

THE NORDIC SAFE CITIES GUIDE

Insights, inspiration and best practice for your city



Nordic Safe Cities Guide

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Preface to the Nordic Safe Cities Guide

Dagfinn Høybråten, Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers

Violent extremism is a fundamental challenge

Not only because of the immediate physical danger that it poses, but because it challenges our democracies and way of life. It challenges the very essence of the societies we have built – the trust in our citizens. A society closing its doors around itself is an excluding society where people become suspicious of each other's motives. It is a society where we ultimately become less tolerant to other people's ideas and convictions.

Nordic Safe Cities is doing the opposite. It is a network of cities from all the Nordic countries working actively to ensure trustful, tolerant and resilient cities that can prevent radicalisation and violent extremism.

How to respond?

When my own home country was attacked in the most horrible way in Oslo and on Utøya in 2011, we did the exact opposite of what the attacker wanted us to do. We responded with great responsibility and love, rather than anger and revenge. We know that hatred leads to more hatred and do not want the actions of one person to be the cause of generalised fear.

We will not allow extreme individuals or groups to challenge our belief in the human rights that are at the very heart of our democratic societies. It is my conviction that this response has made Norway a stronger and more resilient society. It is my hope that this response can show the way for the rest of the world when faced with terrorist tragedies that affect entire nations. On many occasions, all the Nordic governments have stressed that we must stick to our open and democratic societies.

The Nordic Region

Our open societies and strong belief in everybody's opportunity to contribute characterise our Nordic countries more than anything else. We pride ourselves on values like freedom, trust and an immense shared sense of community. These

are values shared by all the Nordic countries and are truly worth protecting. But these values are only possible to uphold as long as we live in safe societies where we do not have to fear our fellow citizens.

We may not yet have all the answers when it comes to preventing people from turning their backs on society and becoming violent extremists. Maybe we never will. But we believe that no person was born a terrorist.

A human approach

Inclusion and respect for human rights must be our guidelines as we work to prevent people from becoming violent extremists. And I am glad that these are also the principles on which Nordic Safe Cities' work is based. These principles are what fundamentally separate us from extremists: We will meet their ideologies of hatred in a manner true to our democratic traditions.

There is a growing interest in providing adequate solutions to behaviour that threatens our cities' safety and tolerance, as well as our communities' cohesiveness.

Nordic Safe Cities network

The Nordic Safe City network enables cities to act and show they are a safe city. This guide describes good initiatives that are already underway in various cities. Hopefully they can serve as inspiration for other cities around the world.

The Nordic Safe Cities network is a fine example of cooperation across borders. All Nordic Cities are hereby invited to become a Nordic Safe City and to take part in the journey towards safety together.

Dagfinn Høybråten,

Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers



Introducing the Nordic Safe Cities Network

Nordic Safe Cities is a city network and programme working to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism whilst striving to ensure safe, trusting and tolerant cities for everyone in them.

In recent years, these values have been challenged by beliefs that have resulted in violence-promoting actions. Whatever the reasoning, radical and violence-promoting behaviour directly threaten our cities' safety and ability to be tolerant. These threats against our communities' cohesion and social contracts have sparked a growing interest in mitigating solutions and efforts on all levels.

With the Nordic Safe Cities network we wish to:

- Cast light on our shared positive values and build on them to ensure safe societies in which we do not have to fear our fellow citizens.
- Enable cities to act and show that they are safe cities.
- Identify, innovate, accelerate and scale Nordic best practices from the Nordic region and out into the world.
- Invite all Nordic Countries to become a Nordic Safe City and embark on the continued journey towards safer societies.

The Nordic Safe Cities network is initiated by the Nordic Council of Ministers.

Why cities?

Cities are unique structures when it comes to pooling efforts that create a safer and more inclusive environment. When they work, they provide citizens with a chance to play a meaningful and important role in society. Cities know local communities and the challenges they face better than any other societal entity.

No two cities are the same, and each and every one of them has a different idea of what it takes to create and sustain a safe city.

But they do have a lot in common, regardless of size and geography. They share highly skilled labour, dedicated volunteers and local community organisations that all have valuable knowledge and experience that can be turned into useful solutions.

20+ safe cities and six ambitions: Joining forces

Through four development sessions in 2016, the Nordic Safe Cities initiative brought together more than 20 small and big cities from the Nordic Region as well as experts from the North, London, Brussels and Washington to discuss, develop and share experiences, best practice and tangible local solutions within six focus areas. All with the aim of preventing radical and violence-promoting behaviour. From this work Nordic Safe Cities has formulated six ambitions for making a safe city:

Safe Urban Spaces

Create a city open for everyone everywhere

Safe Online Sphere

Promote an online sphere with an e-safety culture and safe online communities

Strong Families

Act with families to safeguard children

Safe Public Institutions

Strengthen public institutions to safeguard citizens through inclusive policies and initiatives

Strong Youth Engagement

Empower the voices of youth

Safe Communities

Create safe & resilient local communities and foster friendships between people in the local neighborhood

About this guide

The threat of radicalisation and violent extremism is more complex than ever. Although many of the psychological and social factors that make people prone to violent extremism are the same as they always have been, there are more arenas and channels for recruitment and activity these days. The complexity of the problem calls for new and different perspectives – and a joint effort.

Cities can be the basis of a resilient, tolerant and trusting society. In collaboration with municipal entities such as social services, schools, job centres, health services and other institutions such as the police, the prison and probation service and community organisations, they be safe havens that discourage, prevent and support vulnerable citizens who might otherwise seek the companionship of extremist groups.

This Nordic Safe Cities guide is a free tool for politicians and practitioners in the Nordic countries and beyond. It contains best practices from the Nordic region and words of advice from practitioners and experts. It aims to give cities guidance and inspiration on how to:

- Ensure resilient, tolerant and trusting societies
- Improve safety strategies and practices on how to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism

The guide's six chapters follow the six ambitions of the Nordic Safe Cities network:

- Safe Urban Spaces
- Safe Online Sphere
- Strong Families
- Safe Public Institutions
- Strong Youth Engagement
- Safe Communities

Each chapter contains:

- A short description of the focus area
- Guiding principles that are beneficial when dealing with this focus area
- City cases from the Nordic region
- Expert views on the focus area

The guide does not aim to provide one-size-fitsall answers to how we all prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremist behaviour. It rather aims to highlight existing cases and knowledge for policy makers and societal actors to be inspired by when working in this field.

Kind regards

Nordic Safe Cities

Clarification of terms used

Radicalisation

Radicalisation is a process where an individual gradually accepts violence or other illegal methods to promote an ideological goal.

Radicalisation is a contested concept. It is a process that takes multiple forms which can be fast or drawn out. It is influenced by a combination of multiple push-and-pull factors.

- Often an intensive socialisation occurs, a process of brainwashing involving sharp rhetoric in closed groups
- The individual distances him- or herself from his or her normal contacts outside the group, possibly discarding friends and leisure activities
- The individual often cuts off ties to family and friends
- There is often a focus on *dehumanisation*, where those who are perceived as enemies are no longer perceived as human beings¹.

Radicalisation is a process that can lead to violent extremism or terrorism.

Violent extremism

Violent extremism is a collective term for movements, ideologies or places that do not accept a democratic social order and promote violence to achieve ideological goals.

- Simplified worldviews and pictures of the *enemy*, where certain groups or societal norms are seen as threatening
- The desire to create a more "orderly", "clean" or "fair" society by undemocratic means if necessary
- Intolerance of others' views, rights and freedom
- Threats, harassment, vandalism, violence or terrorism are regarded as legitimate means to deal with the social conditions with which the individual is dissatisfied².

Many individuals seeking to join extremist milieus share an experience of exclusion; not fitting in, feeling like of failure at school, among classmates, in the workplace, in the local community or in society (The Norwegian Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in 2014).

Abbreviation

CVE: Countering violent extremism

^{1.} https://www.aarhus.dk/sitecore/content/Subsites/Antiradikaliseringsindsats/Home/ Om-radikalisering.aspx?sc_lang=en

https://www.aarhus.dk/sitecore/content/Subsites/Antiradikaliseringsindsats/Home/ Om-radikalisering.aspx?sc_lang=en



It takes a joint effort to succeed

Karolina Dam is the founder of 'Sons and Daughters of the World', a network and consulting forum for parents of radicalized children. Her son Lukas travelled to Syria in June 2014, ending up joining ISIS.

By Karolina Dam, 'Sons and Daughters of the World'

Throughout 2016, the network collaborated with FATE/Families Against Terrorism and Extremism. FATE is an organic network of organisations working in communities across Europe and North Africa to prevent radicalisation and fight counter violent extremism and terrorism.

Karoline Dam's story - when a mother loses her child to ISIS

I made headlines in Danish media in March 2015 when I went public with the story of my 18-year old son, Lukas, who travelled to Syria in June 2014, ending up joining ISIS. I lost him on December 26, 2014 and have since struggled to understand what went wrong.

Lukas was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome and Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), like the 40% of young people from the north who have left for Syria or Iraq.

My son was reportedly killed in Kobanî, Syria, during a collision attack. I was the first Danish parent of an ISIS member to speak openly about the issue. Since my loss, I have been working to help and support other families suffering from radicalisation. I believe my story is important when trying to understand the consequences of what happens when recruiters get a hold of our youth. I strive to show articulated different angles so that we can change some patterns before things go completely wrong.

I created the organization 'Sons and Daughters of the World' to combat radicalisation and to focus on its many issues. In the network of parents, I try to create space, peace, love and understanding for the bereaved. I try to cover the many different needs of parents and siblings: Grief support, information for de-radicalisation units, information regarding authorities, lawyers and actual events in Syria or Iraq in regards to their children.



To stop violent extremism we need to involve families, the community and the authorities. Without a joint effort, we will not succeed. There are huge resources within local communities that can support families and contribute to building necessary resilience.

Families can't do it alone and neither can the authorities. We have to make sure that our key people (NGOs, case workers, job centres, teachers and mentors) are qualified and that the authorities acknowledge the task and are willing to become involved. NGOs are a key component as most families are afraid of involving authorities in fear of repercussions. NGOs can be a great asset.



We need to empower families and help them understand what their kids are going through. Their kids are on a slippery slope where the consequences can or will be fatal. We need to help them reach their children, make them heard, get them socialised and support them back into our community.

And that is in fact a true jihad; To educate one self, to give back to your community, to help others when needed.

Chapter 1

Safe Urban Spaces



Urban spaces are crucial to cities' functionality. On one hand, urban spaces can foster creativity and incite harmonious leisure. On the other hand, they can make people feel unsafe and increase the risk or frequency of criminal acts.

A city should work to ensure that its public spaces encourage a sense of inclusion, safety and ownership amongst its citizens. It should ensure that its urban spaces are social meeting places for all kinds of people, that there is proper lighting and access to emergency assistance.

A successful safe space consists of both social and physical elements. Safe urban spaces are ones with open areas, meeting places and green lungs. Like playgrounds, where children can let go of a parent's protective hand and challenge creativity and independence. When a lot of people use the space for events and sports activities, they provide a sense of availability and ownership. An intruder who can feel that a community cares will feel less secure committing a crime.

Guiding principles

- Develop public facilities like open spaces or playgrounds, in particular in socially deprived areas, to make it more appealing to meet and interact
- Carefully monitor all areas of the city to seek out demographic change and enable beneficial proactive measures
- Regulate new areas to facilitate a heterogeneous population through mixing building types, types of ownership and size
- Maintain and develop public transportation services to create mobility that make it easier to help people interact, learn, work and play
- Work towards similar legislation throughout the Nordic countries to achieve similar minimum standards for security by design: Standards that are both preventive of criminality in general and that minimize the opportunity and effect of terrorist attacks

City Cases

Copenhagen, Denmark

Engaging the ghetto

In 2008, one dedicated, full-time employee got to know the area's residents. In the next few years, different development initiatives built confidence and trust in and between the residents locally and the housing association centrally.

Mjølnerparken, Lejerbo

In 2012, we started involving architects and urban developers. But first, the housing association contacted the police for advice. The housing association posed the following question: "How do we physically equip this residential area so that it is unattractive to gangs and their illegal activities, but still easily manageable for the police, should their intervention and services be required?"

We received strategically important advice that was since passed on to architects and urban developers. They are currently incorporating this advice and the masterplan for the area will be implemented in 2022.

The City of Copenhagen established a "Hotspot" initiative in 2011-2014. It was led by a Hotspot manager who reported directly to the directors in the housing associations and to the police. This helped us implement of a number of coordinated efforts. It helped build networks that made it possible to get things done and engage people with a shared understanding of the tasks at hand. This is still of great value to us in 2017.

Our recommendations to policy makers

- Only residents have the power to improve a residential area. Invest in their competences to make them better able to help themselves.
- Build a strategy that makes sense to the residents

 one that is easily understood and won't break
 under pressure. In Mjølnerparken, it helped
 when the housing association communicated
 that every activity had one single purpose:
 Lejerbo København (Mjølnerparken) should be
 a nice place to live (Det skal være rart at bo i
 Mjølnerparken).

 During this transformational period, residents require strong and continuous support and commitment from the housing association, municipality, police and volunteers from nongovernmental organisations.

Our recommendations to places similar to Mjølnerparken

- Establish a dedicated and responsible employee or team, led by the housing association, to coordinate existing.
- Facilitate relevant knowledge-based networks for governmental bodies, urban developers and other relevant entities that can develop physical and social master plans to help eliminate crime and other activities that cause the residents to not thrive in the area.
- Continuously anchor the responsibility and powers amongst the residents: Be careful not to "copy paste" initiatives from other residential areas. Every area has its own characteristics and the residents' potential differ greatly from area to area.
- Invest in the residents and in daily operations:
 The residents are the ones who will take responsibility in the long run when project ends. Use external resources carefully as they ultimately delay the anchoring and sustained operations by residents.
- The more you succeed the more you have to transform your efforts from "big plans" focussed on a given area to having a set-up ready for swift and visible action – anywhere and anytime.

Expert Views



Security by design

A city can either use resources by creating technical security solutions, or save or even create resources by planning areas with overlapping functions.

In active urban environments, the act of 'people watching people' provides passive surveillance of public spaces and streets. Dead areas planned for cars can be made into destinations for people, where pedestrians are prioritized and people are invited to stay and spend time.

By Camilla Richter-Friis van Deurs, Gehl Architects

In the aftermath of a series of devastating terrorist and extremist attacks across Europe, cities and municipalities faced the challenge of creating measures to ensure that gathering spots like historic monuments, key infrastructure nodes, public spaces and public events are secure.

When a city reacts to an event retrospectively by attempting to create 'Security by Design' - a term used to describe urban design that integrates security measures into public spaces and streets,

without compromising the space's functions or aesthetics - it takes a huge amount of financial, technical and physical resources.

It often results in the creation of barricades around important institutions, in the hope that terrorist attacks can be prevented if we construct security bollards, remove parking spaces, intensify the presence of armed forces and police, raise buildings, close streets and install CCTV cameras.

These barriers are often not integrated into cities as 'Security by Design.' Instead, they are crude interventions that constrain public life and incite a feeling of uneasiness in those passing by. They are silent reminders of fear and lost innocence.

Cities should rather take a proactive approach to 'Security by Design' by using security efforts strategically to create added value. This strategic approach to planning is often used in cultural or sports events or to fulfil political goals, like reducing vehicle traffic in inner city areas to lower emissions.

If we design to enhance the setting through incorporating security measures, political goals can be achieved by mitigating potential threats: For instance, areas can be designed to include multifunctional elements like benches and plants that incorporate hidden security measures.

Security: a social dilemma

Even if a building is designed to be safe, it does not mean the city around it is safe. More importantly, a safe building is not necessarily attractive or inviting. In fact, its design risks alienating the public life it aims to protect.

The concept of physical security is not new to city planning. Historically, the art of building a city has always included the aspect of incorporating security and protection measures, from city walls to gates and locks.

The new element is the increasing need to protect our urban spaces from internal or unidentifiable threats. This makes the protection of urban spaces a societal dilemma: We want to invite citizens to take part in public life and allow our cities to be open and grow, but we also want to keep those who wish us harm away.

The main barrier to creating liveable, vibrant and safe cities is monofunctionality. It is one of our century's biggest challenges. The concept of monofunctionality is a consequence of the modernist movement, largely due to a very outdated notion of zoning.

Instead of creating low and dense areas of monofunctional buildings, we should develop mixed neighbourhoods where offices, housing, retail, transport and other functions overlap. Where the rhythm of daily life continues into the night and back into the day. Introducing new housing functions and inviting new residents into them means an increase in passive surveillance around the clock and safer urban centres.

A recent study by Arup found that more eyes on the street decreased crime by 38%. Providing spaces that attract the elderly population also has an added "Grandmother effect:" Elderly citizens provide passive security my merely being present in urban spaces.

New York City takes a different approach to improving public safety. The city tries to establish a gender balance in public spaces like Bryant Park, as male-dominated spaces are often perceived as less secure and make fewer people feel welcome. One solution is creating spaces that are inclusive and accessible for all ethnicities, age groups and genders through careful programming of spaces, functions and activities.

The true challenge is providing mitigating measures that are proportionate to threats: We do not want to over-secure areas and risk pushing potential attackers to other, more vulnerable locations like schools or private homes. Ultimately, we can never make a perfectly secure city. But we can invite citizens to engage with the urban environment actively and responsibly.



Photo: Jordan Sanchez

Trust and openness: right to the city

"If every space is susceptible to attack and every person a potential attacker, then the only recourse is to watch everyone and fortify everyplace. If every communication is potentially a fragment of conspiracy, then all must be recorded. Walking the streets nowadays, with troops at the subway entrance, barricades around buildings, cameras staring from lampposts [...] it feels – more and more – like the battle for freedom is being lost."

Michael Sorkin, Indefensible Space

By Deane Simpson, Associate Professor, Dr. Sc. (ETH), Architect MAA

As the American architect and critic Michael Sorkin implies, our societies, cities and our everyday lives are fragile systems that are vulnerable to the forces and dynamics of securitization. In the context of the current and developing social, cultural and political climate, and in the context of the research I have conducted over the last five years addressing this theme, I believe it would be a fundamental miscalculation to offer expert advice for a section

on 'Safe Urban Spaces' within a Nordic Safe Cities guide focused merely on a catalogue of defensive 'target-hardening' measures. Whether these range from high strength bollards in manganese steel, retractable vehicle barriers, or CCTV cameras, to reinforced garden planters. Whether visible as deterrents or invisible to be deployed across an extensive range of areas which are assessed as 'vulnerable' to threats of terror.

The urban spaces and various forms of human occupation of cities represent an almost infinite series of options for possible attack, with each protective measure offering the displacement of a possible threat of attack to other settings. This has been proven time and again. While I believe that there is a very limited role for the design and implementation of physical security measures in our cities, I would argue that it would be essential to reinforce the need for finding a balance.

In this case, a balance between the deployment of 'protective' measures responding to the politically expressed will to 'protect' citizens from potential attacks on the one hand (potential attacks which are infinitesimally small in their probability compared to other everyday causes of loss of life); and the importance of protecting the openness and accessibility of democratic public spaces in our cities on the other hand – related to what the French sociologist Henri Lefebvre describes as 'the right to the city.'

A number of prominent thinkers and spatial practitioners (Stephen Graham, Anna Minton, Michael Sorkin, Leopold Lambert, Kees Christiaanse, Eyal Weizman, to name a few) have documented the result of the application of physical security measures in introducing or reinforcing spatial and social fragmentation and exclusion in our cities, producing spaces that reinforce a sense of fear, and distrust. As a result, considerable restraint should be exercised against pressures to introduce

extensive 'target hardening'/urban fortification measures. Measures should be used sparingly, and only after reflection and public debate over the potential impact of these measures on citizen's 'right to the city,' physical access and experiential relation to the city.

The suggestion of this author is that such a guide should start from the focus on a culturally specific response to terror prevention in public space, just as we see different types of culturally specific responses in settings elsewhere. In this context, the guide would be focused upon the centrality of the ethos of trust and openness within the Nordic societies – with the ambition of building awareness around the threat that securitized space poses to the experience of the city. Such an approach would foreground inclusiveness, integration, coherency and generosity - together with access and the right to the city - over those qualities mentioned above: spatial and social fragmentation and exclusion in our cities, producing spaces that reinforce a sense of fear and distrust.

Within such an approach, efforts to limit terrorism would focus less on 'target hardening' in our public spaces, and more look to the other established and viable efforts to support social, cultural and economic integration; directing efforts toward limiting radicalisation at its source, limiting youth unemployment and challenging socio-economic segregation.



Chapter 2

Safe Online Sphere



In recent years, social media and the online sphere have become integral parts of our everyday lives. It is where we share emotions, feelings and invite people to engage with us. As part of this development, violent extremist propaganda has also come become available online.

Radicalisation and violent extremism of course also happens offline, but extremists' use of online platforms and the speed at which the network can promote radicalisation has made it clear that online action is required if we are to mitigate the overall risk of radicalisation in our societies.

A safe online sphere is one where cities and citizens collaborate on the continued development of a beneficial e-safety culture. A safe online sphere should offer online solutions that promote human commonalities and uphold a peaceful and inclusive common narrative.

One element in preventing radicalisation is promoting and strengthening citizens' ability and skills when it comes to thinking critically and self-organising: As citizens, we must know "digital self-defence". A city should ensure that content, guidelines and methods based on best practice and user needs are available to everyone.

Guiding principles

- Engage local voices: Include and engage credible local voices in campaigns and local projects to illustrate good examples of inclusion, diversity and integration
- Change the public rhetoric from the alienating "us and them" to the inclusive "we" and "us"
- Work locally and inclusively with public institutions and civil communities on developing digital awareness, resilience and critical-thinking initiatives
- Create platforms that raise the awareness of the safe use of internet and social media within interdependent stakeholder groups, like parents in relation to their children or teachers in relation to their students
- Develop an on going action plan and implement in-process evaluation procedures.
- Prevention online must go hand in hand with prevention offline: Sometimes offline solutions can help solve online challenges

City Cases



Helsinki, Finland

Internet police

In 2008, a police officer in the Helsinki Police Department began working as an internet police officer. He set up a profile on the most popular youth chat forum at the time, the IRC-Gallery. His profile was public and showed his full name and picture.

Helsinki Police Department, Helsinki municipality

His online profile idea came from working with young people. As he was investigating cases involving minors, he noticed that social media played a significant part. It appeared to him that the online sphere where young people gathered and interacted could benefit from some supervision in the name of public order and safety.

What started as one police officer in 2008 has now become three full-time internet police officers in the Helsinki Police Department and 30 part-time internet police officers nationwide.

The full-time officers deal with crimes related to social media. They also forward information about criminal activity to other investigative units, as well as refer clients to relevant service providers. As full-time internet police officers, they must have deep knowledge and understanding of crimes related to social media and be present on multiple sites. Part-time internet police officers use social media, namely public Facebook profiles, as a tool to support their main assignments, be it regular patrol work or criminal investigation.

This initiative has been very successful, for instance when it comes to gaining information about and interacting with various extremist right and left wing groups. A number of these groups' demonstrations have turned out more peaceful than expected after police officers engaged with them in online conversations before the events.

In 2016, the three full-time police officers at the Helsinki Police Department engaged in 4200 private Facebook conversations on topics ranging from general advice to dealing with aggravated crimes. Two of the internet police officers have been named Police Officer of the Year in Finland.

Why internet police officers?

The internet police officer format is represents a low threshold way to contact the police and discuss delicate and controversial issues. It also has a preventive function: When the police is visibly present to discuss and offer guidance on limits, people get a clear idea of what can legally be said and done within the social media realm. As such, it provides a sense of safety in a similar way to seeing police officers on the street. Today, the online world is every part as real as the physical world. It operates as a dual reality and that is why it is essential that people's safety is also being protected online by the police.

What can a city do to initiate a similar initiative?

If a Police Force considers engaging in internet police work, the first step is to determine what is police work and what is public relations work: We do not consider Twitter accounts handled by a National Police Board specialist or the Helsinki Police Department's Facebook page internet police work. This is public relations.

Furthermore, police officers need to be selected for an online officer position based on their own personal motivation. The need to be proactive by nature. It goes without saying that they need to have substantial experience with police work. In fact, this is more important than social media knowledge, as the latter can be learnt on the job.

Potential candidates need to be given freedom to express opinions - more than what is usually allowed in police work - to be able to take a stand in online conversations and debates. It is important to establish ways of sharing information and creating a common operational picture between internet police officers from different departments, as social media users may send the same messages to multiple officers. It is equally important to have an established decision process that can help determine what to prioritise, as social media is a continuous flood of information. Also, a plan for how the internet police work will be managed needs to be in place, for instance by forming a centralised unit where police work might otherwise be divided by districts or operations.



Photo: Min stemme ut

Kristiansand, Norway

"My voice out" (Min stemme ut)

"My voice out" is an initiative that helps immigrants and refugees use their voices to take part in public debate. It aims to give them the necessary understanding of freedom of speech and the means to contribute to current issues without fear of possible consequences.

Kongsgård skolecenter, Kristiansand municipality

A lot of immigrants and refugees come from countries where it is illegal or even dangerous to express one's opinion freely. At Kongsgård skolesenter in Kristiansand in Norway, they aim to help immigrant and refugee students who have recently come to Norway express themselves freely in social media.

"We noticed that young people from minority backgrounds are the least active in terms of public debate, due to language and cultural barriers. We want to mobilise them so that they dare stand up for what they believe and are able to justify why they believe it."

Johanne Benitez Nilsen, initiator, project and crime prevention coordinator

How

- We use social media in the form of Instagram and Facebook as arenas. Here, the students can express their statements in movies, text and images
- We arrange weekly competitions where classes or individual statements are rewarded

The target group

Immigrant and refugee students from Kongsgård skolesenter.

Collaboration

"My voice out" is a collaboration between Kongsgård skolesenter, Tangen high school and Kristiansand municipality. Kongsgård skolesenter is a school for immigrants and refugees who have recently arrived in Norway. Tangen high school has a media programme and its students have created the media package for the concept #minstemmeut.

Key partners and colleagues

- Students from both schools
- Teachers
- Project and crime prevention coordinator

Impact

- 300 immigrant students have completed a course on how to use their freedom of speech on Facebook in the manner that many others Norwegians do.
- Many of the teachers have started using the topics that arise in their teaching.
- The class competitions have proven to be a good way of engaging the teachers.
- All involved parties see "My voice out" as a beneficial development initiative for mobilising the target group.

"It has taken time, and in the beginning a lot of people said 'I daren't say what I really mean. I'm not used to it; I don't know how to talk about what I think and believe. I'll keep it to myself.' After a while our students have loosened up and opened up. Now they're debating religion, injustice and other potent topics."

Tor Kristensen Heskedal, teacher, Kongsgård skolesenter

Key lessons and recommendations

The collaboration and close dialogue between the students at Kongsgård skolesenter and the students of the media programme at Tangen high school has shaped the direction and content of the project.

Next step

The project is currently targeted immigrants and refugees, but could be adapted to other themes and target groups.

"My voice out" is inspired by a similar project from Skien in Norway. This project aims to support freedom of speech in youth groups in general.



Helsinki, Finland

Life skills for a changing Finland

The City of Helsinki, in cooperation with Cambridge University, has developed a new participatory citizenship skills-programme entitled 'Life Skills for a Changing Finland'. The Programme aims to develop value-based critical thinking and citizenship skills to promote social cohesion and prevent susceptibility to extremist propaganda.

The City Executive Office, Helsinki municipality

The course is suitable for young people in schools and youth clubs from all ethnic backgrounds in Helsinki. They learn critical thinking, conflict negotiation and how to affirm their values and opinions in a non-violent way. This helps them become able to contribute to society.

The programme contains of 16 contact hours, divided into 8 sessions dealing with the following themes:

- My Finland, your Finland- the human journey
- We are social beings

- Relationships and lifestyle
- In-group and Out-group
- It's not fair! Justice and money
- Peace and conflict
- Tricks with words
- Wrap Up 'Remember this'

The course is based on the Integrative Complexity (IC) model, developed by Dr Sara Savage and colleagues at the University of Cambridge. It shows robust pre- and post testing results across 43 cross-cultural IC intervention assessments.

IC Thinking® is a unique and empirically validated intervention method that reduces extremism, equips participants to transform conflict between groups and promotes human flourishing.

IC Thinking® interventions enable people to emerge from the 'tunnel vision' that typically accompanies change or perceived threats to one's worldview. The learning activities engage deep brain processes, increasing the complexity with which people view the social world.

Participants learn how to recognise and validate a wider range of viewpoints and values in themselves and others. They also learn how to engage with differing viewpoints by building upon shared values whilst remaining true to their own values. This growth occurs as participants engage with real-life topics. It is therefore important that each programme is contextualised to wear the same cultural clothing as the participants.

IC Thinking® has a track record of working in schools, addressing all extremisms and intergroup conflicts in a way that is suitable and non-threatening for schools comprising mixed cultural and ethnic backgrounds.

The target group

13-19-year old people in schools and youth clubs from all ethnic backgrounds in Helsinki.

Collaboration

IC Thinking® is built on pioneering work by psychologists at the University of Cambridge. All courses and training are research-based and assessed using an empirically validated frame alongside self-reports, observational reports and other psychometric measures. The City of Helsinki will continue to collaborate with the researchers at Cambridge for research implementation.

Key partners and colleagues

- City of Helsinki:
 - City Executive Office
 - Educational Department
 - Youth Department
 - · Health- and Social Services
- Multicultural NGOs
- Two mosques (Sunni and Shia)
- Finn Church Aid (The network for religious and traditional leaders)
- Helsinki Police Department
- · Cambridge University and University of Helsinki

Impact

The results up to now indicate that the students and teachers who partake in this initiative have similar results as to what has been reported elsewhere. Young people point to how they have new-found confidence in presenting their points of view on sensitive issues. They also note an increased ability to listen to others and the realisation that there are multiple viewpoints, even in matters that are very important to them.

Main challenges

- Allocation of resources; The initial development requires adequate funding, as does the maintenance of databases and other systems
- The workload of people involved in supervising and implementing the programme

Key lessons and recommendations

Teaching perspective-taking and increasing integrative complexity of thinking reduces proneness to violence. It is also an active tool in fostering people-skills and creating safe environments for citizens.

Next step

To develop a programme suitable for school audiences and eventually expand the programme to other target groups



Expert Views


Social media does not radicalise alone

Social media often plays an integral role in the process of radicalisation to Islamist extremism, but alone it is never responsible for an individual becoming an extremist. Charlie Winther presents eight points.

By Charlie Winther, senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation

- Social media can be an arena within which radicalisation takes place, but it is never the radicalising agent.
- 2. It is rarely the case that people become extremists simply because they consume extremist propaganda. Extremist videos, photographs and audio materials may catalyse the process of radicalisation, presenting as they do a distorted version of global events, but their role is usually secondary to that of person-toperson relations, whether online or offline.
- 3. The internet is an ideal space for the emergence of echo chambers self-curating communities of individuals that hold and nurture their shared values at the expense of other systems of belief. Echo chambers are not necessarily a negative thing, but in the context of extremism, they can hasten the process of radicalisation.
- 4. Extremist propaganda should not be challenged by counter-messaging alone. The psychosocial forces that render it appealing are too complex to be undone by counter-narratives alone.
- **5.** A lot of extremist propaganda builds upon implicitly positive foundations. What makes the

- Islamic State a successful communicator is that it does not just criticise the status quo, but that it offers an alternative to it, too.
- **6.** The distinction between offline and online should not be overestimated. To meaningfully subvert extremists online, practitioners and civil society organisations should present alternatives offline. The two are inextricably linked.
- 7. It is not the place of Western governments to criticise Islamist extremist groups by alleging that they are not valid representations of Islam. The Islamic State craves this sort of attention when Western world leaders make these allegations, it reifies the group's worldview and presents it with an opportunity to explain why the rest of the world is incorrect.
- 8. Islamist extremist groups are appealing only in part because of the claims they make about religion. Often, what makes them more enticing is their promises of redemption, community and sympathy. To subvert this appeal, it is crucial that practitioners and civil society organisations recognise that an offer of a participatory identity is at the heart of extremist outreach.



A safe online sphere - what can cities do?

Today, online experience is central to who we are. Especially if we are young. Social media is very different from text-based websites of a decade ago. We now live in an upload culture, one that blurs the boundaries between public and private, where our most intimate concerns, fears and hopes are shared, often through images that capture what we may find difficult to put into words.

By Kevin McDonald, Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Criminology and Sociology Middlesex University

Understanding radicalisation and social media

In Europe today, social media is closely linked to what we have come to call radicalisation.

Sometimes this is limited to Islamist extremism, but radicalisation also refers to ultra-nationalism and other forms of violent rejection.

Online experience plays a central role in this. Radicalisation is not about indoctrination or passively receiving a message. Instead, social media underlines just how much radicalisation is a social activity, linked to sharing ideas and emotions, images and sensations. Researchers and policymakers have increasingly come to recognise radicalisation as a pathway.

Multiple pathways

Recognising radicalisation as a pathway (and not just simple indoctrination) helps us develop ways of responding to it. Pathways involve different entry points, different transitions and different ways of disengaging. To begin to understand these, we

need to recognise that there are very different pathways involved when it comes to radicalisation.

Between order and disorder: crime and gamification

If we think radicalisation is about excessive religious devotion, we are wrong. One of the most important pathways to radicalisation today involves people with criminal backgrounds in robberies, assault or drug dealing: More than one third of young people from Germany who have travelled to Syria to join jihadist groups have previous criminal convictions.

These young people are often prolific social media posters, and we encounter two quite different experiences. One embraces radicalisation as a pathway to structure and order; a way to break free of a life experienced as 'out of control' where violence, including one's own, brings an ever-present threat of self destruction. Here, radicalisation offers a kind of structure similar to that offered by urban street gangs.

For others, radicalisation allows people to stay involved in theft and violence, under the veneer of a cause. This is evident in the social media posts of many young Europeans with criminal backgrounds who joined the Islamic State's 'Immigrants Brigade' in Syria, and among those who returned to launch attacks on Paris or Brussels.

This same tension between order and disorder is also central to the 'gamification' of jihad that is increasingly evident in social media posts: They combine a culture of the 'anti-hero' with themes of adventure, winners and losers.

The mutation of humanitarianism and purification

A quite different pathway is often evident among university students, or among people who have been radicalised following an encounter with suffering through media such as television or the internet.

We can see this through their posts to social media, which are often about responding to distant

suffering. These posts are first framed in a language of good and evil, but we encounter radicalisation at work when they start to be framed in terms of innocence guilt, and then purity and impurity.

People undergoing this transition start to call for the 'cleansing' of whole groups of people who are judged as impure or unclean. This experiential structure is at the basis of racism and hate crime, and many people who travel along this path to radicalisation will celebrate extreme violence, in particular through circulating images. This kind of extreme violence not only kills, it sets out to humiliate its victims, and in so doing seeks to present them as less than human.

The 2016 Orlando massacre of gay people at a nightclub in the United States was undertaken by a man, who in the middle of the act of killing, posted to Facebook decrying the 'filthy ways of the West'. But the killer himself was a regular patron of the bar: His killing others involved an attempt to kill something in himself. The theme of purification by violence is central to hate crime. It is also at the centre of many forms of radicalisation and this alerts us to the place of sexuality in experiences of radicalisation.

Conspiracies, hidden realities and spree killing

The links between radicalisation and other social processes are evident when radicalised violence takes the form of spree killing. This entails attempting to kill as many people as possible, with the knowledge that the person undertaking the killing will also die.

This kind of violence is not limited to 'radicalised' people, but is evident among school shooters, such as Pekka-Eric Auvinen who killed 18 people at a high school in November 2007. There were 52 separate school shootings in the United States in 2015.

School shooters believe that they are superior to the people around them. But they also believe they are at the bottom of the school hierarchy. They come to believe that the only way that their hidden superiority can be seen by everyone is through an event on such a scale that reality 'fractures', and



with it the hidden truth of their greatness becomes known. This is why these kinds of killers often seek to mediate the murders they undertake, filming the killing and attempting to upload it to the Internet. Their extreme violence seeks to reveal a hidden reality.

This idea of a 'hidden reality' is central to many forms of radicalisation. In the weeks before three London schoolgirls travelled to join the Islamic State in 2015, they published social media posts about hypocrites who were suppressing hidden knowledge that they had access to through their networks. Their social media posts reveal a search for powerful knowledge that is hidden just out of sight, demonstrating an emotional grammar of anxiety and release.

This emotional structure is central to contemporary cultures of conspiracy theory. Important expressions of radicalisation among young people in Europe are embedded in these emotional structures of hidden reality, hypocrites and hidden knowledge.

One example is 19HH, an apocalyptic movement that emerged in France involving a fusion between jihadist culture and epic adventure evoking Lord of the Rings. Many forms of extremist nationalism also draw their energy from the same tensions of anxiety and release that drive conspiracy theory, and they also rely on epic accounts of hidden pasts.

'I', 'You' and 'Us'

The radicalisation pathways we encounter on social media can be grouped around key themes. The first one focuses on experiences of self or 'I', and comes to be shaped by themes of purification or revelation. A second pathway focuses on 'you', where social media posts are structured around themes of inferiority and superiority, winners and losers, often demonstrating a kind of hyperactivity. A third focuses on 'us', the search for a structured community that offers safety, with strong borders and a refusal of difference.

Safety and cities

The skills and knowledge developed by many urban programmes can contribute to preventing and responding to radicalisation. Many aspects of radicalisation are similar to the transitions leading to involvement in urban gangs. As such, urban youth and probation services working with young people and gangs have major contributions to make in terms of preventing and disengaging from radicalisation. Other forms of radicalisation involve the processes that drive hate crimes and racism, and the antiracism programmes developed by cities have an important role to play in both preventing and responding to radicalisation.

Many aspects of radicalisation are centred on experiences of the self, and here counsellors and teachers in schools have a major role to play when interest in conspiracies or hidden realities, or concern about distant suffering, starts to become expressed in language of violent purification.

As such, radicalisation requires a 'whole of city' response, from youth services and schools to urban planning and policing.

Radicalisation is not the same as a search for meaning, an interest in celebrating the past of one's country, or taking up practices of religious piety. There is a danger that responding to radicalisation may involve stigmatising people who are different, or whose practices we may find difficult to understand. Such stigmatisation amplifies the processes involved in radicalisation.

Cities, urban services and urban design all have a key role to play, from supporting experiences of local solidarity with conflict zones in other countries to ensuring that neighbourhoods do not become excluded ghettos where diversity and encounters with differences cease to be part of urban life.

Cities counter radicalisation not through stigmatising people who are different, but through putting into practice the idea that makes cities what they are: living with people who are different from us enriches our lives, and makes us more human.

Chapter 3

Strong Families



Strong families are key influencers when it comes to identifying, preventing and addressing radicalisation and violent extremist behaviour.

Strong families empower their children and can act as role models by understanding what they are going through when times are tough. They know where to go to for local services, tools and support. They are connected to the society surrounding them and actively try to prevent the risk of their children leading destructive lives.

Guiding principles

- Develop joint narratives based at schools, for families to gather around
- Mobilise family and local stakeholder participation by focusing on the common goal of helping children and young people succeed
- Ensure that parents understand the purpose of meetings and activities
- Identify families who are not being reached (like those not attending parent meetings) and identify who might be best positioned to reach and engage with them

City Cases

Larvik, Norway

International Child Development Program - ICDP

The International child development program, ICDP, takes place in focus groups for parents who are new to Norway and for parents or do not have strong Norwegian language skills. The supervisors speak the participating parents' native languages and facilitate the focus groups.

Larvik municipality

A key component to the programme is the native language of the parent, as it naturally makes them better at reflecting. A course consists of thirteen meetings.

The programme focuses on the following:

- How parents can empower their children through giving them a good childhood with emotional security
- How to support cross-cultural children so that they feel secure, with a whole identity

The target group

Parents new to Norway and parents without sufficient Norwegian language skills.

Collaboration

ICDP is implemented and driven in collaboration with the school nurses, child care services, integration services and the Norwegian School of Adult Learning.

Key partners and colleagues

- School nurses trainers
- Integration services recruiting parents
- Larvik Learning Centre coordinator and facilitator
- Child Care Services recruitment and requester of new courses for families

Impact

The parents say that the course makes them better aware of what it takes to be better parents who support their children's' cross-cultural identity. They also say that it helps them grow closer to their children, become more patient and less afraid of learning other ways to parent. They mention that they have become better at explaining matters to their children and at understanding them.

The ICDP program has been the topic of several Norwegian national research initiatives.

Main challenges

- Finding enough bilingual supervisors in the needed languages.
- Parents are working or attending Norwegian classes, making it difficult to find time to partake in group initiatives.
- A need to increase the status of supervisors from other countries: Municipal employees did not trust that they could do the job as well as Norwegians, when they in fact do it better.

Key lessons and recommendations

- Hire supervisors with different native language skills.
- Parents and supervisors with the same native languages should be in the same group.
- Do not use translators as translation takes twice the time and hinders reflection.

Next steps

Extending the programme to different groups of parents, such as parents in refugee reception centres, parents worrying about their children becoming radicalised and parents who are concerned that their children are outsiders.



Helsinki, Finland

Multiprofessional work, anchor team

Helsinki has established a multi-professional Anchor team within the Helsinki Police Department. At-risk youth and their families are the main client group. All concerns related to violent extremists are also primarily referred to the Anchor team.

Helsinki Police Department, Helsinki municipality

Through multi-professional work, team members become familiar with and understand each other's work methods, organisational cultures, legal restraints and everyday work in a completely different way than if they were only to come together occasionally and ad hoc.

Helsinki distinguishes between multi-agency work and multi-professional work. Multi-professional work refers to professionals working together as a team on a permanent basis. Multi-agency work refers to professionals coming together on a case-by-case basis whilst working and residing in their respective organisations.

The target group

- At-risk youth and their families are the main client group.
- "Lone actors", clients who have fallen through the cracks and might pose a threat due to serious mental health problems.

Collaboration

The Anchor team in Helsinki consists of police officers, social workers and a psychiatric nurse. They have been assigned by their respective organisation

to work together as a multi-professional team and provide low-threshold services to clients and are based at the Helsinki police station.

The social workers and psychiatric nurse work for the municipality but are, as mentioned, assigned to the Helsinki Police Department. It is important they are not hired by the police. Not only because of how this affects how they are perceived, but also because it is important that they have "inside access" to services and client data bases provided by the municipality and also access to client data bases.

Key lessons and recommendations

- Trust, as well as a deep understanding and respect for the other professions, make up the foundation of a fruitful cooperation between professionals.
- Multi-professional work also provides a different kind of solid foundation for family or individual client interventions when the professionals at hand know each other intimately as colleagues.

Anchor teams are also available at other police stations nationwide.

Expert Views



Empowering families

Over the last year, Quilliam has played a leading role in establishing the Families against Terrorism and Extremism network - FATE. Comprising over 80 leading NGOs and family orientated organisations, the FATE network has grown exponentially across Europe and North Africa, impacting thousands of families.

By Joshua Cheung, Strategic Communications Officer Quilliam Foundation

During this time, the Quilliam team has carried out dozens of workshops and collaborated with local partners in 19 countries. Despite working across five different languages and diverse communities, a common pattern can be identified, with families, NGOs and governments suffering similar recurring issues. The below is broadly representative of these recurring issues and the training we offer governments, families and local authorities on how to work better in this space.

Support visualisation

Sadly, we often hear from family organisations that they do not know what local services, tool kits and support are available. At FATE, we know that many cities have well-developed and competent support infrastructures for vulnerable people and families. Families suffering from extremism or radicalisation need to be aware of these services and how they can help them. Similarly, civil society organisations must work closer with professional service providers

and inform their members of where they can seek more in-depth support. Connecting families and stakeholder with these services in a clear, easy to use way is vitally important.

Participatory mapping

When entering different communities and cultures to work on taboo subjects that require difficult conversations, it is important to empower the community to speak first. Our workshops are therefore collaborative as we aim to be facilitators and guides, not top-down lecturers. Our initial workshops are all about teasing out the answers from the community and putting these answers into a format and programme that can help the target group adopt it and act in a more cohesive way. Participatory mapping allows us to quickly see strengths, weaknesses and key players within their environment and help them navigate in a non-patronising way.

We also know that all communities are different. We tailor programmes and are aware of sensitivities from the very beginning, creating a more personalised and comfortable collaboration.

Audience penetration

When working with families, it is important that we do not just reach the communities and groups who are already engaged in CVE. We must also reach out into the most inaccessible social groupings and attempt to support them, too. One of the best ways of doing this initially is through strategic communications and online social media campaigns. By using Facebook ads, we can deliver tailored communications that guarantee that our target demographics view our content.

We constantly assess whether we are reaching the right people. If we don't hyper-localise and hyper-target our message, we risk creating echo chambers of self-selecting community groups who need our support but might not be the most vulnerable ones.

Calls to action and behavioural change indicators

Just mobilising a network or invigorating a collection of families is not enough. Ideally, we want to leave a tangible call to action. Whether this is helping them host an event, getting families to run a campaign or setting up a support group, we have to find ways of stimulating and sustaining engagement. This also helps us evaluate impact and whether we have indeed inspired a new type of behaviour.

An example of a tangible call to action could be 'make sure you join and attend the new youth centre'. If, after training, the youth centre sees an increase in visitors and members from the target audience, we can see a clear behavioural change offline. And then we know that we are making a difference. In short, embedding calls to action and behavioural change indicators in all CVE project planning is crucial.

CVE-specific vs CVE-relevant

This really depends on your audience, but some of our outreach programmes are direct in their approach to CVE and others are very indirect. For example, a family group may be put off engaging with your organisation if your talk hinges specifically on topics such as ISIS, recruitment or extremism.

It may be a better approach to look at online safety initiatives, pastoral care or alternative narratives like inter-faith studies. This is a a more pleasant way of easing a community into talking about extremism and terrorism, but the route to getting there is different.

However, some communities want to delve right into the heart of the issue. In these cases, it is important to tackle things head on. Overall, programmes should always be tailored based on solid knowledge and understanding of the audience. This way, you can prepare in time and deliver what they need.



Chapter 4

Safe Public Institutions



Safe public institutions are important bridge builders when it comes to safeguarding individuals from becoming alienated from society.

Safe public institutions should create networks with civil communities and enable co-creation in planning and acting. They should be able to identify vulnerabilities in individuals and groups and know how to enable constructive alternatives.

At school, all teachers should know how to create tolerant and safe rooms in which their students can be fragile and discuss issues. But implementing initiatives within the sphere of public institutions can be challenged by issues such as non-disclosure clauses.

Guiding principles

- Provide tools: Employees often lack skills, knowledge and awareness of tools that can address issues related to radicalisation
- Recognize schools as the foundation of democratic citizenship and inclusion and provide schools and teachers with necessary tools and resources
- Engage communities: Reach out to local communities like families, youth clubs and faith associations, for instance by inviting civil society into school activities
- Secure the permanent structure of the work at a local level by providing clear and useful guidelines and responsibilities
- Access for everyone: Establish an open platform and a joint language that ensures that each party understands and can participate
- Use existing experiences and structure to strengthen long-term efforts

City Cases



Fredrikstad, Norway

Early warning system

Fredrikstad has found a way to implement an early warning system in a medium-sized Nordic municipality. Their experience is that some details are more important than others and that there must be a long-term approach. Functional systems for professionals presuppose systematic work on a day-to-day basis, and can't be dealt with as a one-off. The same goes for cooperation with civil society and police.

Departement of Education and Youth, Fredrikstad municipality

Municipalities that aim to prevent violent extremism often focus on early warning systems that can make it possible to intervene towards people or groups that raise concern. These are complicated issues; first and foremost because early signs of potential violent extremism often are within the limits of free speech and free religious practice, yet still cause concern amongst friends, parents and professionals.

Secondly, by professional intervention we risk increased marginalisation and stigmatisation of the person and/or group in focus. The question

is how to catch early concerns and ensure early intervention without marginalising the individual in the process.

Friends, family and professionals constitute important early worriers. We need the following to help them voice their concerns:

- Knowledge about violent extremism and available measures/programmes
- How to get in touch/points of contact and guidance for concerned family and friends

Our courses on violent extremism for professionals last between 45 minutes and 3 hours. We prefer small groups (10-30 people) to ensure time for dialogue, questions and adaption to this specific group of professionals' needs, daily work and target group.

We run courses and dialogue meetings for youth, parents and volunteers in cooperation with civil society organisations. The courses focus on local knowledge on violent extremism: When to worry, which existing programmes can help and where to turn for guidance. We have not focused on a worry check list, as we find it difficult to ensure that it is knowledge-based. Also, concerns are too complex to narrow down in a list format.

What we focus on

- When friends, family members or professionals begin to worry, there is often a good reason.
 Guidance and discussions about the total situation are the best tools.
- Questions are important, because the issue is complex and because the audience tends to be sceptical. Honesty and openness works.
- The courses should be co-hosted by the municipality and local police department where it is possible and appropriate.
- It is important to inform the audience about local measures and programmes. If people are worried, they won't voice their concerns if they don't believe that the person can actually get help.
- Point of contact: It must be easy for professionals and citizens to contact the police and/or municipality.
- We have a designated phone number for both groups to get in touch with experienced professionals throughout the week. Emergency calls are channelled to the local police.

The target group

Friends, family and professionals of all ages. Cooperation with the target audience is based on equality and a combination of systemic and personal relations.

Collaboration

We cooperate closely with the local police and discuss inquiries within the rules of confidentiality.

Schools are a primary partner when it comes to catching early concerns. Volunteer organisations, faith communities and minority organisations are important stakeholders and can function as channels to reach parents. They are valuable cooperation partners with important perspectives who can reach people differently than municipal employees can.

Key partners and colleagues

- The local police
- Schools
- Social service
- · Faith communities
- NGOs

Impact

- We had a significant increase in inquiries after
 we started doing courses and meetings. Most of
 them were low-level concerns and most of them
 were from professionals such as schools, social
 services and the police. Most of the inquiries
 were handled with guidance alone and did not
 require reference to any programmes.
- Audience response has been positive. People want to understand the phenomenon and the discussions are often engaging. Professionals are content with the courses.
- A higher competence level for our group working with violent extremism in our municipality and amongst professionals – handling inquiries increases our knowledge and experience.

Main challenges

 This is time-consuming work, in particular because we chose to have small groups.
 Professionals are already swamped and finding time is sometimes difficult. This will be even more difficult when the focus and buzz surrounding violent extremism decreases in calmer times.

- How to raise awareness and maintain vigilance over time, ensuring a long-term focus.
- How to communicate signs of concern so people know when to be worried, without stigmatising vulnerable groups.
- How to make people establish contact when they are concerned about a loved one or a student and how to reach friends and family with information in general.

Key lessons and recommendations

- Make small groups
- Focus on all types of extremism (religious and political)
- Plan long-term
- Present the complexity of CVE, not just the headlines
- Encourage people to make contact if they are concerned, to discuss the concrete case.
- Do not focus too much on lists with signs of radicalisation
- Set up cooperation between the municipality and local police to discuss concerns within the limits of the law
- Early concerns regarding violent extremism are often complex and difficult to assess, both for the worried person and the professional

- who is there to help. We have seen that open discussions on early warning situations could be a tool to assess the level of concern and help ensure a holistic view on the issue at hand.
- Preventing violent extremism is a new and complicated discipline. It is important that professionals have someone to turn to for guidance on this issue.
- Friends and family are important stakeholders, but they are often ambivalent about voicing their concerns. A point of contact and guidance from professionals could help them reach out.
- A number of difficult issues need to be addressed, like how legal confidentiality influences and restricts communication between the municipality, local police and intelligence service. And how we should offer services to families and particularly ambivalent subjects of concern, including determining which signs should make us worry in the first place.

Next step

- Follow-up sessions for new employees.
- Follow-up sessions on specific themes relevant to specific stakeholders. For instance, how to address extremism in classrooms for teachers and how to deal with CVE in a social work context for children and social services.

Aarhus, Denmark

Dialogue-based workshops for young people

The purpose of these dialogue-based workshops is to via early intervention make contact and achieve a more intimate and engaged relation to young people, as opposed to simply handing out general paper-based information.

Department of Children and Young people, Aarhus municipality

The workshop model consists of a 2,5 hour session plus materials and a teacher's guide, including proposals for student assignments.

12 instructors have been trained to conduct the workshops. The workshop is created by Aarhus Municipality and East Jutland Police within the Aarhus Model.

The students discuss knowledge and dilemmas in the field of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism from three different perspectives:

- The world and me
- My class and me
- Me and myself

The target group

8-10th grade students in public schools and youth education institutions.

All youngsters can benefit from the workshop, not only those at risk of being radicalised.

Collaboration

The workshop is a part of the Aarhus Model on Preventing Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, a corporation between the City of Aarhus and East Jutland Police. Workshops are conducted in public schools, private schools and in youth education institutions.

Impact

- Approx. 250 workshops have been conducted from August 2012 to November 2016
- The workshops get very positive response from schools and teachers
- Some high schools have made the workshop mandatory for their students

Main challenge

How do we avoid stigmatisation when defining the content of the workshops?

Key lessons and recommendations

- It is important to inform all youngsters of this kind of awareness work, not only schools in problem areas. Radicalisation can happen everywhere.
- Workshops should be conducted in the local culture of teaching.
- Digital behaviour is becoming a more and more important focus area in the workshop.

Next step

Workshops for middle-graders in schools are under development. The aim is not to discuss radicalisation and violent extremism directly, but within the framework of democracy, citizenship, polarisation and understanding.



Expert Views

Strong public institutions upon democratic principles

For young people to live peacefully together with others in culturally diverse societies, they need to acquire the competences to do so. When preparing for life as active democratic citizens, young people cannot only learn about, but also through and for democracy and human rights. Schools not only prepare us for the labour market, but also for life as active democratic citizens in sustainable democratic societies.

By Jennie Holck-Clausen, The European Wergeland Centre

The European Wergeland Centre (EWC) is a European resource centre for education for democratic citizenship, human rights and intercultural understanding. It was established by Norway and the Council of Europe in 2008. The Centre offers a wide range of capacity-building activities for education professionals and other stakeholders within the fields of formal and nonformal education.

What are strong public institutions and schools?

Strong democratic public institutions are based on trust. Trust is established in institutions that exercise democratic principles through policies and practices.

In schools, this manifests itself in how well all aspects of school life reflect democratic and human rights principles, such as respect for human dignity, diversity, inclusion, equality and peaceful coexistence. It is reflected in the school ethos and governance, in the teaching and learning environment in the classroom, in the school yard and in the relation with parents and the local community. In short, it is reflected in the whole school.

A democratic school is a school that not only takes measures to prevent anti-democratic ideologies and practices such as discrimination, hate speech and violent extremism, but actively promotes democratic and human rights-based values and principles through a whole school approach.

Recommendations to school professionals

- Apply a whole school approach that involves all school stakeholders to support a culture of openness, inclusion, participation and trust.
- Engage young people in democratic dialogue about controversial issues and provide tools for teachers and school leaders that encourage them to facilitate discussions about controversial issues like radicalisation and extremism in the classroom.
- Ensure that teachers can create a safe learning environment where students discuss their views openly, even if these differ from those of the teacher or the other students, while respecting ground rules about inclusion and respect for others.

Why it is important to engage public institutions and schools

Participation in shared decision-making and school governance helps young people gain trust in the democratic process. It encourages them to practice their own democratic competences with increased confidence. Schools can offer a safe environment for discussions, dealing with different views and opinions in a democratic and human rights-based way.

Active dialogue to promote tolerance and respect

Intolerance is a growing threat in today's society. We aim to reach young people and get them to reflect on these important issues.

By Lovisa Fhager Havdelin, Teskedsorden

The Order of the Teaspoon is a Swedish foundation engaged in active dialogue with children and young people to promote tolerance and respect. Our main activities are in Sweden but we also contribute with our expertise at conferences and seminars abroad.

The Order of the Teaspoon presents free material to schools. This includes books, films and guides that help teachers create insight into other people's living conditions. We have for instance presented books together with teacher's guides to Everyone should be a feminist by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie and How to cure a fanatic by Amos Oz.

We arrange and take part in various events and exhibitions aimed at increasing tolerance and respect for other people. Every year, we participate in the Swedish week for politics in Almedalen, the Human Rights day and the Swedish fair for literature.

Important lessons from the work

We use culture as a tool in our work, hosting activities that give young people an opportunity to attain insight in other people's lives. One important lesson is that it takes a long time. You must be persistent and never give up. Another important lesson is that intolerance and prejudice usually originates from ignorance and lack of knowledge, not deeply grounded values and ethics.

Highlights

It is vital that all material is based on long-term work and not only on shorter special-feature workdays. Every year, the Order of the Teaspoon grants two scholarships to individuals or groups who have contributed, in words and deeds, to a respectful dialogue between different people; people who have torn down walls of ethnicity, social position, age, gender, religion and politics.

Scholarships

The scholarship for 2016 was awarded the Swedish journalist Niklas Orrenius, who through his work as a writer and journalist has helped chart and visualise intolerance and extremism. The second scholarship for 2016 was awarded a class at Lillboskolan in Edsbyn, Sweden, for collecting money to help a classmate and his family get home safely after being stuck in the earthquake that hit Ecuador.

Our recommendations to teachers and social workers

- Listen to your pupils and try to get them to explain how they feel about various questions.
 Never condemn their opinions. Be curious!
- Make use of art and culture in your teaching.
- Create concrete exercises in which pupils learn to identify with their own opinions and attitudes.
- Make sure that you have fun you come a long way with humour and warmth.



Chapter 5

Strong Youth Engagement



Violent extremism is a generational struggle in which youth are especially vulnerable and have been disproportionately affected. Education approaches are vital to protecting young people, but there must also be a greater attempt to empower youth and proactively involve them. Families, friends and local organisations are close to the young population and are key influencers when it comes to identifying, preventing and addressing radicalisation. Municipalities are uniquely positioned to facilitate proactive youth involvement and to engage them as key partners in building resilience within their local communities.

Guiding principles

- Involve youth early in the process and make sure you engage with diverse groups
- Dialogue is fundamental. Be curious talk to people, not about them
- Build trust through face-to-face interactions (Stop emailing and come visit)
- Once won't do it. Continuously incorporate youth engagement in your institution and processes
- Cooperate across all sectors to engage more actors and empower credible messengers

City Cases



Photo: Helge Hansen

Bergen, Norway

Fargespill

What happens if we look for gold instead of dirt when different cultures meet? Because that's how we work as humans - the things we look for in other people are what we'll find. And the things we don't look for, we rarely find.

Stiftelsen Fargespill

What we look for – that's up to each and every one of us. This is the heart of Fargespill.

Fargespill is an intimate, musical meeting where young peoples' stories about who they are and where they come from are told through music and dance from their respective cultures. The experience is elevated by professional musicians, choreographers, instructors, sound, light and set designers who bolster and fortify the kids' stories.

The ensemble consists of children and young people from 35 different countries. Most of them have come to Norway as refugees and immigrants. The youngest is 7, the oldest 25.

"At Fargespill, we believe that to truly meet each other, we must go beyond categories and our tendency to perceive the world schematically and in silos. The recipe for a good meeting is found in complex and comprehensive processes that demand all our experience, sensitivity and intelligence. Fargespill seeks to spark an understanding of how we wander this little planet together and that we need to make the best of it."

Kjersti Berge, daglig leder, Fargespill The shows are created from the children's native songs and dance traditions; global youth culture such as hip hop and beatboxing, Ethiopian shoulder dance, Norwegian "gangar", Mogadishu meets Bollywood, "fallturillturalltura" meets "habibi habibi". Treasures from around the world that we would never have seen or heard if these kids hadn't come to Norway.

Main challenges

- Cultural differences, for example how different cultures view appointments and time or how some cultures don't allow children and youth to dance on stage
- Getting information across to performers and their families when we don't speak the same language

Collaboration

Fargespill is a private foundation funded through Bergen municipality, Hordaland county, the Norwegian State, private organisations and ticket sale profits. All these external parties are important collaborators and sounding boards for Fargespill. Usually they are not directly involved in day-to-day operations or projects. Artistically, we have collaborated with some of the biggest artists and venues in Norway on time-limited projects.

Bergen University College:

In 2015, Bergen University College launched an interdisciplinary, supplementary training-programme for teachers, based on the Fargespill method and philosophy – giving teachers tools to work resource-focused in their own classrooms. Fargespill has actively in developed the programme with the University College and Fargespill's artistic managers and some of the performers are lecturers in the programme.

Impact

- Art project as an integration method: Fargespill can function as an integration project and as an art project in schools, as well as on many levels in the world of the arts.
- A chance to give and to feel strong: For all the hundreds of performers that have taken part in Fargespill performances, the important thing is that it affords them the chance to give. This

exchange creates good meetings because the act of giving allows everyone to feel strong.

The experience gained and the material gathered can be used to design programmes suitable for many others, for example in:

- Schools and kindergartens
- Municipal schools of music and performing arts
- Teacher training
- Local communities
- Refugee reception centres

The Fargespill concept is licensed to 22 municipalities in Norway and 3 in Sweden.

Key lessons and recommendations

- Working with people from different cultures requires a basic understanding that we are all people, as well as an awareness of our cultural differences.
- If your surroundings see you as a resource, you
 will start defining yourself as one. This platform is
 essential, because it also creates a starting point
 where we are all equal.
- All people have something to offer if they are just given a chance.
- Toning down social motives has positive social consequences that would be unattainable in a client-therapist relationship. Traumatised children and youth need people around them who regard them as resources rather than just as difficult cases.
- If you are perceived as a resource, you become a resource. We have seen many examples of this and these experiences make it impossible to ignore the social consequences of Fargespill.

Next steps

- Continue creating new shows, and spreading the concept, hopefully further into Europe.
- Continue the collaboration with Bergen University college.
- Work to get other University Colleges across Norway to implement the programme.
- In 2017, Fargespill will start up a new company in Oslo, managed by Fargespill in Bergen.





Aarhus, Denmark

Mentor programme

The mentor programme is part of the Aarhus Model for prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism, a corporation between the City of Aarhus and East Jutland Police. The mentor programme is fully implemented and functions within this framework.

Department of Social Affairs and Employment, Aarhus municipality

The mentor programme was initiated in 2011 and is developed in collaboration with Professor Preben Bertelsen, Psychological Institute, University of Aarhus. The programme is based on the concept of life psychology, developed by Preben Bertelsen.

The anti-radicalisation programme's management group recruits mentors. Mentors are employed part time and paid by the hour. They have different personal backgrounds: Some are lawyers, security guards, university graduates or self-employed. None of the mentors (thus far) have been radicalised.

Mentors undergo a six-day course in life psychology before they are assigned a mentee by the management group.

The intention is to equip the mentors with useful tools to support them in their work with the young mentees. These young people often lack basic life skills that can be instrumental when it comes to keeping them attached to extremist environments. The mentor's role is to support the mentee in (re-) developing life skills.

The target group

Youngsters who are radicalised or in risk of being radicalised politically or religiously.

Collaboration

The mentor programme collaborates with the University of Aarhus, Dept. of Psychology. The University has created a six-day basic education for new mentors. Educated mentor consultants provide supervision and support mentors with feedback. A professor in psychology from the university offers supervision to the mentors and the mentor consultants.

Key partners and colleagues

- Mentors
- Social workers
- Municipal employment consultants
- Police
- Private companies
- Educational institutions
- Psychiatric hospitals
- Psychologists (in specific cases, when needed)

Impact

- The results from the mentor-mentee-relations are very positive. Many mentees have turned away from radicalisation; they are in school or working.
- 24 individuals have been granted mentor support from 2011 until November 2016.
- Five mentorships are currently running.

Main challenges

- Allocation of sufficient resources
- To find and employ mentors with appropriate interpersonal skills
- To match mentors and mentees on personalities, personal chemistry and human competences
- To maintain the mentor-mentee relationships as a professional relationship (not a friendship)
- Mentor education

Key lessons and recommendations

- To have a strong theoretical base: In the Aarhus Model case, it is the theory of Life Psychology
- A clear framework and precise description for the mentor-mentee relationship is needed
- Mentors need to have strong, personal values and personal stamina
- Personal guidance is a strong tool in the deradicalisation process
- Costs can be kept low by payment by the hour
- Psychological supervision is essential to mentors and mentor consultants

Next step

The mentor education is continuously updated and adjusted.



Gothenburg, Sweden

Young East

Crime amongst young adults aged 15-24 is a growing problem in Gothenburg's East Gothenburg city district. The local council and community lack methods and tools to prevent and stop vulnerable young adults from engaging in criminal and anti-social activities, anti-social behaviour, street gangs and radicalisation.

Departement of Social Resources and Social Development, Gothenburg municipality

The project aims to develop a local partnership and platform between partners in the local community. It aims to set up a team of youth workers that can support young people at risk of engaging in criminal behaviour. Through prevention and support, the project aims to contribute to a long-term decline in youth crime in East Gothenburg, as well as contribute to a decline in the health, housing and institutional costs related to this group.

Most importantly, the project aims to support the social inclusion and independence of young people in East Gothenburg, by supporting them back to school or to the labour market.

The target group

Young people aged 15-24 who:

- Have a norm-violating and/or antisocial behaviour
- · Have difficulties dealing with or attending school
- Are gang-affiliated
- Are influenced by or have connections to violent extremist groups
- Risk being placed in care by the local authorities
- Are returning home after being cared for by local authorities

Collaboration

Young East is co-financed by the European Social Fund and is a partnership between the District Administration and Social Welfare Office, police, Job Centre and Emergency Services. With the support of transnational benchmarking, the project will adopt new tools and methods for crime prevention and support.

A team of six youth workers will focus on combining behavioural programmes with education and job support to motivate young people 15-24 years to move away from a criminal and/or negative lifestyle.

Key partners and colleagues On a local level:

- Private companies
- · Outreach team
- Local community actors
- Youth centres
- Local police
- Other actors on a municipal and national level

Transnational collaboration:

London boroughs (Hackney, Westminster and Newham).

Expected results:

- A new work method that combines behavioural programs with education and job support.
- A local partnership with the competence, mandate and ability to act proactively towards criminal and/or anti-social behaviour.

- The team of youth workers leads to a cut in costs regarding care and housing support for this group.
- That young people in East Gothenburg feel more included in society and are motivated to change their risky behaviour.

Main challenges

- An increase in gang violence, social unrest and structural violence.
- A growing number of young people from East Gothenburg have joined ISIS.
- A rise in costs related to placement of young people in care.
- Insufficient work methods and knowledge to support the target group.

Key lessons and recommendations

The project is just starting up, but the key lesson so far is the importance of creating a sound platform with key people in the right places in the cooperating organisations. Furthermore, be brave and have the courage to fail and later improve; Get to know the real needs and make an effort to get to the core of what is not working, on both an individual and structural level.

ExpertViews



Young people and CVE strategies

Preventing and countering all forms violent extremism requires a whole of society approach involving a broad array of actors operating in the public sphere - national governments, municipalities and civil society. Communities are the most important force in countering violent ideas and must be seen as an essential partner in creating stronger and safer societies.

By Sabine Barton and Kesley Bjornsgaard, Institute for Strategic Dialogue

When youth are discussed in CVE, they are typically framed in a binary way, as victims or perpetrators of violence. Successful CVE strategies must see youth as an invaluable resource in developing and delivering solutions to prevent and counter extremism.

Involving young people adds a credible voice and an invaluable insight into how to structure and communicate programs that appeal to youth and meet their needs. They can help bring an authenticity that may feel amiss in traditional top-down programmes and their involvement reflects a

city's willingness to include multiple stakeholders. By giving young people a stake in the process, it results in better engagement and offers unique opportunities to address and contain grievances that fuel extremism. Young people must be seen as part of the solution; policy makers and practitioners must facilitate their involvement as legitimate actors in building peace and challenging hate.

Young people are an invaluable asset; they just need to be given the skills and access to opportunities to influence change. The Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN) aims to do both. With over 1,000 members from more than 100 countries, YouthCAN is an international initiative to support young people in their efforts to prevent and counter hate speech and extremism and build peace. We work directly with young people all over the world, offering training, support and opportunities to help them challenge extremism and actively shape their communities.

This work has taught us some valuable lessons on engaging young people:

- Make your engagement meaningful, not just a gesture. It is important to treat young people with respect as a partner and make them feel heard.
- Young people are innovative and progressive:
 Policy makers must help youth gain a real stake in the process and show them they can make a difference in their community.
- Involve youth from the beginning in co-creating programmes and policies at a stage when their input can make a difference. This will help them feel valued and saves time down the line as all contingencies are considered from the very beginning.
- Work with diverse groups. While it is impossible
 to ensure all voices are heard at all times, make
 sure that those that can be represented are
 represented so that the process does not appear
 stigmatising or elitist.
- When you design programmes, focus on imparting practical skills and working toward tangible outcomes.

- Cooperate with multiple sectors to engage more actors and empower credible messengers.
- Take time to develop relationships and build trust through face-to-face interactions. Youth engagement must be seen as a long-term investment with sustainable resourcing.

Municipalities need support in designing, convening, facilitating and creating opportunities to include young people in their CVE efforts. The Strong Cities Network is made up of 95 cities from 40 countries and is well-positioned to support cities in answering the following key questions:

- How can cities strengthen relationships between youth and municipal service providers?
- How can cities go beyond engagement with local activists and reach youth most in need?
- How can cities leverage existing local structures such as schools, libraries, universities, youth centres and sports clubs in resilience-building and engaging young people in PVE/CVE?
- How can cities catalyse independent youth initiatives and campaigns?
- How can cities create safe spaces and arenas for interaction?

Together with the Strong Cities Network, Nordic Safe Cities intends to embark on a new project that will use the questions above as a basis for developing a new framework of how cities can best leverage youth engagement for resilience-building on the local level.



Chapter 6

Safe Communities



A safe city requires involvement, empowerment and motivation of as many community actors as possible for great solutions to be created. Civil society organisations and municipalities have different but equally important resources, and together they can create and secure safe cities. When a challenged individual or group is not reached via municipal efforts, community actors and civil society in general can play an important role.

Family, sport associations, faith communities, computer cafes, choral societies, theatre groups and homework groups etc. are visible role models that can show the value of groups and people being different and that trust is fundamental to a safe community. The approach cannot be static, but requires an on going, respectful and dynamic dialogue with expert resources on a local level. Safe communities are connected, interactive and foster friendships between people in the local neighbourhood.

Guiding principles

- Use existing infrastructure, arenas and systems to put radicalisation and violent extremism on the agenda
- Rethink your partnering. It is important to recognise that the partners involved can be varied and need to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. This may also involve reconsidering existing partnerships
- Engage early on. Implement the local strategy and ownership of the work in close cooperation with other relevant stakeholders
- Educate and inform first-line personnel to make them professionally capable of handling any given situation
- Use the national strategy as a support for the local strategy
- Evaluate the local strategy continuously
- Easy access. Ensure that city services are easy to reach and understand
- Faith communities guidelines
- In the planning phase, map religious institutional engagement to assess your area and determine who and what is around
- Evaluate the current state of cooperation with religious minority groups and institutions, assessing to what extent the engagement is working and where things need to be improved. The process must be inclusive and needs-based
- Establish equity-based partnerships to avoid the public sector coming across as controlling

City Cases



Stavanger, Norway

"Learn together - Act together"

Learning together and acting together provide reassurance and confidence both between the members and in one's own work – a feeling of not standing alone in handling these issues.

The municipality of stavanger

Radicalisation and violent extremism was addressed by the Norwegian government in a national action plan in 2014. Stavanger received economic resources to work with prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism on behalf of a regional coordination group consisting of the Stavanger, Sandnes, Randaberg, Sola, Time and Rennesøy municipalities, as well as the police.

The aim of the project "Learn together – act together", is for cities to be better prepared when dealing with foreign fighters - mainly from Syria, but also people who have travelled to war zones for other reasons and since returned to the region. It

does so by coordinating effort and by developing particular amongst selected key personnel in the participating municipalities.

The target group

Cities

Collaboration

The coordination group operates on a strategic level and consists of key personnel with different skills and competences. The group has gone through a case-based practice. The case was based on a real event and tools were developed within this framework.

The regional coordination group is responsible for implementing tools and expertise within their own organisations. Furthermore, the group members are commitment to helping one another if one of the municipalities needs assistance.

Municipalities participating in the coordination group have "action cards" that ensure that the municipality is prepared when handling an issue.

Key partners and colleagues

The group is engaged with partners based on their specific work on the field of radicalisation and violent extremism and other crime-preventive work, such as:

- Social services
- Intelligence agencies
- Dedicated prevention coordinators from the police and the municipalities
- Emergency response advisors
- Special advisors on diversity and integration
- The psychosocial crisis team
- The communication department

Impact

- The coordination group has been a good arena for learning, exchange of information and inspiration for the development of new ideas.
- Furthermore, participants experience that the group provides professional confidence - that are not alone in dealing with these situations.
- The work has resulted in satisfying results in the regional group and has received good feedback from the participants.
- The committing participants in the coordination group have been driving forces in putting this issue on the agenda throughout the district.

Main challenges

- Working with radicalisation and violent extremism requires many different disciplines from different sectors, making the coordination across participating municipalities one of the main challenges.
- The need for specialised expertise in radicalisation and violent extremism.
- Most municipalities are too small to have their own institutions to handle these issues.

Key lessons and recommendations

- Coordination and cooperation is essential.
- It is extremely important that roles and responsibilities are clear.
- Meetings, professional seminars, exercises and joint work cause closer interdisciplinary collaboration.
- Municipalities must have routines for handling situations where people have travelled with a presumed intention to participate in hostilities.
- Since municipalities vary in size and resources, we cannot expect all municipalities to have the same high level of necessary competence.

Next steps

- Because of less activity related to the target group than anticipated, the focus has changed to also include preventive work within all extremist groups, and not just foreign fighters.
 Both police and municipalities have verified the need for a regional coordination team with a high level of competence that is ready to assist smaller municipalities when facing radicalisation and violent extremism.
- Based on a need to increase knowledge and expertise on the preventive field of radicalisation and violent extremism on a local level, a new project started in September and is set to end in March 2017.

The project aims to create a model for gathering, categorising and evaluating information using a systematic approach. The result of this process will be a "knowledge and information base" in which the work, interventions, measures and decisions can be found. We also hope that this will contribute to building and strengthening our preventive measures and ensuring long-term sustainability for our work.

There are three tracks in the project thus far:

- 1. What do we already know? (research and guidelines)
- **2.** Description of the cities' preventive system (municipality, police, NGOs, etc.)
- **3.** Description of the community (including vulnerabilities, information about specific groups and persons at risk, etc.)

Bærum, Norway

Countering violent extremism by engaging the local community

Bærum municipality became aware of serious cases of Islamic radicalisation in 2013, when a few young people went to Syria. In the aftermath, the focus on radicalisation of young people developed locally as it did nationally and internationally.

Bærum municipality

The municipality put several measures into action. The main strategy was based on dialogue, knowledge and cooperation within the public institutions, as well as with the police and different volunteer and faith institutions. An action plan was made together with the local police.

In Bærum municipality, a key public institution turned out to be the family and activity house "Marie P". The house had for many years served as a vibrant activity centre for youth and as a meeting place for parents. In addition, many of the different immigrant organisations had their main offices within the same facilities. The municipality initiated a dialogue forum consisting of different organisations and faith institutions. Also, families and youth at risk were invited to perform individual talks. In collaboration with parents, guidelines for risk behaviour among youth, including when and whom to contact when worried, were put together in a booklet.

The target group

Families and youth showing risk behaviour.

Collaboration

The initiative took place in collaboration with organisations, faith institutions, the police, business community and research institutes.

Impact

- By engaging youth in telling stories from their lives as outsiders, we got a broader understanding of their lives.
- Statistics listing the number of young people returning from extremist organisations, working, being educated etc.

 Feedback from parents, immigrant organisations and regular evaluation sessions with the police, schools and social workers indicate that there is less tension in the area and that more people are integrated into local society.

Main challenges

- Reaching out to high-risk families/individuals.
- Being perceived as stigmatising and discriminating when approaching organisations or people.
- To get at full overview of the inhabitants and organisations in the municipality as is it growing and developing.

Key lessons and recommendations

- A dialogue forum is a good way to engage closely with the local community.
- Focus on already existing structures of cooperation and services before adding new ones
- Secure resources within the municipality to lead the work.
- Build networks to get fast access to people.
- It is important to have support both from executive and political leadership in the municipality, to sustain funding of resources and ensure long-term sustainability.

Next steps

- We continuously build relations to organisations and people, with a particular focus on youth.
- We are constantly developing our approach.
- We are currently in the process of developing a dialogue forum for youth.



Oslo

The SaLTo model

The work to fight hate crime and violent extremism in Oslo is organised in the collaborative SaLTo model, in which the City of Oslo and Oslo police district are the main players. The main objectives of SaLTo are reducing child and youth crime, reducing alcohol and drug abuse and coordinating crime-preventive work.

Oslo Police District, Oslo municipality

The City of Oslo is divided into 15 city districts; each city district has a local SaLTo coordinator and a local SaLTo action plan based on a central action programme.

- Oslo police district has a local contact person for radicalisation at each police station and one central coordinator.
- A wide-ranging, constructive dialogue involving other state agencies, organisations and the local communities is a vital prerequisite to ensure success.
- The Oslo action plan, 'Handlingsplan mot hatkriminalitet og voldelig ekstremisme i Oslo 2015-2018', provides direction for the work.

The target group

Children and young people.

Collaboration

SaLTo Contact Forum:

- The SaLTo Contact Forum for preventing violent extremism is a resource team that meets every month.
- The team is multi-agency-based with participants from the City of Oslo, Oslo Police District and other state agencies.
- The team contributes with coordination, developing efforts, sharing information and formulating the action plan.

Main challenges

- The multi-agency structure: Collaboration between different public agencies that are working under different jurisdictions and guidelines.
- Information-sharing issues: The need for effective communication across multiple agencies to ensure intervention at an early stage and, in serious cases, make sure that the right efforts have been implemented.
- Municipal preventive measures for the target group are based on voluntary participation and consent.
- There are limited measures we can initiate for persons at risk who do not want help. Building trust between the municipality's agencies and the civil society is the tool we can use.

 No dedicated positions on hate crime and violent extremism. The work against hate crime and violent extremism in the City of Oslo is organised in the general crime and drug preventing SaLTo model.

Impact

- Competence has gradually been built in all relevant sectors. Awareness of radicalisation processes, hate crime and violent extremism has been raised. First-line services as youth clubs and schools seek guidance to prevent radicalisation more than they did before.
- This is a complex field that needs broad collaboration between multiple agencies. This has given us new collaborative partners, which is positive.
- The civil society's awareness of the problems of marginalisation has risen.

Key lessons and recommendations

- There are few cases dealing with individuals.
- An established multi-agency structure is essential, in which we make use of the already implemented structure and where the collaborators and their competences are already known in the network.

Next steps

The action plan on hate crime and violent extremism will be updated in 2017.

Expert Views

Multi-level governance means every level of society

Violent extremism may take different shapes, vary in rhetoric and actions and pose different challenges to different functions of society – but the common denominator is the challenge violent extremism always poses to the democratic society.

By Anna Hedin Ekstrøm, Nationella samordnaren för att värna demokratin

Bring actors together

Since 2014, the National coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism has worked to bring actors together, coordinate work, make sure that knowledge is produced and spread to the ones who need it, produce guidelines for multi-level governance, support families and networks close to persons that are at risk of becoming active within a network or organization prone to violence and support structures for exit strategies.

Life takes place on the local level. This is where people live, grow up, meet and work. The core of cities needs to be understood and reflected upon on every other level of society – regional, national and international. Successful preventive work is anchored and carried out on the local level with the support from the state. A city needs to involve all aspects of society and facilitate civil society's contribution and participation in preventive work. Civil society often picks up signals of change, disturbance and annoyance before it reaches public officials. This is a channel that cannot be underestimated as a driver of change and engagement.

Structures for work and progress

The existing structures for safety and security usually give a profound platform to integrate the issue of violent extremism. Know your city. Produce an assessment of the situation in the area. Use it as a base for an action plan. Invent structures that work and build on them. Locate your partners, within the structures of the municipality and in the area. Know your partners, collaborate and be generous with information. The assessment and action plan increase in value when they are known and used by others. Work together with other cities, both in the immediate vicinity but also in other places. Share your experience. Violent extremism does not stop at any border, be it national or local.

The national level needs to support with coordination efforts. Invest in research and concrete knowledge that is easy accessible for practitioners, follow the development and make sure that all necessary actors are involved.

We need to acknowledge that violent extremism poses a threat to society - on a low-intensity scale on a daily basis in a municipality and on a large-scale if and when a terrorist attack strikes. There is no quick fix. Cooperation and coordination is crucial to make sure that the work to safeguard democracy is long-term.

Thanks to our contributors

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Magnus Randstorp, Quality Manager, Radicalization Awareness Network

Participants in Nordic Safe Cities activities 2016 - 2017

IntegrationCERTA Intelligence & SecurityCommittee for Knowledge and Culture in the Nordic RegionDanish National Security and Intelligence ServiceDet Kongelige Danske Kunstakademis Skoler for Arkitektur, Design og KonserveringEU Radicalisation Awareness Network CoEFyns PoliceHaugesund Red CrossInnovation NorwayInstitute for Strategic DialogueLarvik PoliceMiddlesex University, LondonMinistry of Culture, SwedenMinistry of Foreign Affairs, FinlandMinistry of Immigration and Integration, DenmarkMinistry of Justice, FinlandMinistry of the Interior, FinlandNational Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremismNordic Council of MinistersNordic Youth CouncilNordicyllands PoliceNämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund, SSTOslo Police DistrictRoskilde UniversitySkoleforvaltningen, DenmarkSSCATSSP, AalborgSSP, OdenseStavanger PoliceStockholm International Peace Research InstituteSwedish Agency for Youth and Civil SocietySwedish Association of Local and Regional Authoritie, SKLSwedish Association of Local Authorities and RegionsSwedish Defence and Research Agency, FOISwedish Defence UniversitySwedish Security ServicesSouth-West Police DistrictThe Media Council for Children and Youth, DenmarkUppsala University	Participating public institutions in Nordic Safe Cit	ies activities 2016-2017
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	Swedish Security Services	South-West Police District
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Participating cities/municipalities in Nordic Safe Cities activities 2016-2017				
Aalborg	Aarhus	Bergen		
Borlänge	Bærum	Copenhagen		
Fredrikstad	Gothenburg	Haugesund		
Helsingborg	Helsinki	Karlstad		
Kristiansand	Larvik	Linköping		
Malmö	Norrköping	Odense		
Oslo	Reykjavik	Skien		
Stavanger	Tampere	Vantaa		
Västerås				

Participating organisations in Nordic Safe Cities activities 2016-2017				
Action Aid	Dansk Ark	Facebook		
Faith Associates	Flamman Ungdomarnas Hus	Gehl Architects		
Global Utmaning	Haugesund Red Cross	Institute for Strategic Dialogue		
Minotenk, Minority Political Think Tank	Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers	Nordic Youth Council		
Order of the Teaspoon	politico.eu	Project Omelas		
Quilliam Foundation	SEIF, Selvhjelp for innvandrere og flyktninger	Spiritus Mundi		
Swedish Red Cross	The European Wergeland Centre	The Living History Forum		
The Pueblo Project	Viralgranskaren	Youthschool		

Nordic Safe Cities Light on life

The five Nordic Countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have announced a goal towards creating safe cities.

Democracy is deeply rooted in the Nordic countries. We respect fundamental human rights and freedom, and we see ourselves as open-minded, trustful and tolerant.

These are Nordic values shared by all Nordic countries and values worth protecting. We need to cast light on the positive values and uphold them through ensuring safe societies where we do not have to fear fellow citizens.

The Nordic safe Cities network is cooperation across the Nordic borders. Nordic Safe Cities is working to ensure safe, trustful and tolerant cities for all and actively prevent radicalisation and violent extremism.

All Nordic cities are invited to become a Nordic Safe City and to take part of the journey towards safety together.

The guide identifies six central ambitions that the Nordic countries face when creating safe cities. Other countries seeking to transform their cities to safe cities should take note.

Safe Urban Spaces, Create a city open for everyone everywhere.

Safe Online Sphere, Promote an online sphere with an e-safety culture and safe online communities.

Strong Families, Act with families to safeguard children.

Safe Public Institutions, Strengthen public institutions to safeguard through inclusive policies and initiatives.

Strong Youth Engagement, Empower the voices of youth.

Safe communities, Create safe and resilient local communities and foster friendships between people in the local neighborhood.



