up the discussion of the humanitarian dilemmas, the importance of human rights and the relationship between the integrated mission concept and the protection of civilians. Chapter 5 addresses the complex issue of realigning mandates, programmes and resources. Chapter 6 covers planning and evaluation. Chapter 7 summarizes the discussion on partnerships in multidimensional peace operations. Chapter 8 discusses the very important topic of local ownership. Chapter 9 addresses the suggestion to establish a dedicated Contact Group for Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations. Finally, chapter 10 provides a few concluding remarks.

1.2   Defining integration

Before discussing the complex challenges facing multidimensional and integrated peace operations today, it is necessary to have a discussion on what exactly the concept of integration entails.

Participants emphasized that there is no single common definition of integrated missions, but they agreed that the working definition that is often used within the UN system was useful. Integration is understood as a tool aimed at improving both management and impact on the ground. It is an evolving concept and should be "…understood as an institutional reform process that includes the development of initiatives that aim to increase the performance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of UN peace operations by enabling the coherent (simultaneous and sequential) allocation of resources towards common strategic ends"[v]. In other words, integration is not seen or perceived to be a goal in itself, but rather a tool that can help to make the most effective use of efforts, not only those of the UN system itself, but also of other national and international partners.

While there is broad agreement on the need for integrated approaches, new ideas about the form and function of integrated missions continue to evolve. Multidimensionality and integration are terms that are generally used rather loosely and interchangeably in UN reform debates and literature. Neither term is clearly defined in UN documents. This lack of a clear definition of integration was a concern to a number of participants. Nonetheless, the working definition[vi] used within the UN system was found to be useful. It refers to integrated missions as complex peace operations whose guiding principle is to link different organizations into coherent support structures.

The participants also stressed that in the case of integration, one size does not fit all. On the contrary, the appropriate degree of integration will depend on the situation in question. In other words, "form should follow function". Given the different phases of a mission, and its changing needs and capacities, the form of integration will have to evolve and adapt accordingly. It was also agreed that the integrated mission concept is not a structural outfit, which is the view in some parts of the UN system. Neither is it an organigram or a structural flowchart. Neither can an integrated mission be defined as a "mission with a triple-hatted DSRSG", even though this may be an important aspect.

It is important to stress that all the current UN multidimensional and integrated peace operations represent different levels of policy coherence (policy/strategic, operational/programmatic and administrative), and therefore involve the investment of varying levels of institutional and political capital.

In some cases, integration may merely involve networking or co-existence: a situation where actors simply aim to keep out of each other's way, and that requires minimal investment and incentives. At the other end of the scale, it can entail full policy integration and coherence with major investments in the pursuit of agreed objectives. In the latter case, collaboration is necessary not only at the lower levels of organisations, but also at the higher or highest levels, in order to ensure that these objectives are in fact compatible, shared and implementable.

1.3   Integration is not an end in itself

At the same time, caution was voiced about the expectations attached to integration, as there is a risk that integration and even coordination can become an end in themselves. This was raised as a serious concern, noting that if not well-focused, energy and resources spent on coordination could detract attention from achieving other priorities for the UN presence in a country. Integration and coordination in and of themselves, even when backed by a coherent plan of action, are not enough. They cannot ensure responsibility, authority and accountability, and an unbalanced focus on integration may even exacerbate infighting, for example over scarce resources. This can lead to an inward-looking organization that devotes far too much time and energy to coordination meetings and inter-agency processes. Nor is it the case, it was stressed, that a hierarchical structure, with one clear figure of authority at the top, will necessarily resolve all the inherent tensions of the system as a whole. It was noted on several occasions that an important step in this regard would be to systematically identify the comparative advantages and competencies of participating actors.

Furthermore it was underlined that integration should not become a bureaucratic exercise in aligning structures, but rather an exercise in developing closer coordination of the resources and deliverables necessary for each mission. This means that the barriers and enablers for integration must be addressed in a more structured and systematic fashion. The long-term and overall purpose of integration, it was agreed, is to strengthen internal and external partnerships, to enable UN entities to work more closely together, and to enable the UN system as a whole to work more efficiently and effectively with national and international partners, with clear benchmarks for both accountability and results.

To sum up, the essential purpose of the integrated mission concept is to direct UN country-level efforts in a country that is in conflict, or emerging from conflict, towards the achievement of a common strategic purpose, and to build a solid and sustainable foundation for peace and development.

1.4   Current practice

Participants at the conference produced a wide range of early evidence of what integration can look like in practice, and they promoted a differentiated approach to integration and how it should respond to: i) the specific context, needs and situation, and ii) the existing constraints and limitations (political, systematic and operational). It was agreed that integration in practice is very different from any "ideal architecture" of integration. This is largely due to a mix of systemic and political barriers. Similarly, integration in the field entails a number of important challenges at both the policy and operational level. However, it was recognized that the "best should not become the enemy of the good", insofar as an integrated approach could also make it easier to decide what degree of integration is needed in any given context in accordance with the desired impact. The ability to make an informed decision about when and how to integrate depends on an integrated structure already being in place. The ongoing development of a common strategic assessment tool for the system as a whole is thus a very positive development in this regard.

In practice, different components of the integrated mission require different degrees of integration. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo for example, the degree of integration varies between regions of the country due to different operational complexities, in particular between the eastern and western regions. Participants made it clear that the fact that there are different degrees of integration should not be viewed as negative, but as evidence of a system that is trying to adapt, fully recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all solution. While intervention in a fragile, conflict-ridden country or region, or a country or region emerging from conflict, requires a multi-pronged approach (based on a wide range of lessons and best practices acquired over the years), the actual organizational model and its implementation should be guided by the desired impact and a truly integrated planning process.

2. Management and Leadership in UN Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations

During the session on management and leadership, both in the plenary and the breakaway session, participants covered various topics related to improving capabilities of the management and leadership teams in the field, the most important being:

- securing qualified personnel, especially at leadership level;
- strengthening the Senior Management Team;
- challenges facing the DSRSG/RC/HC;
- the need for better planning and support structures for management in the field;
- delegation of authority to the field level;
- building a well-functioning integrated team made up of complementary personnel;
- greater financial leverage as an incentive for integration;
- the need to give the organisation incentives to foster better coherence;
- inter-agency staff mobility and the need to align administrative practices, human resources and common services; and
- the need to improve current training systems.

2.1 Profiling, training and selection of qualified senior leaders

Throughout the conference, participants regularly returned to the problem of the lack of qualified personnel, especially at leadership level. In response to the need for a systematic and effective recruitment and performance evaluation process of each mission's Senior Management Team (SMT), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has initiated the creation of a roster of relevant candidates for leadership positions (the SRSG, the DSRSG, the Resident Coordinator (RC), the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), the Director of Administration, the Force Commander, the Chief of Staff (both military and civilian), and the Head of Police. This was seen to be a positive step, yet several participants drew attention to the importance of continually bearing in mind the parallel roles of Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, to ensure the appropriate mix of skills, competencies and experience in the SMT.

A system for identifying good leaders is needed. It is important to have a long-term perspective in this regard. Developing a top candidate takes time, and a sound career development programme is vital to "catch the good ones".

The importance of cross-sector and cross-system experience was highlighted, because inside knowledge of how the various agencies work is indispensable for a leader striving to integrate an enormously fragmented system. Participants pointed out that there are significant administrative barriers to exchanging staff at the field level, which is inhibiting integration.

Participants stressed the importance of looking at the totality of the leadership team when candidates are selected. This is rarely done in practice, especially in connection with high-level appointments. The latter seem increasingly to reflect political accommodations. Greater weight should be given to finding the right team for the job.

2.2   The Senior Management Team

The Senior Management Team consists of the SRSG with his or her deputies and other key mission staff. Participants raised the question of transferring authority from headquarters to the field in order to give the mission leadership real power to achieve integration on the ground. It was emphasized that the head of mission needs to be given clear political support and sufficient authority to coordinate the mission, which in turn needs to be backed by the necessary resources, in terms of both personnel and finances. Participants argued that the overall goal of an integrated structure – to implement the mandate given by the UN Security Council – should be communicated more clearly by the various headquarters of the funds, programmes and specialized agencies to their personnel and offices in the field, to ensure that the SRSG and his or her senior management have the support of *all* the UN personnel on the ground. This does not mean that everyone should be doing the same thing, or that the SRSG or his or her SMT are the panacea to mission integration, but rather it means that everyone should have a common understanding of *what* needs to be done, *when* and *by whom*. This means that roles, responsibilities and accountability need to be defined more clearly, and that diversity should be encouraged rather than fighting over turf and resources.

Performance assessments should also be improved. The importance of systematically using assessment tools, such as 360-degree assessment,[vii] was emphasized. This is currently mandatory for the DSRSG in her or his capacity as Resident Coordinator, but not for other members of the management team, including the SRSG. If properly adapted and used, performance assessments can boost leadership and management skills, and improve the quality of rosters. It was also stressed that gossip and subjective assessments should never be allowed to influence appointments.

2.3   The role of the SRSG – and her/ or his role in building an integrated team

Participants underscored the pivotal role of the SRSG in the SMT. Ideally an SRSG has a perfect mix of political knowledge and management skills, but too often the emphasis (naturally enough) falls on the political side. However, the management aspect of the job is critical. One of the most important, yet often neglected or under-prioritized issues, is the establishment of a solid and well-functioning UN mission team on the ground. An integrated mission team, as its name implies, incorporates many different elements of the UN system, (e.g. administrative, military, political, humanitarian, the UN Country Team and local staff), each with its own "culture".

As head of the mission, the SRSG, together with her or his SMT, is responsible for securing and building a cohesive mission. As the standard directives for SRSGs state: "….as Head of Mission, the SRSG is responsible for all aspects of its management and functioning. He/she is responsible for the effective management of its resources… (and) for the direction of the mission's various components and for ensuring that there are clear lines of responsibility and accountability within the mission. All mission components fall under the SRSG's direct supervisory authority."

The SRSG will face many challenges in this endeavour. Her or his overarching responsibility is not only to convey a clear strategy for the mission that everyone can understand and adhere to, but also to facilitate a cooperative environment, where each component carries out its task without contradictory demands or competitive struggles, and without pursuing contradictory goals. Moreover, with an integrated mission, it is important that the SRSG and the SMT stress the fact that it is actually one, not two, missions: peacekeeping in the short-term, and building the conditions for long-term peace. Creating a sense of belonging for all the components is essential, and although some components will be given a stronger role during certain phases of the mission, it should be made very clear that all the components are equally important and that their distinctive features and competencies should be respected and utilized. Three main areas were highlighted as being particularly important in achieving the above: teamwork, sharing of resources and assets, information and consultation.

SRSG - UNCT

Participants particularly stressed the importance of building a good working relationship with the UN Country Team (UNCT), as it will have been present in the country long before the mission arrives. The UNCT has a pool of knowledge of the host country and will also have established a relationship with it, which the SRSG and SMT should respect and seek to benefit from by creating a working environment of cooperation and inclusion. It was also underlined, however, that the UNCT carried great responsibility in actually supporting the SRSG and the senior leadership team, and adapting to their procedures, reporting structures and working methods, in such a way that coherence and integration of efforts were both informed, feasible and achievable, while context-specific. This requires that the respective headquarters overlook the day-to-day activities of the larger UN family represented in the UNCT, to stay abreast of developments in the field. This is aimed at fostering a more coherence and integrated approach, engaging and acting accordingly. Several participants underlined that the UN's Chief Executive Board should be reconfigured in such a way, as it would then play a stronger role in compelling necessary inter-agency cooperation.

SRSG - Force Commander

Relations between the SRSG and the Force Commander are also have great significance. The Force Commander has primary responsibility for the operational organization and efficient functioning of the military component of the mission, but performs his or her tasks under the direct authority of the SRSG. In the past there have been instances of inadequate communication. Participants pointed out that these can easily be avoided by clarifying the lines of authority from

the outset of the mission. It was therefore suggested that the entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled as early as possible, co-trained and then deployed in the field at the same time. Indeed the UN Panel on Peace Operations also recommended this in 2000, but it is still not being done systematically.

As the SRSG is the political or "civilian" head of the UN military component, it is important that she or he is familiar with the particular "culture" of the various contingents, because there is a huge variation between the different contingents in their training and doctrine. The SRSG needs to work with the Force Commander to promote coherence among them as well as provide guidance of the common UN doctrine. This will help to establish trust and enhance coordination. Just as the Force Commander should respond to the SRSG's wishes, the SRSG should also listen to the advice of the Force Commander, whose military knowledge may be able to provide valuable insights into a myriad of situations. Likewise, it is important to establish a good working relationship between the Force Commander, the Police Commander and the DSRSG/RC/HC(Resident Representative (RC)) from the start of a mission, to address long-term development issues at an early stage, and prevent misunderstandings that could impede the DSRSG in his or her humanitarian role.

SRSG – Director of Administration/Chief Administrative Officer

Also of crucial importance for the smooth functioning of the mission is the relationship between the SRSG and the Director of Administration (DOA) and the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). This can come under strain as the issue of resources tends to be the most contentious in any organization. The question of resources is further complicated in a UN multidimensional and integrated peace operation by the complex and varying rules and regulations that govern the uses of resources and assets.

As mentioned earlier, the allocation of mission's resources do not always match the overall mission mandate (due to inflexible and contradictory rules and regulations). The DOA/CAO tends to be in a strong position because he or she reports directly to the management side of the UN system, sometimes bypassing the authority of the SRSG. At the same time, the standard directives state that the "…DOA/CAO is the principle advisor to the SRSG on United Nations rules, regulations, applicable policy instruments and procedures, and assists the latter in ensuring that the mission is managed within the framework established by the Organization".

Despite these clear directives, there have been complaints that the DOA/CAO and the administration staff tend to look towards headquarters instead of focusing on the political and administrative requirements of the mission. To counter this trend, it was recommended that the DOA/CAO is drawn into the Senior Management Team, with the result that administrative and financial questions are included in the daily discussions of the mission and for the DOA's/CAO's performance to be assessed exclusively by the SRSG. This would also help the SRSG to gain a better grasp of budgeting issues, which is important because these have important policy implications. The SRSG would thus be able to ensure that the budget is in accordance with the mission's overall political and operational objectives.

Although time is often in short supply in a mission, the need for informal arrangements and more focus on teambuilding initiatives, inter-organizational mediation and knowledge management skills were stressed by participants.

2.4　The role of the plural hatted Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General

The DSRSG/RC/HC position was also discussed at length, both in the plenary discussions and in the breakaway session. Since the creation of the DSRSG/RC/HC role, the dilemmas and burdens that this "superhuman" job description can entail have been discussed on a continuous basis in many different forums. One of the main concerns at the conference was the inherent conflict of interest between the different stakeholders (DPKO, UNDP and OCHA) that the DSRSG has to juggle. Conflicting demands often arise that make it difficult to satisfy all parties despite the fact that common guidelines have been drawn up. However, it was suggested that better coordinated, strategic planning, where all relevant parties are involved from the beginning, would lessen the conflicting demands. Participants also conveyed the need to strengthen the DSRSG's support team (i.e. establishing an inter-agency or integrated support office), arguing that this would not only help the DSRSG's capacity to fulfil his or her coordination mandate, but also better inform and alleviate the heavy and sometimes conflicting workload. For this to happen, there is a need to address some of the current administrative hurdles to promote better inter-agency mobility. Some of these hurdles may appear as trivial issues, such as the use of office space, computers, phone, access to web tools (DPKO staff using Lotus Notes while agencies using Microsoft Outlook etc.) but unless dealt with, they make both the establishment of such a support function, or increased inter-agency mobility and staff exchanges almost impossible. Participants urged the intergovernmental bodies to look into this from the perspective of increasing UN effectiveness and efficiency on the ground.

Another concern raised was the important and essential part of the HC in the "triple-hatted" role. It was emphasised that it requires a particular set of skills. Participants saw the HC as the "moral authority" in the equation. It was therefore suggested that the DSRSG should have experience from humanitarian field work, arguing that training could not compensate for a lack of relevant experience. It was therefore suggested by some participants that the HC role should be given more weight in recruitment.

The DPKO is working closely with the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to improve selection assessments. Nevertheless, some participants commented that the main responsibility for selecting and training the DSRSG/RC/HC should rather be with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and OCHA/IASC,[viii] while other participants argued that the DSRSG/RC/HC should be selected by the wider UN system to truly reflect the desired "team building" aspect of the process. In regard to training, participants argued that training standards should be aligned with those of the leadership team as a whole and more interaction should be encouraged from the outset between the different functions of the leadership team. Several participants noted that calls to improve the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system have been heard since its inception, and that there was a serious need to create an institutional home for the selection procedures guiding all selections in collaboration with all stakeholders (i.e. IASC, OCHA, UNDG etc). The UN OCHA office in Geneva has recently established a dedicated unit to work with humanitarian coordinators, which

was seen as a positive step forward if configured to work with other parts of the multilateral system (and other partners) in selecting and training core humanitarian staff. Similarly, the representatives from the development side, stressed the need for the RC to have sufficient understanding and experience from development work, which requires a different set of skills. In the end, it was clear that there are still many difficult questions attached to the DSRSG/RC/HC position.

2.5   Planning and support structures

It was underlined that sound planning and support structures are essential for smooth management in the field. Planning teams are established at headquarters level, but they are rarely deployed to the field, despite the long-standing recommendation of the Brahimi report. It was emphasized that all the leadership roles need well-staffed planning teams. The DSRSG/RC/HC has had some support from the UNDP, the UNDG Office (UNDGO) and OCHA, for the RC and HC roles respectively (UNDGO has some seed funding and a roster of planners that can be deployed). However, the DSRSG should have a planning and support team that is experienced in peacekeeping missions and understands how a mission operates. These resources are not normally provided by missions, although the DPKO has agreed that they can be funded from the assessed budgets.

As soon as the SMT has been appointed, it should meet with other staff that are to be deployed to the mission. The SRSG, his or her deputies and their advisers and support staff should be the first to be deployed. Joint training is still seen as a key component in fostering better and more informed leadership on the ground, but it has proven to be difficult due to differences in the timing of appointments. The current recruitment structure makes it difficult to predict when and what kind of mission staff will be deployed. Participants argued that more efforts should be made to ensure that key planning and support staff is deployed together with senior management at the beginning of the mission.

The participants noted that coherence and integration in the field often depend on individual personalities, the chemistry of the team and the capacity and skills of the leader. To minimize this dependence on particular personalities, it is important to both address structural deficiencies and enhance communication throughout the system. As was pointed out in an internal review of the UN's peacebuilding capacities and leadership skills, "It is not that unfortunate personality clashes undermine a good structure, but that extraordinary personal fortitude has been necessary to overcome a poor structure."[ix] Clear communication structures and transparent roles and responsibilities were seen as key to the success of missions. These could also improve the missions' interaction with other actors. Somewhat paradoxically, although the system needs to be improved so that integration efforts are less dependent on personalities, there was general agreement that people are still needed who proactively seek ways of working together on the ground that are appropriate to the context in question, despite difficulties caused by the system. This should be a key competence of the leadership team as a whole.

2.6   Recruitment

The expectations placed on the senior leadership of integrated peace operations are multifaceted and almost insurmountable. It was commented during the breakaway session that when developing the terms of reference (ToR) or job description for any member of the SMT, it could be very beneficial to take the management team as a whole into consideration, rather than just focusing on the individual post in question. The need for a matrix of different requirements was stressed, so that leaders that understand different elements of the package can be identified. There is a need for a structure and process at headquarters level that mirrors the needs for integration on the ground. The SMT selection process should also be more closely linked to the selection processes for the RC/HC and UNCT senior management. Teambuilding needs to start at the very outset. Bringing in the right leadership skills is critical to the mission's success. That said, participants also highlighted the importance of not linking all success to the achievements of one or two individuals. It is important to see the mission as a team exercise, so that personal agendas, strengths or flaws do not detract attention from the mission as a whole.

Participants also suggested devising specific ToRs for vacant positions, as general profiles are not always adequate. A cross-mission catalogue of profiles and ToRs should be collected. It was also proposed that job descriptions in general should be divided into two parts: one set of generic requirements, and another set of specific requirements for the position in question. Contributing countries should also have an overview of skills required for different functions within the UN, so that these can be taken into consideration when preparing rosters for secondment and in national preparations and training.

The urgent need for improvement of the UN recruitment process was underlined repeatedly during the conference. As one participant put it, "…when it comes down to the day to day work, this is one of the major issues". Most peacekeeping missions suffer from high vacancy rates and severe delays in recruitment. . It was also pointed out that there are still major gaps in filling posts already budgeted for. Although the recruitment problem is not an integration problem per se, it inevitably impacts negatively on efforts to improve integration within missions. Several suggestions were put forward to solve this pressing problem. One was to decentralize part of the recruitment process, which is currently highly centralized. It was also pointed out that the needs of the UN Country Team as a whole should be taken into account in the recruitment process for candidates for senior positions in missions, including the RC/HC and sector leaders and heads of field offices. As an example, it was noted; candidates rely upon being sponsored to participate in a "Resident Coordinator Assessment", which was described as a skills-based test. This is a prerequisite, set by the UNDG and the UNDP for being considered for RC positions. In the case of multidimensional and integrated peace operations, there is a third requirement, namely experience in dealing with political processes. Thus, since most RCs are also HCs, and DSRSGs in multidimensional operations function as both, it has de facto become a prerequisite for HC positions too. If successful, these individuals would be placed in a pool from which candidates for RC/HC positions would be drawn.[x] Thus, the selection of a DSRSG who successfully meets all criteria and is accepted by all constituencies is a very challenging undertaking. Who and what organization has the prerogative of designating the person remains a disputed topic, which should be further examined, i.e. how to expand and align the requirement of a Resident Coordinator Assessment with the other required competencies and standards.

Participants also mentioned that the exchange of staff between the field and headquarters, and between organizations and departments, was something else that was notably important for improving integration.

2.7   Training

The significance of training and teambuilding was underlined. Training is a valuable tool for improving relations, integration and cooperation between organizational cultures that may often find themselves in conflicting positions. The importance of pre-deployment training was discussed, with particular focus on the lack of a comprehensive approach in present pre-deployment training systems. Participants also raised the need for greater emphasis on developing more refined and better integrated training tools and systems that are more closely attuned to the realities on the ground. They recommended setting a mandatory minimum standard of training. This in turn, calls for a more systemic approach to training, drawing on the UN's collective resources. It was also noted that the name "integrated training cells or standards" did not guarantee that training done by any part of the system was sufficiently geared towards improving integration or overcoming inter-organizational cultural barriers and perceptions. There was a strong call to revise current training standards with that in mind.

It is important to note that while the primary responsibility for the training of peacekeeping troops remains with the Member States, in terms of both specialist training and pre-deployment peacekeeping training, new training systems catering to an integrated approach need to be developed and continuously updated.

3.   The Peacebuilding Continuum: the Interlinkages between Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

As UN and non-UN actors have increasingly recognized that sustainable peace is not achieved in by linear process, the lines between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become less clear. In the past, these terms referred to a sequence of activities. There is now general recognition that they overlap and often take place simultaneously.
There was general agreement on the need to improve the practical coordination between the three main elements of this continuum (peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding). Participants examined the weakness of the concept of sequential development of peace and discussed the implications this has had on strategic planning and implementation in the field. The main issues that the participants focused on were:

- the need to move away from the idea that peace develops sequentially;
- the need to bring politics back into the equation;
- the role of the Department of Political Affairs in the context of integrated missions;
- the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as the architect and convener of efforts to implement the integrated mission concept;
- the important contribution of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office to long-term strategic planning;
- the role of the Integrated Missions Planning Process in enhancing integration efforts;
- the role of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre and Joint Operations Command; and

▪ the benefits and challenges of Quick Impact Projects.

3.1 Peace does not develop sequentially

While peacebuilding efforts depend on successful peacekeeping, the reverse is also true; the success of peacekeeping depends on the achievement of essential peacebuilding goals. These goals are usually set out in the peace agreement, and form the basis for the Security Council mandate. Integration aims to link the tasks of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding together to form one coherent strategy, seeking to achieve a single set of strategic objectives. Unfortunately, the UN structural system mirrors the concept of sequential development of peace, and therefore does not cater well for parallel and integrated processes that better reflect reality on the ground.

Most of the recent Security Council mandates have been multidimensional and have included cross-sectoral programmes that involve political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights actors. However, due to the traditional "silo" structure of the UN, the implementation of these mandates in a coherent multidimensional way has proven to be very difficult. It seems the overall system has to be reformed if the UN is to be able to respond efficiently to mandates and help countries recover from conflict and achieve sustainable peace.

3.2 Bringing politics back

Participants stressed that failure is inevitable if and when peacekeeping becomes a substitute for necessary political efforts and compromises to achieve sustainable peace. This is particularly true at a time where the overall peacekeeping and peacebuilding architecture is under unprecedented strain, in a tense geopolitical climate where demands are greater than the supply and the political solutions sometimes remain absent. As during the series of regional seminars, there was a strong call in this conference to bring politics back in. Participants noted that without an informed and in-depth understanding of the political nature of contemporary challenges, the UN and all other stakeholders run the risk of only addressing the symptoms and not the root causes of the conflicts in question. If these challenges are left unattended, they can easily undermine confidence in the UN as a whole, because the success of UN peacekeeping is one of the key parameters by which the UN is judged. The importance of "bringing politics back" was therefore echoed in all circles.

3.3 The role of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)

Several participants also expressed concern that the Department of Political Affairs,[xi] as the lead department for an increasing number of peace operations, has little operational experience or knowledge of the broader UN system. This has confronted the slow progress on all issues relating to system-wide coherence in general, and the integrated mission concept more specifically. A frequent argument on the part of the DPA is that it does not have the necessary resources to support integration processes. A number of recent reports conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight were cited, suggesting that even if the resources were provided, there is still insufficient will, competence and willingness to give this issue priority. The experience that "just as we finally figured out how to collaborate with DPKO and made it work relatively well, DPA

enters the scene..." was shared by several participants from the development and humanitarian side. Moreover, the DPA's broad interpretation of its own mandate (in spite of its admitted lack of resources to actually implement its mandate) undermine other parts of the UN system that are urging a process of closer cooperation on critical issues.

In an agreement from 2000, the DPA and the DPKO clarified what the lead role in a mission involves, and how the lead should pass from one department to another.[xii] The feedback from the missions is that where the DPA has the lead role, its operational capacity and experience is very weak. No-one suggested that the DPA should be replaced, or that these missions would have been more successful if they had been led by another department or agency, but many stressed the importance of improving the current regime. However, one recent review, which was referred to during the discussions, makes the point that "where logistical challenges or the security dimensions of a mission are so demanding that they surpass DPA's capacity, then DPKO should serve as the lead agency".[xiii] The situation has changed somewhat since the dividing up of the DPKO, and the creation of a separate support department, charged with supporting both departments.

3.4 The role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

The role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the challenges facing it were elaborated on in detail during the previous Oslo conference and in the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) study on the integrated mission concept. Participants agreed that the DPKO has come a long way since the implementation of integrated missions was initially developed. Participants referred to an overall positive momentum and results on the ground, but also focused on work to be done. Structures can be changed relatively easily, but cultures and mentalities are more difficult to alter. What concerned the participants the most was the impact of the recent division of the DPKO, and the creation of the separate Department of Field Support (DFS). Throughout the series of regional seminars, and again at the Oslo conference, it was reiterated that this has been counterproductive to the goal of a more coherent and integrated UN. If the idea is to work better as one, the participants pointed out, why create divisions? The division of responsibilities and structures was seen as adding another layer of obstacles to coordination in the field. The view was that the Director of Administration already carries too much power in comparison to the SRSG. The dual, or in cases involving DPA, triple reporting lines (not counting the reporting lines of the DSRSG/RC/HC) was seen as a complicating factor. However, great caution was urged. It was stressed that it was too early to declare the division of the DPKO as a failure; there have been some positive developments too. Nevertheless, the division means that it is important that the Secretary General remains strongly engaged, to make sure that important political, security, development (and, in some cases, humanitarian) responses are not held hostage, as occurred in the 1990s. The SG needs to be a peaceful advocate for coherence and effective integration between the two departments. The recently-established Integrated Operating Teams were referred to as a double-edged sword: on the one hand they provide a much needed dedicated planning capacity, but on the other hand, since the recent division of the DPKO, they end up merely being used to coordinate the two departments rather than reaching out and involving the rest of the UN system in the key planning stages of an operation. Again, caution was urged; we must not throw the baby out with the bathwater.

3.5   The role of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office

It was recommended that the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which is an inter-governmental advisory body to both the General Assembly and the Security Council, with the support of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), should play a more significant role, providing a focal point for long-term strategic planning, and counteracting the tendency to follow rigid sequential processes.

It was also recommended that one should examine the potential the PBC could have in taking on a more proactive and convening role in promoting better system coherence and integration. The PBC has the potential to be more prominent from start to finish. In the early stages of a peace operation, the PBC (supported by the PBSO) can ensure that the long-term social, economic and development concerns are addressed regularly and systematically during the planning cycles, at a time when the Security Council and other actors are too often absorbed by other more immediate concerns. For example, the PBC can exert an influence through its advisory role to the Security Council and the ECOSOC, and the PBSO can provide inputs to the Integrated Missions Planning Process[xiv] or other related processes. In other words, the PBC and PBSO should not be viewed as only being relevant once a peacekeeping operation has withdrawn. However, it was urged that great caution must be exercised with regard to the PBSO becoming an operational entity. The very reasoning for establishing the PBC and the PBSO was to fill a *strategic*, not an *operational,* vacuum. Therefore, the PBC and the PBSO should remain involved throughout all the stages of a peace operation, drawing on the full capacities of the UN system at large, with a view to identifying risks to the peacebuilding process, gaps that needs to be filled and best practices. At the later stage, when troops have been withdrawn, the PBC could help refocus the attention of the international community, and help to secure the necessary political and financial commitments. Lastly, participants stressed that the PBC could provide input and recommend strategies to help to ensure that local ownership is taken into account from the start. The PBC can act as an advocate in this connection, and the PBSO can provide quality analysis in collaboration with other partners.

Nevertheless, participants pointed out that the PBC still faces many challenges. While the PBC has had a great deal of progress since its establishment, it still has not shown the ability to ensure effective coordination within the UN and with other partners. This is in part due to the fragmented aid architecture and tendencies by donors to ear-mark funds. It is further complicated by the fact that Member States often do not engage with the UN with one coherent, unambiguous voice. During the breakaway session, participants expressed the opinion that too much of the work in the PBC has taken the form of "NY-style", inward-looking discussions, evincing little contact with the realities on the ground. In other words, it is struggling to avoid becoming just another NY-focused body. Participants also expressed concern that the PBSO seemed more busy carving out an operational role rather than positioning itself as the peacebuilding "clearing house" as was originally envisioned (and is still needed).

The peacebuilding fund was also discussed, with several participants voicing a mixture of concern and wonderment about the current application of guidelines for emergency project under the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).[xv] Participants referred to examples whereby the PBSO, on behalf

of the PBC, spent up to six months in responding to what the guidelines define as "imminent threat". The PBF guidelines state that to qualify for support, the project in question needs to state an intention "to address an unforeseen and critical intervention which would constitute an imminent threat to a peace or reconciliation process if not addressed in a timely manner". This, it was argued, calls for a re-examination of the fund in general, as well as its understanding and application of the term "imminent", considering the slowness in response. Another issue that was also addressed was the general state of the PBF, and there was more or less consensus that the current structure and guidelines had to be revised if to be deemed useful. Thus far, the PBF had worked for purposes for which it was not designed, and less so for situations of imminent threats, as it was set up to do.

3.6   The role of the United Nations Development Group

The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) is being restructured to mirror the new UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. The intention of this restructuring is to "strengthen relations between UNDG and the organizations of the United Nations system that are not members of UNDG".[xvi] The role of the UNDG vis-à-vis the Chief Executives Board (CEB), and the fact that it is an interagency body chaired by the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), highlights the important part it has to play in promoting and coordinating support for a more integrated approach in countries that are affected by or emerging from conflict.

However, participants referred to the UNDG's mixed track record in terms of actual coordination, and it was noted that the participating agencies did not feel much ownership of, or accountability to, the UNDG. It was maintained the UNDG tended to give lip-service to the system rather than acting as a body with the authority to coordinate development assistance.

The UNDG office (UNDGO), which provides a secretariat function, has been instrumental in supporting integrated planning efforts over the last couple of years, through the deployment and funding of strategic planning advisors, and in assisting with the development of integrated strategies (such as the UN Development Assistance Frameworks for non-conflict contexts and the UN Transitional Planning Frameworks for conflict areas). Although it has limited resources and coordination leverage, the UNDGO has provided vital support for DSRSG/RC/HCs in linking the activities of the broader UN system to peacekeeping operations at country level.

However, several participants stressed the need for such efforts to be expanded and strengthened in the time ahead. One area where the UNDGO left a lot to be desired is its work on re-examining UNDG planning frameworks and identifying ways to adapt these to the overall goals and needs of integrated mission planning and implementation.

At HQ level, participants reported great improvement in the working relations between the UNDGO and the DPKO, and to a lesser extent with the DPA. Some improvement was also reported regarding the UNDG-DPKO working relationship in the early stages of integrated mission planning. This was closely linked to the good working relations between the head of the UNDG and the head of the DPKO. The question of the UNDGO's location was also raised.

The discussion on how to establish a better "firewall" between UNDGO-funded staff and the UNDP in general has not really moved forward. This was also addressed by the High-Level Panel on System-Wide Coherence. It was hoped that the link to the CEB structure would help to give the UNDG system the necessary coordination leverage, but this would also require the engagement of the SG, in his role as chair of the CEB structure, to revise the current structure and composition of the CEB. It was suggested that the CEB should be moved out of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and linked directly to the SG's office and the appropriate intergovernmental bodies, and that issues relating to how to improve the coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the organization should be addressed.

Finally, the role of UNDG and UNDGO-supported trust funds, as well the support the UNDGO provides for the implementation of post-conflict needs assessments, was reported as having been quite effective, when it was linked to the overall system response. It was suggested that this area should be further examined and improved.

3.7   The role of the United Nations Development Programme

One of the concerns raised was not dissimilar to the concerns raised about the perceived dominance of the DPKO. On the development side, the UNDP was seen to have a disproportionate amount of power and resources, and was not seen as promoting integration with the broader UN system or other financial institutions, and sometimes competed for resources in cases that would clearly benefit from a coherent and concerted system approach.

Another issue that was raised by several participants was the internal disconnection between the regional offices charged with direct development programming and the operational and emergency side of UNDP, which deals with more immediate crisis prevention efforts and recovery (the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)). As one participant noted, 'if one asks the UNDP to participate in an integrated planning exercise of any kind, it tends to send a lower level desk officer from the BCPR who agrees with the plan, yet one will later discover that the agreement was never rooted in the UNDP structure, and is thus meaningless for addressing how to better align planning and assessment frameworks, development programming objectives and peacekeeping and peacebuilding objectives'. This internal disconnection, and the disjuncture it is creating, has to be dealt with in order to foster better coherence both within UNDP, and between UNDP and the rest of the system.

The leadership question is still a problem. The UNDP leadership needs to invest more time and effort in looking into how to better integrate the technical and coordination support provided by the BCPR with the UNDP regional bureaus and senior management. It was underlined that, although BCPR has a responsibility to ensure that its efforts are better coordinated with the rest of the house, regional bureaus and senior management also need to involve the BCPR more closely in the formal structures and processes, and in decision-making that affects countries in post-conflict settings. In practice, participants noted, desk officers in regional bureaus have little time or incentive for focusing on integrated mission planning processes, leaving the BCPR to fill the vacuum. It was noted however, that there have been a number of success stories where the

BCPR has worked very well with relevant regional bureaus to strengthen or re-orient country offices, but again, these were rarely the result of a systematic institutional effort but ad hoc initiatives on the part of individuals.

3.8   Transitional Strategies, planning processes and benchmarks

Participants stressed that the transitional phase between the withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation and the handover to the government and the rest of the international community is particularly critical, and if not managed well, can easily develop that can undo the hard-earned success of the peacekeeping mission. As mentioned above, it is vital to have sound long-term strategies and planning processes in place to ensure smooth transitions.

Participants gave several concrete examples of technical problems that have arisen during the transition from a full-scale UN peacekeeping operation to a peacebuilding mission. While actors in the field are trying to integrate their efforts, many of the rules and regulations (mainly administrative) of the various UN agencies and DPKO are far from harmonized, making transitions extremely complex and time-consuming. Take for example the secondment of a staff member from one office to another, as may be required by the beginning of a new phase of the mission. Everything has to be changed, from IT equipment, mobile phone and office space, to access to transport etc. The current rules do not allow for an expedient transfer. On the contrary, they are a hindrance. If transitions are to be made quickly and efficiently, the rules and regulations need to be aligned and coordinated to a much greater extent. The ongoing process of how to streamline UN management practices in connection with the "One UN" reform process, and the long-awaited (and much needed) human resources management reform currently being discussed, are seen as nothing less than essential. Participants pointed to the CEB as a catalyst for many of the large systemic issues surrounding the "One UN" reform agenda

3.8.1   Integrated planning and analysis

The most significant guidelines for integration so far, the *Guidelines on Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)*, were endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006.

The intention of the IMPP is to bring all of the relevant components of the UN system together to develop a common approach in implementing Security Council mandates and the broader UN peacebuilding support strategy. According to the guidelines, the IMPP "aims to assist UN actors to achieve a common strategic and operational plan that is responsive to the objectives of the UN system and the Security Council mandate through a shared understanding of the priorities, programme interventions and organizing principles, clear delineation of responsibilities, and an organizational structure that supports these priorities ("form follows function"), based upon agencies' mandates".[xvii]

The IMPP thus extends from the headquarters to the field. It begins with a strategic assessment (convened by the Peacebuilding Support Office) and advance planning at headquarters (usually under the leadership of the DPKO), followed by operational planning, field-based planning and

transition planning (ideally jointly with the UNCT). The mission plan is a "living" document, i.e. it is regularly updated and reviewed. The success of the IMPP depends on three different mechanisms: the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) at headquarters level; the recently-established Integrated Operating Team (so far a DPKO/DFS entity); and the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT), which is "an integrated and dynamic structure at country level that brings together senior management, technical and operational staff on a regular basis to promote synergies, monitoring of progress, and adjustments to optimize impact".[xviii]

Preliminary reviews of the IMPP processes for Sudan, Burundi, the DRC and Haiti, which were referred to by a number of the participants at the conference, show that the process was helpful in bringing together all of the components of the UN system and establishing a common framework for understanding the context and UN priorities. Nonetheless, the IMPP was still seen to be flawed and to have insufficient high-level endorsement and support across the UN system and at senior management level at headquarters. Too little information about the IMPP has been disseminated from headquarters to the field, and the cumbersome document-creation process could impede effective integrated strategic planning. The non-involvement of key donors was also referred to as a problematic, and new and better ways to engage the donor community were called for.

3.8.2 The Joint Mission Analysis Centre and Joint Operations Command

On 1 July 2006, the DPKO issued a policy directive to establish two integrated planning and analytical structures at the field level: the Joint Operations Command (JOC), and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). These structures are designed to gather, collect and analyse important information, and to ensure timely and informed decision-making by the mission leadership to better respond to the need to regularly monitor fluid post-conflict environments, The JOC provides the SRSG and the SMT[xix] with integrated reporting on current operations and the day-to-day situation.[xx] The JMAC takes a longer-term analytical perspective to support mission planning and strategic decision-making.[xxi]

Participants pointed out that joint analysis of the driving factors of conflict is a vital precondition for improving delivery on the ground. A sound, joint analysis should include humanitarian, development, security, political and human rights perspectives. The right "mix" should be determined according to the country-specific context. Participants expressed the hope that the JMAC will to be a useful tool for mission management.[xxii]

While the IMPP and the DSRSG/RC/HC focus on integration beyond the DPKO-led peacekeeping operation, by actively including the UNCT in their structures, the JOC and JMAC focus primarily on the integration of the various entities within the DPKO-run mission structure. The JMAC, in particular, is tasked with outreach, but there is not yet any official inclusion of or relationship with the UNCT (despite the fact that the UNCT is formally part of the mission), the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), donors or NGOs.

The JMAC is a multidisciplinary analytical team, reflecting the spectrum of expertise found in multidimensional peacekeeping. However, there have been concerns that the JMAC's analyses are too biased toward operational needs and security considerations. Some of the participants felt

that this was fair criticism in some cases. Despite the many challenges the JMAC faces, it could be developed into a useful tool. To begin with, however, the exact purpose of the JMAC and who it is targeted towards needs to be established.

The importance of engaging regional and national partners for the success of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding was reiterated. The capacity of the host state and society and tools for evaluating the impact of international assistance are therefore essential for determining the success of the short-term impact and how good a foundation this will be for medium and long-term impacts.

3.9 Quick Impact Projects

Participants generally agreed that Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) can have a beneficial effect if they are well-designed and well-implemented. In a crucial phase of a mission, where the local population is uncertain and sceptical of it, QIPs can provide an immediate peace dividend. However, they should be used with care. If poorly planned and designed, QIPs can duplicate activities already initiated by development actors with a long-term plan. Care must also be taken to ensure that QIPs do not cross over into humanitarian territory. The guidelines developed by the DPKO and the OCHA were described by the participants as a very important step, but more efforts should be made to ensure that these are widely disseminated and understood. The guidelines should also be updated to better reflect the shifting realities and complexities (i.e. levels of use of force, military activities) on the ground.

Representatives from the development actors also highlighted the importance of drawing the development agencies into the process, as some of the activities implemented under the umbrella of a QIP or a rapidly dispersible funding mechanism were clearly development activities. Examples were given from Haiti, where a voluntary peace and reconciliation fund was established for the use of MINUSTAH. This was overseen by the DSRSG/HC/RC and implemented by the Force Commander in consultation with the former, in accordance with the UN guidelines. It was used to quickly address community needs and help to secure the fragile security and peace dividend, following military actions in the favelas, until the humanitarian and development actors were in place. This proved very effective, though questions remain regarding the reliability of such arrangements, as they depend on donors providing funds. The formal financial mechanisms of the UN are urged to revisit the issue.

4. Humanitarian and Human Rights Partnerships in UN Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations

It is important to address the issue of humanitarian aid, protection and human rights within the integrated missions context. During both the plenary and breakaway session, participants discussed in depth:

- the importance of increasing the focus on human rights in an integrated mission context;
- safeguarding the humanitarian space;
- the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator in an integrated mission;
- the protection of civilians as the centre of gravity for mission integration; and

- the dilemmas and challenges faced by international assistance.

4.1   Human Rights in an integrated mission context

In areas relating to human rights, considerable progress has been achieved in surmounting paradigmatic and institutional challenges. Considerable progress is also being achieved in ensuring appropriate prioritization of human rights concerns in mandate implementation, as well as the sustainment of human rights efforts following the draw-down of a peace operation. Participants agreed however, that more has to be done to ensure a consistent approach to human rights within all peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. From the perspective of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR), human rights enforcement is not what it should be. Security Council practice is often very inconsistent. As discussed previously, sequencing has become the problem when it comes to securing peace. This sometimes negates important issues that should be included right from the outset. This is often the case with human rights, included too late in the process. Representatives from the UNHCHR pointed out that this is far from ideal. But efforts are being made to improve the situation. The UNHCHR has worked to strengthen its contact with the DPKO, and this has bolstered human rights efforts in integrated missions. The UNHCHR has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the DPKO that has helped to clarify responsibilities and identify how to join forces to improve the human rights impact. Today, the UNHCHR provides the highest number of human rights officers to UN peacekeeping efforts (approximately 500).

The UNHCHR, alongside a number of other representatives from the humanitarian community, mentioned a number of problems that have arisen regarding how best to preserve not only their own role but also, and more importantly, human rights within an integrated mission context. In the case of human rights, the MoU has resolved to a large extent existing concerns. In cases where a UN peacekeeping mission has been withdrawn, reduced or transformed into a political mission, the UNHCHR has developed different models for maintaining its presence, still aiming for a system-wide approach to human rights. However, it was noted that cooperation with the DPA has not been the best possible, and participants urged that stronger efforts should be made in the future to improve the dialogue concerning the role of human rights in political affairs and peacebuilding.

4.2   Bridging conflicting paradigms: Humanitarian principles in an integrated mission context

The dilemmas surrounding the bridging of political, security and humanitarian paradigms and principles in an integrated setting were discussed at length at both the preceding seminars and the conference itself. The high tension that has often characterized discussion on humanitarian principles and imperatives has recently given way to a much more constructive debate. All parties agreed that creating and safeguarding humanitarian principles is a prerequisite for a successful mission, and that the establishment of an integrated setting does not mean that everything should necessarily be integrated. The importance of preserving humanitarian principles – that is the functional and perceived impartiality of humanitarian actors in the delivery of aid – in the contexts of multidimensional peace operations is no longer a disputed

principle, but the precise way to strike a correct balance between respect for this principle and the need for an integrated and coherent UN approach is still lacking. Clearly, the two types of response are mutually dependent; the delivery of humanitarian assistance is routinely delayed by lack of security, while the manipulation of humanitarian aid has been known to feed the cycle of conflict.

An important step towards striking the balance, as was noted by several of the participants representing the humanitarian organizations, is clarifying the concept of integration, and therefore, the implications of integration. It was stressed that in order to prevent humanitarian assistance from being manipulated for political ends, it is crucial that senior mission managers (who may not have extensive experience drawing a functional distinction between short-term humanitarian action, and long-term – political – aims of development assistance) understand that humanitarianism is not just a principle. When aid becomes overly politicized, the lives of humanitarian workers are at risk. Thus, one cannot be dismissive of or careless with the protection of impartiality.

Humanitarian organizations in general have been concerned that integrating humanitarian components into peace operations undermines the independence and impartiality of humanitarian actors. It is importance that they remain perceived as being impartial. It is also absolutely essential that they maintain a dialogue with all parties to a conflict, in order to gain access to all areas and can provide humanitarian assistance during critical phases of conflict and post-conflict situations.

The challenges to the protection of humanitarian principles and imperatives have become more complex in recent years. However, with regard to integrated missions, it is interesting to note that according to a recent study that was referred to during discussions, violence and impingement or restriction on the mobility of humanitarian workers have not been increasing within an UN integrated missions context. On the other hand, there is no doubt that concerns remain valid and should be addressed continuously.

Several of the participants noted that the integration debate has in fact improved the focus on a number of key humanitarian dilemmas. Not only have guidelines been reviewed as a result and better communication promoted, but cultural differences between the humanitarian and other components of a mission are also in the process of being addressed. The parties involved in a mission are better informed about each other's mandates, operating procedures, structures etc., which makes communication easier, and they have also reviewed their own approach to humanitarian issues.

4.3 The role of the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA

The complex role of the DSRSG/RC/HC and the implications for the role of the HC was discussed at length. There have been continuous worries that the role of the HC in this set-up would be undermined, and as a result a limited amount of time would be given to the issues the HC has the responsibility to deal with. Participants made the point that regardless of where the humanitarian component was placed structurally, there was still a need for full integration of humanitarian considerations at the senior management level. The location of the OCHA outside

the integrated structure, as recommended in the 2005 *Report on Integrated Missions*, has so far been found to secure the necessary impartiality and independence that humanitarian assistance requires. When needed, it should be given the latitude to operate autonomously at the operational level, albeit within the overall coordination of an integrated UN strategic framework. It was also stressed that an important function of this office, whether it is outside or within the mission structure, is to provide support and advice for the HC. As such, it is important to retain the function of the HC within the integrated mission senior leadership structure.

4.4   Protection of civilians

It was highlighted that the protection of civilians being is centre of gravity for mission integration. Participants focused on the dangerous vacuum that can arise between the short-term and long-term mechanisms for the protection of civilians. Both the military and the humanitarian components operate on a tight schedule, focusing on the acute need for protection. It is important that both engage rapidly and help secure a smooth transition to long-term protection and prevent a vacuum from developing. In other words, better communication and strategic planning on the ground are essential.

Participants also stressed the need for a strong mandate and robust and clear rules of engagement, as they are vital for effective protection of civilians. They assist the military component of the mission in more effectively implementing the necessary procedures, and prevent manipulation by spoilers. They also assist in clarifying roles and the division of responsibility for the protection of civilians between the key actors and stakeholders on the ground. The use of force in military operations can stimulate violence, unpredictability and opportunistic action. It was maintained that military force should only be used after all other options in the political tool box have been tried, and should never be employed in isolation. Military representatives underlined that military force is only effective if used within a larger political and development context.

Participants also pointed to the dilemma of the intrinsic need for the mandate implementation to be capable of both robust and nuanced action at the same time.

4.5   International assistance: dilemmas and challenges

Also essential in this equation is the institution of an inclusive process in which UN humanitarian actors and – importantly – the non-UN humanitarian community, which constitutes the bulk of the implementing capacity on the ground, are given input into the integration process. Non-UN actors, it was noted, often feel they have been shut out of the integrated strategy at the development stages. This, it was argued, can impact on the willingness of the broader humanitarian community to be "coordinated" under the auspices of the UN, and therefore also on the success of the mission as a whole. The dialogue or consultations could be informally done, but on a platform of mutual respect, i.e. wherein the UN recognizes the role and contribution of non-UN actors and consults them on critical areas. This, it was noted, might go a long way towards facilitating and informing the integration of humanitarian planning and coordination into the bigger mission. Failure to do so could further distil existing resistance to integration, where

integration is seen as subordination to political goals rather than fostering an environment of mutual trust and respect.

Humanitarian actors and development agencies also agreed that the above was further complicated by the general reluctance to admit the political effect that their presence can create, which in reality contradicts the reason for their resistance to integration. They point out that the fact that they are sometimes perceived as political players does not of itself require that all humanitarian activities or actors should be integrated, but that it does mean that humanitarian actors need to be better attuned to the theatre of operation. As a representative from the NGO community stated, "As NGOs we need to be self-critical – we have blurred the lines. We need to engage in a more rigorous debate about where we draw the line." Sound political analysis and clear assessments of context and needs do not impinge on humanitarian principles, it was argued. On the contrary, they can contribute to a clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities on the ground.

Participants also distinguished between humanitarian assistance and development assistance, with one participant stating that "everyone recognizes that development is intrinsically political, and so the use of development projects as political incentive will always be more acceptable to humanitarian groups than the use of emergency relief". The need to revisit the whole recovery agenda of international assistance was also highlighted, to address the gaps that often occur between humanitarian emergency responses and long-term development efforts.

Participants also referred to the ongoing humanitarian reform process, which has been setting important standards for all humanitarian activities, and serves as an example of an effective process of change. Lessons learned and best practices gained thus far should be further examined with a view to inform how to move forward with the integrated mission concept. On the basis of the recommendations in the Humanitarian Response Review,[xxiii] the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has developed the cluster approach, which aims to "strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies by ensuring that there is predictable leadership and accountability in all main sectors or areas of humanitarian response".[xxiv] At the field level, the cluster approach aims to increase the accountability of the humanitarian community to the HC, and vice versa.

5. Implementing UN Integrated Peace Operations: Re-aligning Mandates, Programmes and Resources

In these times, peacekeeping mission mandates are covering an increasingly broad range of activities. This entails an enormous increase in workload, and there is thus an urgent need to improve the structural relationship between mandates, programmes and resources. There are many overlapping and interconnected variables. Participants discussed some of the most relevant barriers, gave sound analyses, and made essential recommendations. The main focus was on:

- the need to avoid fixed templates;
- the importance of matching mandates with sufficient resources and political support (improving dialogue between the Security Council and other UN bodies);
- predictable and manageable funding;

- inter-organizational communication (addressing cultural barriers between the various UN entities);
- recognizing the key importance of a demographic and gender-sensitive approach to planning; and
- creating incentives for greater coherence and integration.

5.1   Avoiding fixed models or templates

One recommendation that was repeated at all the regional seminars was the avoidance of fixed templates. Rigid organizational templates make integration much more difficult in the field. Templates that are developed at headquarters level are often based on ideal circumstances or previous operations, and do not take into account the actual capacity within the mission, the broader UN system, the international community, or even the host state and society. In other words, integration models should be designed to fit the specific needs, capacity and goals of the UN effort in the country concerned.

As mentioned above, the lack of staff, together with the additional strain of inflexible templates and guidelines, makes it difficult to carry out necessary adaptations in the field to ensure coherence both within and outside the UN system. In spite of this, studies show that adaptations have been made at the field level, but these have been on the initiative of staff members, who have sought to find ways of working around rigid guidelines and templates. In other words, many of the innovations to improve integration in the field have taken place in spite of, not due to, UN policies and procedures.

The workload expected at the mission should be based on its capacity not the desired impact. Listing all the expected accomplishments and actual resources and indicators of achievement should primarily be used as a strategic management tool. These can also serve as an internal information system for mid- and senior-level managers, to get a better idea of the state of affairs in various sections, and make adjustments as needed. Budgets should also reflect the capacities required, and capacities should be adjusted in line with the situation as it evolves. In connection with preparing the budget, the existing capacities on the ground should be evaluated, and efforts should be made to capitalize on these capacities before proposals for new resources are put forward.

As stressed above, an integrated approach requires flexible and adaptable templates and guidelines, in order to deal with the changing dynamics of post-conflict environments. But at the same time, accountability must be ensured. It is vital that each UN entity follows a standard set of procedures, ensuring professionalism and accountability. The nexus between the need for a flexible structure and structural guidelines that facilitate accountability inevitably leads to tensions that should nevertheless somehow be addressed.

5.2   Backing up mandates with resources

One of the most important building blocks of a peacekeeping operation is the Security Council mandate. Participants noted that mandates are too often "recycled", and therefore do not cater well for the individual character of each particular mission. It is therefore important that

sufficient time is taken to draft a relevant mandate that takes the desired impact into account. Time is not the only variable here; a sound analysis and evaluation of the situation on the ground is also required. Secondly, the review process needs a thorough improvement. Both the mandate itself and the situation in the field need to be reviewed, re-evaluated and updated throughout the mission. In other words, there must be flexibility in planning, design and implementation. Form must follow function. Just as the situation on the ground changes over time, so must the mission. It must be able to adapt and evolve, and in this way respond more appropriately to the reality of the situation. Mission mandates need to be flexible in such a way that the mission can reconfigure as it goes, and the Security Council needs to be held accountable to do this.

One of the most obvious barriers to coherence is the simple fact that Security Council mandates involve several different UN funds and programmes that are not accountable to the Security Council. As a result, the DPKO may be charged with implementing a mission mandate where many of the necessary resources are withheld, subject to intergovernmental negotiations in the General Assembly. Participants welcomed the Security Council's increased willingness to issue multidimensional mandates, but saw an urgent need for better integration in New York of the necessary elements for the review of mandates. On a positive note, the Security Council's recent efforts to step up their visits to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and areas of operations was described a very positive step forward (if a bit costly, as the costs are deducted from the mission budget directly) in strengthening links between the formation of mandates and the realities of missions. There was a call to systematize such visits, including for and with other parts of the intergovernmental system (i.e. the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Administrative and Budgetary Committee, aka the Fifth Committee), to foster more informed deliberations and dialogue in New York.

What needs to be done to give effective oversight to implement multidimensional mandates effectively? Discussions underscored the fundamental importance of improving consultations and dialogue between the various UN bodies and the Security Council. At present, consultations are of a superficial character. There is too little substantive exchange of views on what can realistically be accomplished given the time-frame and the constraints on the ground. These constraints include the forces available for deployment, the accommodation for both military and civilian personnel, and the infrastructure in the area of operation. It was recommended by some participants that Members of the SC need to interact with those who have developed a solid analysis of the specific needs of the mission, prior to issuing the mandate to authorize the mission.

5.3   Predictable yet flexible funding

The above discussion ties directly into the issue of predictable and manageable funding. As mentioned, effective peace operations need resources from programmes and funds that are organized under the General Assembly and the ECOSOC. In order to secure predictable funding, it was recommended in the breakaway session that missions need first of all to prepare more realistic budget submissions. It was argued that this would improve the relationship and interaction with the General Assembly's ACABQ, which would again result in better recommendations to the General Assembly and a better decision by the Fifth Committee on

funding and provision for the mission. The interdependency between the various elements of the chain described above were emphasized throughout the conference.

Participants pointed out that baseline data is required for shaping plans and arguments for the necessary funds. Little seems to have been learned from previous deployments and the general recognition that missions evolve and budgets submissions and deliberations have to be adapted accordingly. Realistic assessments of actual deployment schedules of troops and civilian personnel always pose a problem in budget submissions, given past deployment and recruitment experiences. It was noted that it is equally difficult for the ACABQ and the General Assembly to accept what may look like an overly optimistic budget submission from the UN Secretary General compared with previous budgets. In other words, given the present budget system it is important to strengthen the ability to convince the General Assembly of actual funding needs. If not, it can easily become less than forthcoming in the provision of much needed resources.

However, despite sound arguments being put forward during management and budgetary processes, mandates can unfortunately also be affected by political bickering between Member States. While Member States will analyse and evaluate budget submissions on their merits, this requires that there is a technically sound budget submission, leaving very little room for politicization. While, naturally, a degree of politicization is unavoidable, weak budget submissions and processes invite a great deal of it.

5.4   Pooling of resources

The unpredictability of funding was also discussed. There are too many structural discrepancies within the system that prevent predictable funding. The different budgeting systems that the mission and the UNCT rely on, assessed contributions and voluntary contributions, respectively, cause many unnecessary setbacks for implementation.

Moreover, due to the growing complexity of mandates, many aspects fall outside the traditional peacekeeping area, and they may not be fully covered by the assessed contributions. This means that the DSRSG/RC/HC has to raise voluntary contributions to cover parts of the mandate drawn up by the Security Council. A further complication is that voluntary funding is often subject to restrictions that can be highly counterproductive to integration and can make it difficult to move funds quickly to where they are needed at a critical time. In other words, the pooling of resources is very important and Member States need to be made aware of their ability to change the current system.

5.5   Inter-organizational communication

Cultural barriers between the various UN entities make already-strained integration efforts even more difficult. As the UN has evolved over the years, so have the various funds and agencies, in line with their various mandates and programmes (humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, rule of law, etc.). As a result, the UN today consists of many different entities each with its own culture, language and procedures. Moreover, these entities do not know enough about each other, which creates a significant barrier to the development of integrated strategies and approaches.

Participants urged the building of stronger connections and the sharing of information between these entities. The importance of cross-sector employment was also brought up in this context.

Issues relating to decision-making procedures and processes also came into the discussion. Whereas the DPKO and other Secretariat-based entities tend to be very headquarters-driven and thus centralized in their decision-making processes, other parts of the UN system (funds, programmes, and specialized agencies with field presence, including the World Bank) are more field-driven. For example, it is the World Bank director on the ground who develops the strategic framework for adoption at his or her headquarters in Washington, which then secures the necessary political support to ensure that the needs in the field are met in the best possible way. The different decision-making procedures reduce the potential for real coordination and integration on the ground, especially between the DPKO or the DPA and the UN Country Teams.

Several participants referred to communication difficulties with headquarters. For example, missions receive code cable after code cable, written by staff officers who have no or limited insight into the realities on the ground, and these are more or less useless. Participants reported that in cases where the senior management of the mission has taken a stance, progress could be made and integration was possible, but this entails a considerable personal risk on the part of the managers concerned as it sometimes involves "working around" the existing rules and regulations of the UN system. Several participants noted the need to adapt the current regime to one that actually supports the UN as a field actor, and not continuously adopt rules and regulations that may well work if your area of operation resides on first avenue in New York, and not where the majority of all UN activities take place, namely in complex and highly fluid situations on the ground. It was pointed out that the division of the DPKO into two departments has given more leverage to the budget and administrative side of the mission, which is run by a very headquarters-driven decision-making process (as these activities are also closely linked to the Department of Management). This has been and continues to be an obstacle to efficiency on the ground and much depends on how the mission leadership team "gets along".

There was little mention of the roles of the Department of Management and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at the conference, beyond the general comment that they are ineffective and out of touch with the reality of the field. The Department of Management is in charge of more than 80% of the total peacekeeping procurement budget, and serves as the focal point in the negotiations with member states on budget-related issues. The fact that most Department of Management employees have little or no experience from the field, and yet are responsible for procurement to meet the needs of the mission and the mission mandate, has contributed to difficulties in aligning mandates with sufficient resources in a timely fashion.

The case of Afghanistan was given as an example of complex decision-making procedures and how these impact on coordination efforts on the ground. The DPKO and the DPA have primarily headquarters-driven processes, whereas the UN funds and programmes involved, the IFIs and NGOs have very decentralized processes. NATO has a highly centralized structure, balancing its decision-making between its headquarters in Brussels, its planning base in Germany and each troop-contributing country's national structure. In addition, decisions pertaining to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are made in the NATO capital in question. Similarly, the EU's

programmes and activities tend to be designed in Brussels. Further complications are caused by the bilateral donors and actors who set their humanitarian and development priorities in a process that is rarely coordinated with their PRT. Great progress has been made, including the recruitment of a SRSG for Afghanistan, and the efforts to integrate national programmes into an overall UN-led strategy. The participants made it clear, however, that unless such strategies and programmes are backed by political support (at all levels and at all headquarters and capitals), and are given sufficient authority and the funding needed to reinforce that authority, little can be achieved.

5.6 Recognizing the key importance of a demographic and gender-sensitive approach to planning

An important but often neglected issue, both in the integration discussion and in connection with the implementation of mandates, is the need for a demographically sound and gender-sensitive approach, with particular focus on the role of women and children in conflict. A simple indicator of the level of success in our peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts is the extent to which the lives of women and children have improved. Participants stressed the urgency of stronger focus on the situation of women and children in conflict and post-conflict settings. How can we give women a stronger voice and position in a situation of post-crisis recovery? There are clear gaps that need to be filled both at the planning stages of an integrated mission and in the actual implementation phase. Improvements in this area can boost integration in the field. As studies show, there is a strong correlation between the inclusion of the gender perspective in a mission's activities and the level of cooperation between the mission and the UNCT. Participants also stressed the urgent need to reduce sexual violence against women. It is vital therefore that the entire UN system on the ground can be mobilized to prevent, respond to and reduce sexual violence, through a joint approach to planning, advocacy and action.

5.7 Creating incentives for greater coherence and integration

A frequent point of discussion was the need for a more incentive-based culture of integration. This is beginning to be seen in the UN, but much work remains before rules and procedures for integration are streamlined. It was agreed that it is critical to ensure a higher level of accountability with regard to integration. This should be measured by the impact on the ground by actors in the field and at headquarters, as well as across institutional boundaries. Financial leverage was also identified as a key element for creating better incentives (see chapter 2 on management and leadership).

Participants also recommended using the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as an incentive for UN entities that are reluctant to integrate. This would help them to look beyond their own mandates and to focus on common objectives, which in turn would encourage integrated planning.

6. Integrated Planning and Evaluation

Participants discussed many of the central issues surrounding planning and evaluation, such as the urgent need for strategic planning to consider the question of resources, and the need to bring

all relevant actors into the planning process at an early stage to improve both strategic and operational integration. Other important issues discussed by the participants were:

- the importance of evaluating integration reforms;
- incorporating incentives and accountability into plans;
- the avoidance of a sequential approach in planning;
- local programming processes, ownership and planning;
- the use of planning and evaluation as tools to assess the impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the whole mission, including the various UN agencies that are directly engaged in long-term peacebuilding;
- the importance of effective and coherent partnerships;
- the need to define the "priorities of the priorities" and the necessity of close communication between headquarters and the field; and
- the use of monitoring and evaluation as tools for benchmarking and mapping best practices for improved adaptation.

6.1   Strategic planning

Participants acknowledged the role of the DPKO in coordinating the planning of integrated missions and their implementation. However, planning has often proven to be inadequate. The participants also underlined on numerous occasions how important it is that integration is evaluated not only within the context of the DPKO-led operation, but also within the framework of the entire UN presence during the course of a peace operation. This echoes the definition of integrated missions found in the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): "An Integrated Mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level."[xxv]

Planning is too often based on past experience and does not adequately take into account the specific situation of the mission in question.

Moreover, effective planning requires the incorporation of incentives and accountability mechanisms for each UN entity. In practice, strategies rarely take into account those in charge of implementing activities in the field. Another important point raised was that integrated mission planning is a comprehensive process and requires an increase in staff capacity both in the mission and in the UNCT. In many cases, a lack of planning capacity means that non-DPKO agencies are not able to adjust their programmes sufficiently in order to implement the integrated strategy. In other words, the lack of planning capacity has direct consequences for implementing coherent activities.

The participants applauded the DPKO's IMPP initiative. Although it is still an imperfect planning tool, it has the potential to improve the Secretariat's response to Security Council mandates. It was stressed that it has to take much more account of national programmes, actors and international partners, and needs to be based on field-driven assessments and constant adaptation to the needs, context and political realities on the ground.

Again, the need to avoid sequential thinking when planning received mention. Participants pointed out that planning should take the efforts of all the involved components of the UN system into account.

Participants also made clear that all actors should be brought into the planning process as early as possible in order to avoid duplication and use resources efficiently. The question of resources and competence needs to be addressed in this connection. Discussions in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee tend to be linked to the mandate and assessed needs, instead of the realistic needs on the ground. There is a need for a realistic assessment of the available resources before strategic planning takes place.

When it comes to the complex relationship between local ownership and planning, it was stressed that the gap between rhetoric and reality needs to be closed. Local engagement and the sharing of priorities is key. Actors at the operational level have an essential role to play in obtaining local ownership.

6.3 Partnerships and coordinated planning

In order to achieve effective and coherent partnerships, mission planning needs to clarify what other actors (such as the national government, bilateral donors, the World Bank, the IMF) are doing. The activities and funding of these actors will generally be governed by a post-conflict needs assessment and by a reconstruction and development or recovery planning process that runs in parallel to the IMPP. These should to be linked as early as possible to the UN process. Linking personnel was suggested as a good way of gaining knowledge of each other. A key question the mission should ask is: Are our plans aligned with the national recovery plan and/or donor strategies?

Participants also stressed the importance of cooperation with the IFIs, and in particular the World Bank. It was rightly pointed out that unless the mission seeks to ensure a common set of priorities for strategic planning and programmes, there will be no guarantee that integrated strategies will be funded, and thus implemented. In other words, integrated planning does not automatically mean integrated funding. The current IMPP guidelines are not designed to include bilateral donors and the IFIs.

6.4 Defining core priorities

There is also a need to define the "core priorities" of the mission mandate (protection of civilians already mentioned as a key priority in most multidimensional mandates) based on a realistic analysis of the situation, including local capacities and resources, even when these are not deemed "sufficient" according to international standards. At a minimum they provide a framework in which capacity-building efforts can be designed and adapted, in contrast to the current tendency to discount certain elements, and develop a new model that proves impossible for the country to absorb. Awareness of this factor should guide decision-makers from the beginning. There is also a need for greater flexibility in setting, reviewing and adapting priorities during the implementation process.

Headquarters needs to be continuously informed about what is happening in the field, and the UNCT needs to be an integral part of the planning process. This could be facilitated by using, and more importantly standardizing the use of, IT tools in the early planning process to allow efficient exchange of information (for example, ensuring that all actors have access to the mission intranet and related databases, sharing best practices, lessons learned, peacemaking data, etc). Another suggestion was the development of a web portal, linked to the mission intranet site, to provide information on current UNCT activities (for example where programmes are being run, their timeline, focus, priorities, cycles, partners etc, as well as lessons learned and observations from their geographical and thematic areas of deployment).

6.5   Monitoring and evaluation

Participants also discussed dilemmas surrounding monitoring and evaluation. These should be used as tools in benchmarking and for mapping best practices for improved adaptation. But participants were not in complete agreement about whether or not they should be a management responsibility. Some felt that they should be, since managers are engaged in the day-to-day tasks of their divisions, sections or departments. They would thus be better positioned to carry out evaluations themselves and make adjustments as necessary. Others felt that monitoring and evaluation is such a specialized area that dedicated capacities should be devoted to such tasks. One concern regarding the latter point of view is that it means creating an additional layer in the structure of the mission, which complicates the structure and may lead to unforeseen problems. It was stated however, that if integration is presumed to improve the way the UN operates and the impact on the affected society, there is an urgent need to improve the monitoring and evaluation capacity and tools of the organization, to better assess the impact of both integration reforms and peace operations over time. This could also assist in promoting better mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency for delivery. Better and more systematic use of indicators, benchmarks and impact assessment tools and processes could also assist in improving the understanding of the internal and external effects of the UN presence in general and the integration reforms specifically, and will be important both to dislodge perceptions of integration as an 'ideology' and ensure timely and informed configuration of the mission mandate to better respond to local needs and context.

Participants recommended that lessons learned by missions with good experience of monitoring and evaluation should be drawn on. For example, the missions in Liberia and Timor both had common benchmarks that were shared between sectors and actors. Participants also voiced the importance of a well-functioning best practice office within the mission that is linked to the mission leadership and the training unit, and can be used in developing and adapting training packages to address the ever-shifting needs and mission priorities.

7.   Partnerships in Multidimensional Peace Operations

A significant part of the integration debate focuses on improved cooperation with non-UN actors. Today, NGOs and other regional and international actors increasingly play a central role in post-conflict settings. Efforts to improve integration and thus increase the coherence and effectiveness of the UN machinery have inevitably had consequences for the quality of partnerships with NGOs. As the UN has not sufficiently included the NGO community in the discussion and development of the strategic integration frameworks, NGOs are reluctant to be coordinated in an integrated operational setting. This is an area where the UN needs to focus more attention. The discussions highlighted:

- the importance of aligning the various analytical, programming and financial tools in order to avoid duplicating and counteracting activities in the field;
- the importance of knowing when *not* to integrate; and
- the importance of shared baseline analysis.

7.1   Partnerships

There are many barriers to achieving coherent partnerships and because of the time-consuming process this entails, the question has to be asked in each case: What is the purpose of this partnership? What are we seeking to achieve through coordination? Partnerships should be based on complementary capacities and result-oriented activities as one participant stated, "You have to ask what you are responsible for and how you are accountable. We are all for coordination as long as it is reality-based." If not, more harm than good may be done. Not all assistance is necessarily helpful. This has proven time and again to be a difficult lesson for the international community to learn.

The simple fact that there is a vast number of different organizations is also a real challenge to achieving successful partnerships. It was stressed by some participants that criteria have to be carefully set in order to select the top 20 most relevant actors. Carefully chosen partnerships can be effective.

7.2   Shared analysis

The importance of a shared baseline analysis was identified as a prerequisite for effective partnerships. Harmonized strategies and adequate exchange of information are also vital for avoiding duplication and ensuring effective results in the field. In other words, efforts should be made to base cooperation on common principles, agree on the boundaries of integration and cooperation, and facilitate regular consultations. This calls for a serious review and streamlining of the current structure of joint analysis tools. Such guidelines for drawing up strategic assessments could serve as a useful baseline in this regard, even though they do not sufficiently deal with how to bring in partners from outside the UN system. They could also be developed further to address the need for a shared baseline and analysis, both with a view to improving the adaptation of the international response, and with a view to developing effective partnerships where relevant.

8.   The Regional Context: Building, Restoring and Supporting Local Processes

There was general agreement that understanding the regional context was essential for understanding the underlying reasons for conflict. It was also pointed out that knowledge of the historical and cultural context is just as important for the formation of a sound analysis of the conflict in question.

There was further agreement that the involvement of the host country (including representatives of both the government and civil society) is essential if the mission is ever to succeed. Participants agreed that, while it is crucial to continue to seek to integrate efforts, integration will not be effective unless there is dialogue with the people of the country concerned. Participants focused on:

- how to avoid the problem of institutional dependency and instead build national capacity;
- the conflict between the need for speed and the need for ownership that easily arises in a post-conflict reconstruction situation;
- managing the expectations of the local community;
- the role of the host government at the operational level of planning; and
- innovations from the field relating to local ownership.

8.1 Local ownership and capacity building

The issue of local ownership was raised repeatedly during the conference. It is pivotal for the success of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Gaining and consolidating the confidence of the host state and society is obviously vital for the mission to achieve its goals. However, building local capacity has unfortunately proven extremely difficult. It seems that one not only runs the risk of establishing the wrong priorities but also reducing and in the worst cases undermining local capacity. As it was pointed out by one of the participants, "You can only be sure that you have succeeded when indigenous structures in government can take control and do the work that you are doing at the moment."

In post-conflict reconstruction, there is tension between the need for speed and the need for ownership. It is important to deliver peace dividends quickly to the local population, but it is equally important that (re-)building local capacity should already have started, right from the planning stage. These two targets may not be easy to combine. As one participant commented, "Consequently, a tension exists between the international community's efforts to deliver services directly to the population, and its efforts to build the capacity of the state to deliver these services."

One of the most important things is to manage the expectations of the local community. Locals need to know what to realistically expect. Good communication strategies that convey what the international community can provide in both the short and long-term are important in this respect.

Participants agreed that increased emphasis should be given to the role of the host government at the operational level of planning. This has been an area where it has been difficult to link peacekeeping, budget planning and capacity-building. Building capacity in post-conflict contexts

is particularly difficult because of the absence or weakness of governmental counterparts. In these circumstances, the tendency has been that the UN builds capacity according to strategic plans, with little consideration of local perspectives and needs. In other words, instead of building local capacity, the UN builds its own capacity to deliver. There was strong agreement that capacity-building efforts on the part of the international community are far from satisfactory. Innovation is clearly lacking. Unless the capacity of the host state is improved, efforts will not be sustainable. It is therefore vital to strengthen coordination between strategy development (planning for peacekeeping deployment) and planning with the host government with a view to developing national strategic plans. As one participant stressed, "If the host government does not buy into the priorities, you will not be able to implement the plans going forward; they follow the priorities laid out in national recovery plans."

8.2 Innovations from the field – compacts, strategies, and integrated offices

There have been numerous innovations at the field level to better address issues relating to local ownership, national programming and capacity building in general. One of these innovations is the concept of the *compact*, [xxvi] or governance strategy, that emerged in 2005, and has been further developed since. Compacts are agreements between governments hosting peace operations and the international community to improve governance.[xxvii]

8.2.1 Compacts, pacts and consolidation frameworks

Compacts, or peace consolidation frameworks or strategies were referred to as cross-sectoral programmes, encompassing the governance aspects of the economic, political, administrative and security sectors. They are developed and implemented as a means to support increased integration by establishing a common strategy and standard against which both the host government and the international community (i.e. donor governments, IFIs, the UN) hold themselves accountable. Current compacts include the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program in Liberia (GEMAP), the Afghanistan Compact, the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact for Sierra Leone (IGAP), the International Compact with Iraq (ICI), and the UN Integrated Peace Consolidation Framework for Burundi (IPCF). In addition, the UN Mission in DR Congo, MONUC, has developed a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) with the UNCT and the World Bank. The compacts were described as unprecedented efforts, originating and pushed forward by the field missions, to create a joint framework linking the programmes and activities of the UN and the World Bank with those of the key donors, regional actors and most importantly the host government. The GEMAP, it was noted, had proven very effective in encompassing a powerful oversight mechanism overlooking all international efforts to realign these with the national programming objectives. The CAS on the other hand has reportedly been most effective in harnessing inter-agency support on the ground and the IGAP in overcoming some of the administrative and operational hurdles of working as "one", both within the UN and with the Government. The difference in approach and means of implementation underlines that while there is full agreement that such a framework is needed and indeed deemed useful, there is no blueprint as to exactly what it should look like.

9. International Contact Group on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations

In his opening address, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, suggested that the an Integrated Missions contact group should be established at the intergovernmental level, in close collaboration with all stakeholders, especially at field level, to discuss specific issues as a follow-up to the conference. This would not in any way substitute official forums that already exist, or aim to have any political decision-making authority.

Participants welcomed the idea of a contact group that could be a tool for coming to grips with some of the key challenges identified during the series of seminars and the conference. They pointed out, however, that the aim and purpose of this contact group should be defined more clearly in the time ahead. Mr Støre agreed, and encouraged all participants to become actively engaged and share their suggestions.

Several suggestions were put forward during breakaway discussions. The view was put forward that the group should be an informal "meeting place" that encourages open and frank discussions, which is often not the case in most formal, high-level settings. Secondly, it was suggested that the contact group could be a useful vehicle for communication between capitals and the field (missions). Participants also thought the contact group should focus on specific topics, for example a particular mission, or a particular challenge or barrier within the integration debate. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry volunteered to host the first meeting of the contact group sometime during 2008, but underlined that the opportunity was also open for others and encouraged all members interested in UN reform to take this on or to co-host such an event, preferably in the field.

10.   Conclusion

UN peacekeeping missions operate increasingly in complex environments that call for a multidimensional and an integrated approach. The conference made it clear that the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding architecture is currently faced with both political and operational overstretches, and the demand continues to exceed supply. Participants expressed the clear understanding that, when a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission is given a multidimensional mandate by the Security Council, an integrated approach to implementation is an operational imperative. However, participants also provided clear examples showing that, while there has been some progress in achieving integration, there is still a significant divide between integration as a policy ideal and integration as a reality on the ground. As a result, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are "moving targets" that continue to grow in size and complexity, making it difficult to assess precisely how implementation can and should take place.

Moreover, the global call for a more integrated and coherent approach to countries in, emerging from, or affected by conflict, does not necessarily mean that we have to do more, but we have to do things differently. Participants highlighted that, despite the daunting tasks at hand, there has already been significant progress towards making peace operations more effective and efficient on the ground. However, the progress achieved had not been systematic, but has rather been due to innovative approaches by key personnel.

Some of the main issues, principles and best practices that were identified during the conference have been raised time and again in various reform discussions and reports. However, they are still important, and have not yet been addressed in a systematic manner. One of the most marked needs is ensuring sufficient support for this process. Participants suggested that this could be even more important than developing new tools and solutions.

Key problems that were highlighted were:

- national funding approaches and deliberations,
- absent or contradictory intergovernmental political decisions and partners,
- weak communication between the Security Council and the rest of the UN system,
- mandates involving elements of the UN system not accountable to the Security Council
- the lack of political will to provide information, and generate necessary political support and processes,
- scarce and inflexible resources and a general need to better match mandates with assessed funding and create the necessary bridge to voluntary funding,
- the disconnection between strategic level HQ policy processes and operational implementation on the ground,
- the fact that the UN's working methods are far too centralized, and the need to develop a field-based organization,
- the failure to adequately select and train senior leadership and provide leaders with robust, clear mandates underpinned by commonly agreed doctrines,
- the failure to build functional and complementary leadership teams charged with implementing the UN responses on the ground,
- the urgent need for a more decentralized structure, where authority is delegated to the field, without which real integration will not be possible,
- the failure to re-align human resources and administrative practices and create incentives for greater inter-agency mobility, and
- the need to break down cultural barriers and optimize the collective insights and resources of the various organizations.

FOOTNOTES

i These conference proceedings have been prepared by Anja T. Kaspersen and Kristina L. Revheim. The views expressed in this introduction and throughout the volume should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of, or being endorsed by, the Norwegian government, the United Nations or other institutions with which contributors are associated. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the authors.

ii The authors would like to extend a warm thank-you to all presenters, speakers, facilitators and participants at the Oslo Conference for sharing their invaluable lessons, experiences and insights. A special thank-you goes to Espen Barth Eide, Colin Keating, Mohammad Tal, Susanna P. Campbell, Spyros Demetriou, Erin Weir, Halvor Sætre Barry Kavanagh and Jostein Leiro for insightful comments and support. The conference proceedings were shared with all conference participants for comments prior to being finalized.

iii Individual seminar proceedings can be downloaded from www.regjeringen.no/integratedmissions

iv Leverage is used here to describe the nature and level of influence or power to act effectively.

v Campbell, Kaspersen and Weir *Integrated Missions Revisited* Conference Background Note, Synthesis of Finding. October 2007.

vi "Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimension of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy". UNSG *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, paragraph 4.

vii 360-degree feedback is a multi-source feedback mechanism in which each employee, including the manager is evaluated and appraised by his or her peers. It should be noted that the impact and effect of the mechanism is increasingly being debated, questioning whether the 360-degree feedback system, if not sufficiently adapted to the organizational profile in question, can also negatively affect an organization's performance.

viii Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

ix Charles Call, Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA, 31 January 2005, p. 24.

x Claire Messina, *Strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator system*, Force Migration Review, 2007

xi The DPA was invited but did not attend any of the conferences/seminars.

[xii] *Guidelines for the Implementation of the Lead Department Concept Concerning Field Operations*, 13 June 2000

[xiii] Charles Call, *Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA*, 31 January 2005, p. 26.

[xiv] The Integrated Missions Planning Process is designed to provide a common understanding through an inclusive planning process that engages the capacities of all the parts of the UN system that are relevant for achieving the shared objectives in a given country setting.

[xv] The guidelines state that the project in question meets the requirements of the PBF if it: falls within the scope of the Terms of Reference of the PBF and seeks to support national capacities in sustaining peace; the project intends to address an unforeseen and critical intervention which would constitute an imminent threat to a peace or reconciliation process if not addressed in a timely manner; there are no other funding sources available which could be tapped into to implement the project; the activities proposed under the project are time-limited in nature (up to six months); where the project forms part of a longer term approach, it must be demonstrated that its activities can be sustained through other funding sources, beyond the completion of the project; appropriate consultations with key stakeholders have taken place during the design of the project; national authorities have fully endorsed the project (in exceptional circumstances, the Head of the PBSO can agree to waiver this requirement); budgetary requirements are expected to be modest and should remain well within the approval limit of US$ 1 million; and the UN Organization submitting the project has concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with UNDP's Multi Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF). (www.unpbp.org)

[xvi] UN Document DP/2007/7 *Implementation of the reform programme of the Secretary-General and the provisions of the triennial policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system,* paragraph 1.

[xvii] United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP Guidelines) endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006, p. 4.

[xviii] IMPP Guidelines, p. 3.

[xix] The Senior Management Team includes the Head of Mission and his/her deputies, usually the PDSRSG/RC/HC, Force Commander, and/or Police Commissioner.

[xx] DPKO Policy Directive, p. 3.

[xxi] Philip Shetler Jones Intelligence in integrated UN peacekeeping missions: the supportive potential and diagnostic properties of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Journal of International Peacekeeping, forthcoming (fall 2008).

[xxii] DPKO took the initiative to develop the JMAC concept. The objective being to ensure that all peacekeeping missions have integrated operations monitoring, reporting and information analysis hubs in place at mission HQ to support a more effective integration of mission-wide situation awareness, security information and analyses for management decision-making.

[xxiii] Humanitarian Response Review, August 2005.

[xxiv] Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) *Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response*, 24 November 2006.

[xxv] IMPP, p. 3.

[xxvi] Campbell and Kaspersen *Confronting Integration: The UNs integration reforms and their barriers*. Journal of International Peacekeeping. Forthcoming (fall 2008).

[xxvii] PBPS Internal Document – Governance Agreements, paragraph 1. PBPS, November 2006.