From Coherent Policy to Coordinated Practice:

Are We Delivering Coherently in Afghanistan?

Conference | Oslo 17-18 November 2008 | Grand Hotel

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Background paper

In this paper we argue that the key conference question "are we delivering coherently in Afghanistan" can usefully be complemented by two additional, related questions: "are we delivering well" and "are we delivering in a way that is optimal for our Afghan counterparts". Coherence is important only insofar as it helps the international community contribute to the fulfilment of the ultimate end goal in Afghanistan: The development of stable power systems and structures that can provide human security and development for its citizens. If the national government in Kabul is to extend its writ and authority, including gaining popular support and further increasing its institutional capacity, it will need to be supported, not undermined, by international assistance.

While the international community's engagement in Afghanistan potentially provides important solutions to Afghanistan's problems, it may also in some ways constitute part of the challenge the country is facing. Two issues stand out as particularly problematic: rivalry between various international actors and the danger that such actors create parallel structures that undermine those of the nascent Afghan state.

First, there are real political differences among the international actors in Afghanistan. The friction between them is not only due to technicalities or organisational problems. It is easy for all actors engaged in Afghanistan to agree with the end goal we listed above. However, as with all overarching goals, this one can also be disaggregated into a hierarchy of mid-term objectives. The priority given to the different objectives and the sequencing of actions to reach them will be disputed according to the political perspectives and functional roles of the actors involved. Moreover, the will to allocate resources to obtain the different goals will vary among actors. Some actors may share the above goal, in principle, but may only be willing to finance a bare minimum version of it (i.e. an Afghan state capable of preventing the export of narcotics and terrorism).

Rivalry and friction between international actors may be unavoidable. But both continuous infighting among them, and the periodically intense search for operational and organisational concepts to facilitate cooperation be-

tween them, may consume time and resources better spent elsewhere and dilute the efforts made in the respective missions. The negative consequences stemming from fragmentation of the international efforts during the first phases of the operation in Afghanistan suggest that more cooperation, coordination and coherence are needed. But this does not come free of charge: human and financial resources are required. This begs the question: at what point does the investment in international coherence become cost ineffective? And how much coherence is needed in relation to achieving individual objectives?

Second and importantly, a strong and internally coherent international presence does not automatically result in equally strong and coherent national institutions in the host country. Instead, as has been amply discussed in the context of Afghanistan in recent years, heavy international presence may create local institutions dependent on the international community.[1] Local institutions may become geared towards meeting the demands and perceived expectations of that community rather than the needs and expectations of the Afghan people. Clearly, such institutions are unlikely to prosper or become self-sustainable. A related problem is that international actors tend to drain local institutions for competent employees, thereby further undermining the prospects of indigenous structures.

In the following we will discuss these dilemmas in the context of three issues:

- the relationship between the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), UNAMA and Afghan authorities
- donor coordination
- transfer of authority to civilian actors in insecure areas

1. PRTs, UNAMA and Afghan authorities

It was never intended that the PRT concept should become a fixed design for the international troop presence in Afghanistan. It was always the plan to eventually replace the PRT concept – all the more so as the limitations of the model have become increasingly apparent in recent years.[2] The central policy question at present seems to be

what mechanism should replace the PRTs and how the transition best can be handled and sequenced. Moreover and related, how can this be done in a way that supports rather than undermines the Afghan state?

Before embarking on a discussion on future templates, it might be helpful to highlight a few problems with the concept as it functions today. First, a basic challenge associated with strategising around the PRT concept is that little analyses has been undertaken to illustrate the security and development yields associated with the PRTs in relation to the costs for their upkeep. Barbara J. Stapleton has forcefully argued that the PRTs are "peripheral to the bigger political challenges in Afghanistan".[3] Doubts have also been cast regarding the efficiency of development projects, in particular the Quick Impact Projects (QIP).[4] Are there grounds for similar scepticism in relation to the security contributions of the PRTs? How much security is provided per million dollar spent on the upkeep of the PRTs?[5] Could there be other potentially more cost-effective ways for ISAF and ANA to provide security in the provinces?

A second challenge with the PRT concept today pertains to lines of authority. PRTs are clearly situated within ISAF's chain of command structure, but this, however, applies only to military activities.[6] Development and reconstruction initiatives are left to the discretion of the individual PRT's lead nation. This means that while there are relative coherence and coordination in the security contributions offered by the PRTs, the development initiatives are more randomly organised. In practice civilian and aid advisors within the PRTs often maintain a good dialogue with UNAMA and other development agencies, but in the process of determining aims, activities and funding the lead nation's development and foreign policy making bureaucracies play a central role. There is a chance that the direct line between individual PRTs and Western capitals is to the detriment of the coordinating role of Afghan authorities and UNAMA in Kabul (see also discussion under next subheading).[7]

On the backdrop of these and other challenges associated with the PRTs, increased co-operation between ISAF and UNAMA is being debated. At least two models are under discussion. Below, we present these two models and additional variations of these proposals. Our ideal type models are developed so as to guide strategic thinking – they should not, of course, be seen as immediate calls for action. An underlying dichotomy underpins these suggestions. This pertains to the role of international relative to Afghan institutions. Below, we first present five models/variations that are premised on 'autonomous' lead

over security and development de facto remaining in the hands of various combinations of international institutions. We end by presenting a model where Afghan national and provincial state structures take centre stage.

- One model envisions the co-location of UNAMA representatives with Regional Commands and PRTs, with these teams taking the lead in development issues.[8] If each UNAMA team consisted of 5–10 experts in each of the PRTs and RCs some 150–300 personnel are needed. In terms of resources that is a manageable challenge. The model could facilitate increased UNAMA–ISAF dialogue. Moreover, the UNAMA personnel stationed in the PRTs could help increase support from the PRTs, and indirectly donor states in charge of PRTs, on the realisation of Provincial Development Plans (PDP). There are, however, practical difficulties associated with this proposal. Co-located UNAMA personnel would face added security and mobility restrictions. Counter-arguments may also be raised at higher level, as the model could potentially entail a further entrenchment of the PRT concept as it functions today rather than spur evolution and possible downsizing. However, the most serious objections are probably found at the political level; the co-location of such teams with PRTs is unacceptable to UNAMA and the UN in general. The recent decision to build 5–6 OCHA offices, perhaps co-located with UNAMA, is likely to reinforce those political objections.

- It is possible to envisage a second related model: an Integrated Mission model where UNAMA's lead is extended to military affairs.[9] That would, for both practical and political reasons, not be acceptable to NATO or to the United States. Indeed, presently a transfer of command and control from NATO to US Central Command seems far more likely than a handover to the UN.

The political differences that block these solutions should be recognised as real. If reconciliation is at all possible it is not likely to happen soon. Such a recognition implies that efforts to push for very coherent and elegant solutions are very probably a waste of time and energy – resources that could be better spent elsewhere. Moreover, none of these models really address how to strengthen Afghan authorities.

- A third model suggests pulling out the development staff of the PRTs and re-locating them to UNAMA compounds or elsewhere. This model is likely to bring benefits for the (ex-)PRT development personnel in terms of increased mobility, less security restrictions

and more co-ordination with other development actors, including UN structures. This could achieve much of the same effects as the first model, but see below.

- A fourth model could be based upon a clean-cut functional burden sharing where PRTs concentrated solely on military issues and left all development tasks to UNAMA and other development actors.

Both these models are based upon a clear division of tasks between military and civilian actors. To some nations this may be perfectly logical and desirable. The ISAF PRT review calls for ISAF to recognise UNAMA's primacy in coordinating development support, and the need for UNAMA guidance in development issues. However, as new and emerging counterinsurgency doctrines strongly link development and security, such a sharp division might not be acceptable to major military contributors. This is particularly the case if long-term development plans are not perceived as supporting short-term security objectives. Such agreement will not be easy to achieve as the relationship between different development strategies and security on different levels is highly disputed both between and within the international development segment and the corresponding military segment. More-

over, the effects of these models would depend upon donor nations' will to integrate funding. Mere co-location or burden sharing would not solve the basic problems. Again, the basic problems are political, not questions of organisational designs. And again, none of them take local capacity building directly into account.

- A fifth model could envisage a transfer from international military to international civilian leadership and increased focus on civilian tasks in the PRT, but along national lines. Here, the PRT lead nations would simply run this process themselves and, for instance, replace a Norwegian military officer with a Norwegian civilian diplomat or bureaucrat from the MFA. This is a likely future development in several PRTs (entailing a move from PRT via Regional Stability Team to Regional Development Team).

The fifth model would probably lead to an increase in national development spending through the PRTs. That, in turn, would increase the negative fragmentation of the international effort. As will be discussed later, such a model could further weaken donor coordination and Afghan ownership.

All of the models above would include cooperation with

UNAMA and ISAF at the provincial level

In order to help facilitate the conference discussion on co-operation, coherence and potential co-location, we present below an overview of the structure and presence of key actors in the provinces.

Whatever model is chosen, there is a need for support of Afghan authorities throughout the country. There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan and the strength and capabilities of local institutions vary strongly. ISAF has six Regional Commands and 26 PRTs, while UNAMA has eight regional offices and nine provincial offices. Most UNAMA offices and many PRTs support several provinces. Furthermore:

- 15 out of 17 UNAMA offices are located in towns where there is an ISAF RC or a PRT. In other words, the physical requirements for cooperation are more or less in place.

- While RC East as such has been part of ISAF for a while, Regional Security Command East, which is responsible for security and reconstruction duties in

Eastern Afghanistan, has been part of Operation Enduring Freedom.[10] This suggests that managing US–UNAMA relations is just as important as relations between NATO/ISAF and UNAMA in this region. Note that while several of these provinces are still highly insecure, a fairly large number of them are seen as having made good progress. These provinces may be ready for an expanded development effort, and therefore for an increased UNAMA presence. The fact that General McKiernan will be in command of both ISAF and all US forces could ease the linking of these processes.

- Two UNAMA provincial offices are in provinces with no PRTs (Nimruz in the Southwest and Daykundi in the Hindukush) or Regional Commands. The lessons learned in these two cases may prove interesting for the way forward.

- Five provinces have neither PRTs nor UNAMA offices (Jawzjan, Sari Pul, Samangan, Takhar in the north and Kapisa close to Kabul). These provinces may be used as test beds for a new, combined ISAF/UNAMA presence.

Afghan authorities at different levels. None of them, however, are really designed to reinforce Afghan national or regional authorities. Still, as we have noted above, a central and underlying challenge with pushing forward integration between civilian and military international actors in Afghanistan is the potential negative effects this might have on Afghan government structures and presence. Today, at province level, there are complex formal and informal political bargaining relationships between governors' offices, PRTs, UNAMA and the central government authorities in Kabul.[11] Part of the ultimate end goal for the overall international presence in Afghanistan is to strengthen governance and enable a well functioning relationship between the government in Kabul and the provinces. There is a danger, however, that consolidated international security/civilian cooperation would outweigh nascent Afghan government institutions.

- A sixth model of cooperation could be envisaged where regional authorities and/or the provincial representation of line ministries become the focal points, the nodes, of the international presence. This model should be designed in ways that optimise local capacity building. That could mean moving international civilian structures away from PRT, UNAMA or other compounds and re-locating them to relevant Afghan government compounds. This could facilitate mentor roles, on-the-job training, recruitment to the Afghan institutions rather than the international ones to avoid brain drain, sharing of technical facilities etc. It could also help ensure that development funds are re-routed away from PRTs and instead channelled through Afghan government institutions.

An important premise of any restructuring of the international presence should be that it aids rather then undermines governance and state building in Afghanistan. There is a danger that restructuring and bolstering the international presence could create parallel structures of government. International actors, when attempting to move the PRT concept forward are well advised to keep the end goal of the engagement in close sight – a key criterion for any reconfiguration is that the restructuring is designed in a way that optimises growth and capacity building for Afghan state institutions.[12]

2. Donor coordination

Just as the role of the Afghan government is central to discussions on evolutions in the PRT concept, the role of Afghan state structures is also paramount in assessments of donor coordination. Two challenges are particularly important.

First, where are decisions and planning made for the use of the funds that donors contribute to Afghanistan? In recent years, policy makers and civil servants in European, Japanese and North American capitals have developed comprehensive yet separate strategies for their Afghanistan support. Of course, national aid bureaucracies need some national guidelines and plans, and national bureaucracies need also to ensure that accountability mechanisms for their spending are upheld. Still, the question for donors remains whether differing strategies and approaches conceived in capitals outside of Afghanistan have made it more difficult for coordinating bodies in Kabul to work effectively. A basic yardstick in relation to these issues is the degree to which the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) has taken on prominence as the central organising strategic framework for donor input, or whether, conversely, donors' individual development plans that are in potential contradiction with the ANDS continue to carry independent weight.

Second, how are funds channelled to Afghan beneficiaries? Are funds primarily channelled bilaterally from donor countries to Afghan communities via 'external' agencies (i.e. international or national NGOs or via PRTs) or are they primarily channelled via Afghan government line ministries and facilities like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)?[13] Given difficulties associated with absorption and implementation capacity of the Afghan state after 2001, the international community seems to have regarded the option of channelling the majority of funds via the state machinery as too risky. Clearly, however, evading Afghan government structures is detrimental to the achievement of the end goal in Afghanistan: the creation of sustainable state institutions that can provide human security and development for its citizens. By evading government structures, competing institutions are created and opportunities for capacity building of government personnel are lost.

The two above challenges provide an important frame for debates on donor coordination. Recently there have been major improvements in tools and frameworks for donor coordination. The international community's support to UNAMA, the enhanced role of the JCMB and the unified commitment among donors to the ful-

filment of the ANDS is now central organising principles for the international community's involvement. At province level Afghan authorities, development agencies and PRTs are encouraged to focus their efforts at jointly developing and implementing Provincial Development Plans (PDP).[14] Nevertheless, while it is important that international actors enhance information sharing among themselves and with Afghan counterparts, and also tailor their initiatives according to the development plans of the Afghan government (i.e. ANDS), this does not necessarily offer value in and of itself for Afghan state building. It is only when decision- making power, including power to allocate among provinces (irrespective of donor countries' PRT province preferences), is transferred to Afghan authorities that the international involvement helps increase the long-term viability of the Afghan state. Similarly, development projects, even if in correspondence with ANDS priorities, need to be conceptualised and implemented in close cooperation with, or by, national authorities.

A basic and central challenge in the period ahead for the Afghan political leadership, and for UNAMA in its assisting role, will be to get donors to continually maximise the percentage of funds that are channelled through Afghan line ministries – and to convey the capacity building value of these funding policies. In the short to medium term, if absorptive capacity increases, the international community together with UNAMA could usefully consider installing (or reviving) a continuous and transparent evaluation mechanism ('donor barometer'), which traces international donors' willingness to channel funds through government institutions and multi-donor funds. In this way the 'norm' for the desirability of channelling funds through the Afghan government could be enhanced further and increased adherence encouraged by way of comparative assessments or rankings of donors' performance.

The situation today seems to be one where there does not exist a fully consolidated reporting system for aid flows to extra-budget development initiatives in Afghanistan. Few, if any, actors in Afghanistan have full oversight of development spending. This seems to be the case both at national level and for individual provinces. This undermines accountability and it makes it difficult for Afghan state structures to bring about coherence in efforts or take the lead role. It also makes it particularly difficult to counter the negative trends we have seen in recent years, where insecure regions with heavy foreign military presence have received the bulk of development funds, while the stable regions are marginalised – and by consequence increasingly disgruntled with the central

government and its international partners. The inability of the Afghan state to take the lead in resource allocation – a central function of any state – undermines its claim to statehood. It also increases fragmentation and further complicates centre–province relations.

Achieving a form of coordination which implies a lead role for the Afghan state will not be easy. Not least due to the differing agendas of the various actors and because of the reluctance of foreign capitals to relinquish their control of funds. There is also an added twist to this, which stems from profound differences between military and aid institutions in their conceptions of strategies and objectives for provision of development. Modern counterinsurgency doctrines are based upon an assumption that development is strongly connected to security. While most development experts use long-term perspectives on development, military planners think in terms of rapidly meeting local expectations of improved living conditions. Quick impact projects designed to create local goodwill are still essential in the operating concepts of international military actors in Afghanistan and beyond. While profound concerns in relations to 'humanitarian space' remain, some of these conflicting strategic conceptions could perhaps be reconciled. One unifying concept could be a common focus on 'Afghan owned' national programmes for job creation so as to reduce the pool of young men available for recruitment by the insurgents. But even so, the strongly perceived link between development and security among military actors, and the geographical division of military responsibility among ISAF nations in Afghanistan, creates a logic where each donor country focuses its development efforts, either directly or by earmarking funds spent through the Afghan government, in areas where the country is militarily engaged. This adds to the challenge we identified above: that provinces perceived to be stable receive less money from the government than the destabilised areas.

3. Transferring authority to civilian actors in insecure areas

Current plans and discussions on transferring authority and lead in Afghanistan seem, at least at face value, out of tune with the negative security developments over the past three years. However, even if intuitively unworkable, there might be some viable steps that could be taken.

Before we proceed further, however, let us just define what we mean by transfer of authority. One type of transfer would involve international security actors giving up the lead role to international civilian representatives (i.e.

from ISAF to UNAMA). A second set of transfer pertains to transfers from international security providers to Afghan security providers (i.e. from ISAF to ANA and ANP) or from international civilian actors to Afghan civilian (government) actors.

Above, we have argued in favour of increased international coherence based on strongly reinforced linkages and transfer of decision-making powers to Afghan authorities. We have also warned that the creation of very strong international structures may actually harm the development of Afghan institutions. But obviously, transfer of authority is only possible where capable Afghan structures are in place. This, of course, is a central reason why the building of such structures should be a priority in all areas – thereby offering important groundwork for later transfers of authority. At present, the most obvious provinces for early transfer to Afghan civilian authority seem to be secure, stable and capable primarily because of the presence of strong leaders (i.e. Balkh, Herat). A basic dilemma here (as is often the case in personality-based rather than institutionalised governing systems) is likely to be how to transfer authority without negatively upsetting the constantly negotiated balance between central and local leaders that form an important part of the political context for provincial as well as national politics in Afghanistan. Another dilemma is the fact that these secure provinces already receive far less government and international funding than the least secure areas. There seems to be reason to fear that this situation could get even worse if the international role in the secure areas is reduced. A related concern pertains to ethnicity and differing levels of influence between regional groupings in Afghanistan. The insecure areas are primarily Pashtun areas. Transferring authority earlier into secure areas could potentially entail a further disfavouring of Pashtun political actors versus non-Pashtuns, thereby further marginalising these forces and making ownership and commitment to the evolution of the Afghan state harder to encourage.

Transfer of authority from international security to international civilian actors might be easier in areas that are stable and relatively secure than in areas with large insurgency activity. If one accepts the idea that military leadership is required to obtain security, then, it would be logical to start transfer of authority into stable areas. Furthermore, it would be sensible to postpone transfer of authority until the areas were deemed safe and stable. However, if development is seen as a necessity for stability and security even in the short term, then that logic no longer applies. Then, the insecure areas should be led by development experts and they should be given priority when civilian expertise is allocated and

distributed. Still, one cannot escape the fact that enhanced development efforts in such areas are far more difficult in practical terms, and probably more expensive, than in stable and secure areas. Therefore, one would get more yield out of investments made in development if the secure areas are given priority. But as noted above, if security is seen as the key to success, and development is perceived as the key to security, then priority will be given to the insecure areas.

In any case, it is important to put PRT development initiatives in insecure areas in perspective: development initiatives in insecure regions cannot be expected to yield significant 'hearts and minds' benefits. In insecure territories it is likely that only improved human security can bring about a rise in 'hearts and minds' rates – or at least the preconditions for a potential positive assessment by Afghan citizens of the international presence and the Afghan government's performance. The basic success criteria for PRT development initiatives should therefore not be linked to 'hearts and minds' effects but rather to success in fostering long-term and sustainable development.

Deciding timing for transferring authority from security to civilian structures depends on how the security-development nexus is conceptualised. It is nevertheless likely that a differentiated approach of some sort will be developed, where the schemes applied in the secure areas will be modified considerably in the insecure areas.

Similarly, a differentiated approach is likely to be developed for transfer of authority to Afghan civilian structures.

4. Concluding thoughts

At the outset of this paper we highlighted that in addition to asking ourselves how we can deliver coherently in Afghanistan, we also need to pose the questions of how well we are delivering and to what extent we are constructively engaging with Afghan counterparts. Improved coordination and coherence among international actors are not the answer to all the problems facing the international community in Afghanistan. There is a danger that too much emphasis on technical intra-donor coordination will provide an excuse for international actors not to fully assess, recognise and engage with the underlying flaws in the way the international community operates in Afghanistan – in particular how the actors representing the international community in Afghanistan understand the Afghan context and how these interact with Afghan counterparts. Indeed, focusing on intra-donor coherence and coordination may potentially bring with it an overly insular perspective,

which enables members of the international community to keep focusing on entities they are comfortable and familiar with (i.e. themselves) rather than dealing with unfamiliar Afghan realities and challenges.

The conceptual bridge that needs to be made, and is already being made by many analysts and practitioners, is one where the goal of increased coherence in the external engagement in Afghanistan is linked with a further bolstering of Afghan state structures – including sovereign decision-making powers.

Finally, we end with a broader note on expectations, pace and scope. The overwhelming resources potentially at hand for international donors might paradoxically partly be a disadvantage to their approach to Afghanistan. These levels of resources lead to an expectation of rapid returns, with the real possibility of making strategy just the collection of short-term tactics. The lack of a need to prioritise resources (relative to the absorptive capacity of the Afghan government) leads to the suppression of another vital component of a strategic process: time, and its emotive counterpart: patience. Societal change does not happen overnight. Education takes effect over generations, not years. Technology and communication effect cultural, normative, political and economic change in a complex interplay which nowhere is predictable in detail or time scale. The international community might need to rethink or at least re-measure its approaches to Afghanistan in terms of general 'thrusts of influence' rather than in terms of outcomes from individual donor projects and activities. The 'crisis mood' currently surrounding the situation in Afghanistan might well be partly associated with unrealistic expectations and a misunderstanding of the pace of social processes and corresponding flaws in the use of resources.

Notes

1 See for example Lakhdar Brahimi, 'Shaping a Constitution: The UN's "Light Footprint" Approach in Afghanistan', The Interdependent, Winter 2005.

2 As of June 2008 there are 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan. Twelve of these are led by the US, while the remaining fourteen are led by thirteen different states.

3 Barbara J. Stapleton "A means to what end? Why PRTs are peripheral to the bigger political challenges in Afghanistan" Journal of Military and Strategic Studies fall 2007, Vol 10 Issue 1.

4 Stapleton 2007, World Bank Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-National Level in Afghanistan July 2007, 46 (World Bank: Washington D.C.).

5 Actions causing "security" are notoriously difficult to measure. It is important, though, that the output, the effects of such actions, are measured and not only the quantitative input. See for instance Bi-Strategic Command Pre-Doctrinal Handbook (Effects Based Approach to Operations), NATO December 2007.

6 Stapleton 2007, see note 4 above.

7 The question is to what extent the nations' involvement in their respective PRTs promotes the goal of local ownership. The different donor nations should not be responsible for their respective provinces in Afghanistan. It is the provinces themselves that needs to take this lead, which means that a strategy for transferring PRT responsibilities to Afghan authorities is needed. The void that was created by the weak civilian effort, and filled by the military, needs to be taken back, and the government of Afghanistan needs to contribute to the local ownership process by strengthening its relations with the provinces. But in order to achieve this goal, a major change in the direction of the aid is needed. The donor countries will have to direct their aid in accordance with Afghan strategies and as support to the Afghan state budget.

8 This model has been proposed by high-ranking Norwegian officers.

9 A position taken by some of the harshest critics of the present operational setup.

10 Twelve PRTs and one ISAF Regional Command are in provinces with no UNAMA office. A last one is in Takhar in the northeast. Two are in the South – in the troublesome Helmand and Uruzgan provinces. But the RC and nine of these provinces are in the east, under the command of the US-led RC East.

11 Dipali Mukhopadhyay "Warlords as governors – opportunities and pitfalls", presentation at the NUPI seminar "Afghanistan: Aspects of the post-war political settlement", 03.09.2008.

12 Some PRTs (Wardack (Tur), Chagcharan (Lit) have focused on building up local capabilities and structures for governance in the first phase, in order to work through those structures later. Obviously UNAMA and the UNDPs capability-building programmes could add to such efforts.

13 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank and funded by 27 donors. In the six years since it was established (in 2002), the ARTF has been the main source of pooled financing for the Government of Afghanistan's (GoA) recurrent budget, but has increasingly also supported priority investments in the Government's reconstruction programme, SCANTEAM Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: External Evaluation Final Report, August 2008 (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1201489063036/4608353-1220998199117/ARTFevaluation-August2008.pdf).

14 PDPs are supposed to be based on the ANDS and should logically be the operationalisation of the ANDS on the regional level. It is intended that the PRTs align their development activities towards implementation of PDP (direct funding from PRTs adds up to less than 10% of total development funding in Afghanistan. PRTs may nevertheless have a much larger indirect impact since PRT development personnel is directed from national capitals). Questions remain however regarding the extent to which PRTs and provincial Afghan authorities are capable of this task. The ANDS is a broad strategy document that could be implemented and operationalised in various ways – how then, in practice, do the PRTs in their support of the PDPs help uphold the spirit and letter of the ANDS?

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